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INTRODUCTION
Corporate law governs the operation of business organizations in a
given state or country. Generally, it is conceived of as being a
combination of permissive mechanisms designed to lower transaction
costs for varied economic players and regulating mechanisms intended
to smooth out embedded structural flaws. While the distinctions among
the corporate laws of the various U.S. states have usually been explained
on the basis of competition among the states,1 the distinctions among the
corporate laws (and especially the corporate governance structures and
corporate finance patterns) of different countries have been explained on
the basis of the existence of myriad exogenous conditions, such as
market mechanisms, ownership structures, historical legal origins, and
quality of enforcement.2 Out of this latter sort of explanation, there has
* Associate, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP; J.S.D., Yale Law School,
2004; LL.M., Yale Law School, 2001; LL.B./MBA, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
1998. This paper is largely based on a doctoral thesis entitled "Looking at Corporate
Law through a Political Theory Lens - The New Israeli Corporate Law as a Case
Study" (Feb. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law School
Library). I am deeply indebted to Roberta Romano for her enduring support and
guidance as well as to Henry Hansmann and Alan Schwartz for their valuable advice. I
would also like to thank Aviva Diamant for her insightful comments. Further, I wish to
express my gratitude to Shuki Abramovich, Michal Agmon-Gonen, Aharon Barak,
Amihud Ben-Porat, Sam Bronfeld, Joseph H. Gross, Reuven Y. Hazan, Meir Het,
Menachem Hofnung, Davida Lahman-Messer, Dan Meridor, Arie Mientkavich, Michel
Ohayon, Uriel Procaccia, Eran Rosman, Eliezer Sandberg, Amir Sharf, Zeev Sher, Ruth
Shikler, Nathan Shilo, Gad Soen, Eyal Sulgenik, Shimon Wise and Omri Yadlin, who
shared with me their experience and knowledge regarding the process that led to the
enactment of the new Israeli Companies Law. Finally, I thank Kobi Abramov of the
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, Amir Bachar of Bank Israel, Rivka Marcus of the Knesset
Archive, Yigal Mersel of the Supreme Court of Israel and Shelly Udvin-Aharoni of the
Israel Securities Authority for granting me access to the formal records of the legislative
process of the new Companies Law and current economic data.
1. For the different views regarding the efficiency of that competition, see
William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflection upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J
663 (1974); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDOZO L. REv. 709 (1987). For cross-sectional empirical study of the effect of state
law on firm value see Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J.
FIN. ECON. 525 (2001).
2. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
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arisen a lively debate in recent years with respect to the possibility, or
even the likelihood, of convergence of corporate codes toward a
common standard.3 And yet, this rich scholarship has thus far paid little
heed to the way in which political factors impact corporate law
legislation.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by providing its reader with a
new and different outlook on the substance and structure of corporate
law. It does so by examining the political history that accompanied the
recent enactment of a new Israeli corporate law and placing this history
in a firm framework of political theory. By tracing this law as its case
study, the paper is able to trace the influence of interest groups on
different stages of the legislative process and assess the implications of
this particular instance for corporate law in general. As we explore the
political history of the new law, we are also given some fascinating
insights into the production process of corporate law and the complex
relationship between theory and practice. Political theory will be the
whetstone that we use to sharpen our understanding of this relationship.
Given that major mechanisms within the new Israeli law have been
built upon common law arrangements and heavily influenced by
American doctrines, 4 our exploration is sure to shed valuable light on the
Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance,
106 J. POLITICAL ECONOMY 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance];
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Working Paper Series (2000)
[hereinafter La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance]; Jonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A
Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV.
73 (1995).
3. For the conflicting opinions, compare Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 2, with
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) and Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward a Single
Model of Corporate Law? in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERSITY (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds. 2002). For an intermediate position see
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1999) [hereinafter
Coffee, The Future as History]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership:
The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE
L.J. 1 (2001).
4. These mechanisms include, inter alia, board structure that includes outside
directors, fiduciary duties (duty of loyalty and duty of care) and their enforcement
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study of both Israeli and American corporate law, as it traces the
interrelationships between interest groups and legal outcomes and
assesses the suitability, or lack thereof, of specific legal regimes to
distinctive market realities.
The new Israeli Companies Law came into force in February 2000.'
It replaced the Companies Ordinance which had largely been based on
the English Act of 1929 but which had since been reformed several
times. 6 The legislative process that gave birth to the new law lasted for
eighteen years and grounded itself on a proposal prepared by Professor
Uriel Procaccia of the Law Faculty of the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem.7 This proposal was then slowly shaped into a bill by a public
committee chaired by Supreme Court Justice, and later Chief Justice,
Aharon Barak. s After the bill gained the preliminary approval of the
Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, it was referred to a parliamentary
committee that formulated the law's final version.9 This paper argues
that this unique legislative process facilitates examination of the impact
that interest-group involvement has on the legislative process.
This paper's analysis of the legislative process that produced the
new Israeli corporate law has generated two main findings. First, the
interest groups that participated in the enactment of the Israeli
Companies Law differed from those involved in the formulation of
American corporate codes. The Bar, which is the driving force behind
corporate law legislation in the United States, was far less dominant in
the Israeli context.10  And yet, the Israel Securities Authority, the
equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in this
case was highly involved in the process." One explanation of these
through derivative and class actions, and proxy voting.
5. See The Companies Law, 1999, S.C. 204 [hereinafter the Companies Law,
1999].
6. See Appendix A infra for main amendments in the Israeli corporate law and the
legislative process of the Companies Law, 1999.
7. See URIEL PROCACCIA, A NEW CORPORATE LAW FOR ISRAEL (1989); Uriel
Procaccia, Crafting a Corporate Code from Scratch, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 629 (1996).
8. See THE COMMITTEE FOR THE LEGISLATION OF A NEW COMPANIES LAW, A
REPORT (1994) [hereinafter BARAK COMMITTEE REPORT].
9. See THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, THE SETTING UP OF A
SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THE COMPANIES LAW (Dec. 13, 1995).
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. Id.
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distinctions arises out of the different sets of incentives driving these
groups, another, out of the differing political structures of the two
countries.
The second of this paper's two main findings is that the
modifications in legal arrangements, which happened during all the
various stages of the legislative process of the new law, followed
distinctive patterns. The changes made during the deliberations of the
Barak Committee, for instance, were characterized by a shift from
bright-line rules to standards and from enabling provisions to mandatory
ones. In the course of the parliamentary discussions, on the other hand,
many of the mandatory provisions were mitigated or otherwise
reshaped. 12 Indeed, this last trend continued to the post-enactment
refinements.' 3 It is the contention of this paper that the involvement of
various interest groups in the different stages of the lawmaking, and the
dynamics among them, played no small part in shaping the variously
distinctive patterns of legislation just mentioned.
The paper's findings have wide implications for both political
theory and corporate law. Among others, they illustrate how various
concepts of political theory play out within the sphere of corporate law
legislation, such as the role played by the media and public opinion in
constraining interest groups, the effect of legislators' personal ideologies
on legislative outcomes, and the use of public interest rhetoric to
advance private interests. Moreover, evidence regarding the
involvement of interest groups in the various stages of the legislative
process and the effect of this involvement on the end product has serious
normative implications for corporate law. Specifically, political theory
predicts that a legal arrangement arrived at as the result of an arm's
length struggle among interest groups will be less susceptible to the
disproportionate influence of one interest group at the expense of other
groups or the public.' 4 Thus, a thorough examination of the involvement
of interest groups in the legislative process can provide us with a
benchmark against which we can strive to assess the efficiency of the
resulting legal outcome; arrangements that reflect the interests of a wide
range of groups may be considered as normatively more desirable than
those that reflect merely the special pleading of one narrow interest.
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part I.A.
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It is the ultimate aim of this paper to show that distinctive market
and political realities affect both the chance of constructing successful
legislation and the efficacy of the resulting legal arrangements. It may
indeed be the case, as so many American legal scholars have suggested,
that vigorous competition is the ultimate generator of shareholder
wealth, in that it constrains the power wielded by interest groups. This
paper proposes, however, that in the absence of such competition, a
more regulated market represents the second-best way of reaching this
goal.
The rest of this paper is comprised of four parts: Part I furnishes the
reader with an overview of the political theory of legislation and its
applications to corporate law, and outlines the political factors that affect
corporate law legislation. The two ensuing parts present the case study
of the new Israeli corporate law. Part II describes Israel's economic
background, traces the political processes that accompanied the
enactment of the new law, and depicts the participation patterns and
relative strengths of relevant interest groups. Building upon these
findings, Part III explores the new law's contents, with special attention
being paid to the main modifications that were made during the
legislative process, analyzes the impacts that the various interest groups
have had on different segments of the legislation, and places the new
Israeli corporate law within a political theory framework. Part IV offers
some concluding remarks and policy recommendations.
I. THE POLITICAL THEORY OF LEGISLATION: OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION
Several contemporary political theories strive to explain political
behavior in economic terms. These theories are generally referred to as
"public choice theory." Public choice theory has been defined as the
economic study of non-market decision-making.15 With its basic notion
being that political outcomes are best understood as a function of self-
interested individual behaviors, 16 the idea here is that political actors,
much like the classic economic actors, are rational, utility-maximizing
players moving through a collective action market in pursuit of their
15. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 1-2 (Rev. ed. 1989) (1979).
16. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 3-11, 27-28
(1957); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 17-23, 31-39 (1962).
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own private interests rather than public ones. 7 Formal models derived
from this concept have been applied to such issues as voting processes,
governmental performance, legislation, and the behavior of bureaucratic
agencies. These models have found favor among legal thinkers most
notably by bringing the judiciary into the mix.' 8
A. Interest Group Theory
One of the aspects of public choice that is most pertinent to the
subject matter of this paper is interest-group theory. This theory focuses
on the organization of groups, as opposed to individuals, and their
relative advantage in gaining political influence.' 9 It drops the naive
concept of pluralism - that the practice of political grouping allows a
society's majority interests to gain proportional representation - in favor
of the more realistic notion of the disproportionate influence of interest
groups on the political process.20 In its economic version, often referred
to as the economic theory of legislation, interest-group theory analyzes
the aptitude of special interest groups to use the state for their own
purposes under the supposition that all relevant actors act rationally from
a political point of view.21  According to the theory, the lawmaking
process is a product that abides by the laws of supply and demand. 22 It
17. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 11 (1997).
18. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.
802, 811-832 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword:
The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-18, 42-58 (1984)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System]; William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 875 (1975); Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of
Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982).
19. The seminal work regarding the factors affecting interest group formation is
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971) (1965).
20. For the different conceptions of representative democracy, see Daniel A. Farber
& Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 875-79
(1987).
21. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 1 (1971). Though originally applied to economic regulation, the theory's
implications extend to different fields of legislation, and this is the way it will be treated
here. For the specific implication of the theory for the issue of delegation, see infra Part
III.B.4.
22. For the development of the economic theory of legislation and its evaluation,
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is controlled by competing political forces, which tend to advance the
interests of certain groups in society rather than the well being of the
public at large. 23 "In short, legislation is 'sold' by the legislature and
'bought' by the beneficiaries of the legislation.,
24
On the empirical front, the Schlozman and Tierney study in the
1980s remains the most extensive of organized politics.25  Through a
systematic examination of that decade's interest-group involvement in
U.S. federal-level politics, the researchers were able to transform the
rather stiff theoretical models into a more pliable analysis of the actual
circumstances under which interest groups can be expected to influence
the legislature effectively. Their conclusions were as follows. 26 First,
interest groups are likely to affect legislative outcomes when the issue at
hand is neither on the public agenda (highly visible to the public and/or
the media) nor at odds with party lines or specific constituency needs.
Second, lobbying that opposes legislation is more likely to succeed than
is lobbying that supports legislation and seeks to alter the status quo. 7
Third, interest-group pressures tend to show up more in narrow, specific,
and technical amendments than in the overarching construct of an entire
piece of legislation. Fourth, interest groups are more likely to be
effective when they do not encounter opposition, as in the case where a
policy's costs or its benefits (but not both) are diffuse, or where there
exists no policy entrepreneur or other group that stands in a close
see Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
Sci. 335 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 18, at 265-68; Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227-33 (1986).
24. Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 877. Throughout this work I would adopt
this definition of supply and demand, that is, the legislature as supplier and interest
groups as demanders of legislation. For a different approach that views the supply curve
of legislation as an inverse demand curve, and politicians as brokers that pair
demanders and suppliers of legislation, see Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and
Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 341-44 (1988); ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D.
TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
INTEREST-GRouP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 15-27 (198 1).
25. See KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986).
26. Id. at 314-17.
27. This is due to the institutional patterns of the American political process.
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relationship to the relevant policymaker, be the latter an administrative
agency or a member of a legislature. Fifth, and finally, the influence of
interest groups is inevitably enhanced when they have an abundance of
resources to draw upon and when they are able to work closely with
such institutional coalitions as congressional caucuses. Schlozman and
Tierney's all-encompassing suggestion is that although our instinct is
right and pressure politics do indeed tend to benefit affluent minorities,
nonetheless, even the broader, relatively disadvantaged public is still
able to affect policy making through direct and indirect representation,
electoral and social movements, and the initiatives set forth by public
officials.28
In an effort to reconcile the economic theory of legislation with
both the rhetoric and the factual evidence of public interest legislation,
Levine and Forrence have developed a model which they believe allows
one to predict the outcome of a political process.2 9 Drawing on political
analysis and on information and agency theory, they advance the general
hypothesis that slack (i.e., policy discretion on the part of the regulator
caused by the principal-agent relationship between voters and
representatives) tends to impede general-interest regulation.30  Such
slack can be reduced via different means, such as incumbent self-
publicity; political competition; organizations, such as trade associations
or single-issue organizations, which can raise public awareness of
issues; those scholars who constitute the public-policy intelligentsia; and
the news media.3' Ultimately, however, if any piece of general-interest
regulation is to prevail, the issue it addresses has to be placed on the
public agenda.32
Despite the seeming crudeness of Levine and Forrence's model, it
does in fact serve to sharpen interest-group theory in three important
28. See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 25, at 398-403.
29. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990)
(Special Issue).
30. Id. at 176-82 (asserting that slack allows a regulator to function without being
perfectly observed by the polity, thereby encouraging it to adopt policies that are
designed either to maximize its own private utility or to further its own conception of
the public good).
31. Id. at 183-89 (discussing in turn the measures regulators have enacted
protectively and proactively to reduce the effects of slack).
32. Id. at 191-94 (demonstrating that placing an issue on the public agenda
dramatically reduces information costs, which in turn drastically reduces slack).
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respects. First, it suggests that most of the public interest rhetoric
mouthed by legislators simply represents their attempt to economize
monitoring costs by drumming up public support.33  Second, it
distinguishes between two forms of ideological policy adopted by the
regulator: one, the "general-interest policies," would be ratified by the
public in keeping with accepted aggregation principles in the absence of
information, organization, transaction, and monitoring costs; another,
the "Burkean policies," are merely a form of ideological consumption by
legislators - other-regarding acts that will not garner general support.34
Third and last, Levine and Forrence's model makes it clear that a
general-interest policy - a policy ratified by an informed public, absent
monitoring costs - does not necessarily result in an efficient outcome,
nor is it otherwise normatively warranted.35
Before we turn to a discussion of the various applications of
interest-group theory to corporate law, a general caveat is in place. The
focus of public choice on the rationality of the political actors does not
necessarily imply that ideology, morality, and the public interest exert
little or no force as motivators of individual and collective action. To
the contrary, it is precisely those factors that have served as benchmarks
for all those trying to assess the validity of interest-group theory.36 It is
the treatment of individuals as rationally self-interested that facilitates
33. Id. at 180; cf Posner, supra note 22, at 355 (examining the application of the
economic theory of fraud to the public interest rhetoric).
34. See Levine, supra note 29, at 176-82. Burkean policies include policies that the
public would ratify if it knew about them, as well as policies that the public would not
support but that the regulator nevertheless believes the public ought to support.
35. Id. at 178; see also Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 59 (1991) (arguing that "majoritarian
baselines are normatively unattractive because they do not account for the varying
intensity of individual preferences"); Posner, supra note 18, at 266 ("The properties that
make legislative redistributions feasible have nothing to do with the public interest,
whether defined in efficiency or equity terms.").
36. Compare Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 890-901 (criticizing economic
models of legislation for rejecting ideology as a significant factor in the political
process) and DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, 21-33
(1991) (same) with Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and
Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV.
993, 996-1002 (1988) (using the law of demand to argue that the importance of public
interest and ideological commitment in political decision-making is consistent with the
self-interest postulate of public choice) and Tollison, supra note 24, at 352-53.
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the notion that the processes of political decision-making are not
primarily or exclusively driven by an amorphous altruism.
It also needed to be noted, in this context, that even the most
enthusiastic scholars working in this area have conceded that the
salience of their work is to be found not so much in its irrevocability or
in its compatibility with reality as in the openness of thought it evokes.3"
Moreover, current legal work asserts that the most important merit of
public choice is that it demonstrates the significance of institutions in
determining political outcomes, 38 which leads to my aim in applying
public choice to corporate law. My intention is to provide a new outlook
on the process of corporate legislation by delineating certain attributes of
political theory that tend to affect it. It is by no means my intention to
take an uncompromising, purely public choice based stand that rudely
elbows aside all of the best and most traditional justifications for
corporate legislation.
B. Applications to Corporate Law
When one looks at the matter from the perspective of economic
theory, the same notions that underlie interest-group theory are at the
core of modem corporate law; namely, self-interested actors, collective
action problems, and slack, which is the result of agency relationships.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the Berle-Means sort of
37. See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral?
The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179, 180 (1988) ("[T]he more
appropriate use of the homo economicus construction is to further the normative
exercise of investigating the incentive structures embodied in various institutional forms
rather than the descriptive exercise of providing predictions as to the likely outcomes of
political interactions."(citation omitted)); Tollison, supra note 24, at 368 (concluding
that an economic theory of legislation "is by no means the only approach to legislatures,
but it is provocative to think of the legislature as an institution guided by private
interest"); Posner, supra note 18, at 269 (concluding that "the public interest and
interest group theories are, at least in some mixture, complementary rather than
antagonistic").
38. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-
Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REv. 647, 663-70 (1997) (reviewing
MAXWELL STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY
(1997)); Maxwell L. Steams, Restoring Positive Law and Economics: Introduction to
Public Choice Theme Issue, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 709, 722-25 (1998). Professors
Skeel and Maxwell refer to this comparative institutional analysis as "the second wave
of public-choice-influenced legal scholarship."
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dispersed-ownership corporation is subject to the agency costs that arise
out of the inherent conflict of interests between shareholders and
managers.39 After one has postulated a self-interested legislature and
reminded oneself that ultimately the goal of corporate law legislation is
the maximization of shareholder wealth, 40 however, the question that
emerges as most essential is this: how (and to what extent) is a
legislature able to resist its inclination to benefit managers and/or other
interest groups at the expense of dispersed shareholders?
Several studies have used interest-group models to explain
corporate law legislation, identify the groups that could benefit from
such legislation, and describe the interrelationships between those
groups. The common denominator linking these economic models is
their vision of corporate law legislation as arising out of the competition
among interest groups. While the pertinent interest groups in this
context can be depicted by and large as such classic corporate players as
managers, shareholders and creditors, a closer look brings a more
complex picture into view.
To begin, both the attributes of a specific group and its ability to
influence the political process depend upon its identity, its cohesion, and
39. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REv 469, 479-80 (1987) (noting that
"in publicly held firms, the benefits of monitoring, bonding, and contracting [on the part
of managers and shareholders] will be spread among the shareholding population pro
rata, but the costs will be concentrated upon whichever shareholder takes it upon
herself to attempt to control the managers").
40. For a different approach for the corporate purpose, see FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
67-70 (1991) (describing relational-oriented models that undermine the basic
assumption of the economic approach to corporate law, according to which
shareholders, as residual equity claimants, are the best risk bearers among the corporate
constituencies and therefore the best monitors of management). For the reconcilement
of this approach with a contrarian one, see Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate
Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984) (concluding that transaction cost economics
results in regarding the board of directors principally as a governance instrument of the
shareholders); Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium: Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims:
Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266 (1999) (arguing that the nexus-of-contract paradigm includes
the shareholder-primacy paradigm, but does not necessarily lead to the same comer
solution).
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its size.41 Thus, there must be room within the rubric "managers" for
high-ranked professional employees, entrepreneurs, and control holders;
within "shareholders" for entrepreneurs, individual control holders,
families, institutional investors (e.g., mutual and pension funds),
financial institutions (e.g., investment banks and insurance companies),
speculators, and widely dispersed small shareholders; and, within
"creditors" for financial institutions (e.g., commercial banks that may or
may not be separated from investment banks), institutional investors,
and other debt holders. The second point is that, in addition to
managers, shareholders, and creditors, other groups may very well have
some impact. Three in particular come to mind: regulatory agencies,
42
workers, and such business-service providers as lawyers, accountants,
exchanges, and other financial intermediaries. In this regard, one also
sees how the relevant interests and coalitions are likely to continually
realign themselves around the ever-shifting issues, with the most basic
example of this being the way the interest of managers and shareholders
will collide in some cases and coincide in others. Then too, coalitions
between managers and shareholders may well hinge not just on their
own interrelation but also on their dealings with other groups, such as
creditors and lower-level employees.
Whether it be groups that supply corporate services, groups that
constitute the corporate entity, or groups that are affected by corporate
activities, one thing is certain: all are dependent upon and passionately
interested in any legislative outcome that will impinge, however
remotely, upon their functioning. To put the matter differently, all
relevant interest groups are consumers of the legislative process who
exploit comparative advantage in pursuit of self-interest. Given that
reality, one better appreciates the need to examine some of the more
prominent of the interest-group schemes offered by the literature before
one glibly attempts to apply interest-group theory to corporate law
legislation.
For more than a decade, corporate legal scholars have been delving
41. See OLSON, supra note 19; MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES, 17-20 (1982).
See also, MUELLER, supra note 15, at 307-19.
42. On the political role of regulatory agencies, see Jonathan R. Macey & David D.
Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: the Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. OF
ILL. L. REv. 315 (1985); Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative
Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997).
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into the political history of specific laws, trying to assess the impact of
political determinants on outcomes and evaluating the prospects for
reform.43 Specifically, the analysis of political history has been used for
the study of corporate finance; state takeover laws and the Williams Act;
corporate political speech; bankruptcy law; corporate two-tier taxation;
and securities, derivatives, and international financial regulation. 4  In
most cases, such analysis has been conducted by examining voting
patterns, the testimony provided at congressional hearings, and other
legislative materials. In some cases, it has also involved inquiry into
such aspects of congressional bills as content, amount, sponsorship and
connection to a specific market activity, and the gathering of empirical
evidence on public opinion. 45 And yet, probably due to the longstanding
existence of American corporate codes, such studies have not provided
us with any evaluation of the legislative process of corporate law as a
whole. Rather, they have served to illuminate various substantive
aspects of the law.
Legal scholars have also turned to economic models in their attempt
to ascertain a more general pattern of corporate law legislation.
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have, for instance, depicted the
Delaware system of corporate law as being a de facto political
equilibrium arrived at via the struggle between the Delaware Bar, on the
one hand, and the various interest groups seeking to expand that state's
43. See infra note 44.
44. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS
OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A
Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995); Enrico Colombatto
& Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation
and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925 (1996); Mary E. Kostel,
A Public Choice Perspective on the Debate over Federal versus State Corporate Law,
79 VA. L. REV. 2129 (1993); Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities
Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001); Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47 (1997); Roberta Romano, The
Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457
(1988) [hereinafter Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers]; Romano, supra note 42;
Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition
for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1128-38 (2002).
45. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 44, at 333-35; Romano, The Future of Hostile
Takeovers, supra note 44, at 470-503; Romano, supra note 42, at 297-300.
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treasury, on the other.46 These authors also have postulated, within the
context of the competition for corporate chartering among the states and
the question of its efficiency, that "Delaware's dominance in the
corporate chartering market stems from the fact that its substantive law
rules benefit those ultimately responsible for the incorporation
decision" 47 - namely, shareholders, managers, attorneys, and investment
bankers - and that this dominant position is maintained through
Delaware's credible commitment to keeping its corporate law highly
attractive to corporate managers in the future.48  The authors' main
argument is that the premium created by Delaware's market power is
exploited by the various interest groups operating within the state, and
that the Delaware Bar reaps a disproportionate share of this bounty.49
Three aspects of Macey and Miller's theory stand out as most
salient. First, although the authors criticize both the race-to-the-bottom
and the race-to-the-top approaches to corporate law, they nonetheless
presuppose that corporate law legislation in the United States, although
not optimal, is still efficient.5" This assumption is implicitly grounded in
the notion that interstate competition for corporate charters benefits
shareholders. 51 This notion is, in turn, predicated on the belief that
46. See Macey & Miller, supra note 39. For a similar interest group model
explaining the SEC action with regard to American national market system, see Macey
& Haddock, supra note 42.
47. Macey & Miller, supra note 39, at 487.
48. See Macey & Miller, supra note 39, at 484-91; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 37-44 (1993); cf Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy:
The Final Ingredient in an Interest Groups Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 85 (1990) (contending that Delaware's continued primacy is the result of the
balancing among different interest group, including one that was neglected by Macey
and Miller, namely, the shareholder's or plaintiffs counsels); William W. Bratton,
Fiduciary Duty, Limited Liability, and the Law of Delaware: Delaware Law as Applied
Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary and the Basic Course After Twenty-Five Years, 34 GA.
L. REv. 447 (2000) (developing a multiple demand model of Delaware regulatory
capture to explain its tilt toward management, while acknowledging the threat of federal
intervention and the role of the judiciary in constraining this tilt and protecting
shareholder interest, at least to some extent).
49. See Macey & Miller, supra note 39, at 491-509. See also David A. Skeel, Jr.,
The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 127, 156-62 (1997)
(suggesting that the unanimity on the Delaware Supreme Court is meant, among others,
to benefit Delaware's lawyers).
50. See Macey & Miller, supra note 39, at 479-83.
51. For empirical support of this premise, see Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:
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agency problems are mitigated, and shareholder wealth enhanced, by a
combination of efficient markets and enabling and flexible legal
provisions.52 Anyone seeking to assess the impact of political influence
on corporate law legislation must take into account the vital role played
by these assumptions. In this regard, it should be noted that some
doubts have been raised recently as to the degree and even the mere
existence of state competition for corporate charters in the United
States,53 and yet even this scholarship concedes that Delaware's
dominance in the incorporation market is not entirely unchallengeable,
given the constraints imposed on it by weak state competition and the
threat of federal intervention. 4
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 265-73 (1985);
Daines, supra note 1. For an overview of the empirical literature, see Roberta Romano,
The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 387, 494-507 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, The Need for Competition]
("[a]dvocat[ing] opening up international securities regulation to greater regulatory
competition than the scant competition that exists at the present").
52. See Macey & Miller, supra note 39, at 484-85; ROMANO, supra note 48, at 14-
16.
53. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L. J. 553
(2002) (arguing that there exists no active competition among states for corporate
charters and that Delaware's dominance is much stronger than has been previously
recognized); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for
Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1212-14 (2001) [hereinafter Kahan &
Kamar, Price Discrimination] (discussing the sources of Delaware's market power and
noting that other U.S. states and foreign countries have failed to compete with Delaware
in the market for incorporations); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State
Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002) (hereinafter Kahan &
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition] (showing that "[o]ther than Delaware, no state
is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations of public companies"). But see
Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 51, at 507-13 (contending that other
states but Delaware engage in "defensive" competition, i.e., aim at refraining local
corporations from reincorporating in Delaware).
54. See Kahan & Kamar, The Myth of State Competition, supra note 53, at 739-43;
Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 53, at 586, 604-05. At the risk of being accused of
over-cynicism, one might suspect that the assessments of the efficacy and the strength
of the above mentioned constraints are derived from the writers' presupposition
regarding the warranty of federal intervention in corporate law, rather than the other
way around. Cf Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005)
("Views on whether more federal action is wise depend not only on which outcome the
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The second of Macey and Miller's valuable points emerges out of
their discussion of Delaware's credible commitment to keeping its
corporate law manager-friendly. They note that since the physical assets
of most large Delaware corporations are located in other states, other
groups that are likely to have an interest in those assets, such as unions,
environmental groups, and local communities, are absent from the
political scene.55 When, however, corporate assets are located in the
jurisdiction within which the corporation has been incorporated, as holds
true of national unitary corporate codes and of the corporate laws of
other U.S. states for that matter,56 the pressures extended by the
aforementioned groups will very much need to be taken into account.
Third, and finally, the authors illustrate how greatly legislative
outcomes are impacted by interest groups' access to political institutions
and such attributes of interest groups as size, stakes in the matter, and
organizational ability.57 When one peruses another piece penned by
Geoffrey Miller, one sees how this approach has general applicability to
speaker prefers, but also depend on which outcome the speaker anticipates from
Washington.").
55. Macey & Miller, supra note 39, at 490. See also Romano, The Need for
Competition, supra note 51, at 529-39 (asserting that Delaware's unique political
dynamics is one of the reasons for its relatively mild takeover statute and therefore for
its superiority over other states or national legislative output); Sitkoff, supra note 44, at
1139-52 (mentioning this unique political environment as the reason for Delaware's
"reduced likelihood of political rent extraction regarding corporate law," that in turn
espouses Delaware's credible commitment towards its corporation). But see Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1505-07 (1992) (claiming that
the presence of other interest groups but managers and shareholders in the federal arena
would likely to result in the adoption of more socially desirable corporate rules).
56. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 53, at 564-72 (evidencing a significant
"home-state bias", i.e., in-state incorporation pattern, among public companies that
incorporate outside of Delaware. Specifically, they found that while 58% of all public
companies are incorporated in Delaware, 33% are incorporated in their home state).
57. Id. at 498-509. See also Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy
of Corporate Governance, CSEF Working Paper No. 29 (1999) (analyzing the principal
relations between investor protection and employment protection as a function of
political agreements among entrepreneurs, outside investors, and workers); Raghuram
G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial
Development in the 20th Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003) (Tuck Special Issue)
(attributing time series variations in financial development across countries to the
incentives and ability of domestic incumbent industrialists and financiers to oppose
development).
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the political theory of corporate law. In that piece, Miller shows how
the differing approaches to federalism in the United States and in
England can result in very dissimilar regulations of takeovers and of
shareholders' derivative litigation, owning to the differences in the
political influences exerted, in each of these countries, by the local bar
and/or such interest groups as potential targets and bidders.58
William Carney has extended the model offered by Macey and
Miller in an attempt to trace the corporate law legislative patterns of
other U.S. states beyond just Delaware.5 9 Carney's model postulates
jurisdictional competition among the chartering states, which possess
differing degrees of market power. The corollary here is that, "larger
states, less dependent on chartering revenues and with more local
interest groups likely to benefit from corporate laws, will adopt more
rent-seeking provisions,, 60 since they face lower elasticity of demand for
a cost-minimizing corporate law and higher elasticity of demand for the
private benefits likely to be derived from the legislation.61 Carney's
more specific assertion is that the development of corporate law in U.S.
states other than Delaware has been initiated by local corporate lawyers
and corporate managers, with each of these seeking to extract rents
through the modification of state corporation laws.62 Marcel Kahan and
Ehud Kamar make essentially the same point by surmising that state
58. See Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some
Points of Contrast between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
51 (1998); Cf ROMANO, supra note 48, at 28-31 (asserting that the relationship between
the bar and the legislature and the judiciary can affect, at least marginally, the legal
outcome).
59. See William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate
Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997) [hereinafter Carney, Political Economy];
William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 715 (1998)
[hereinafter Carney, The Production of Corporate Law].
60. Carney, Political Economy, supra note 59, at 305-06. Rent-seeking is the
extraction of economic rents beyond those available in market transactions. See id. at
305.
61. See id. at 307-09.
62. See Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, supra note 59, at 717-28
(analyzing the benefits and collective action problems associated with each of those
groups and noting the limited role of other interest groups such as shareholders,
employees, customers, suppliers, and local governments in shaping corporate law in the
United States). See also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 53' at 606-07 (reaching the
same conclusion under the assumption of weak competition).
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lawmakers tend to create corporate laws that align with their own
political interests rather than conduce to efficiency ends.63
Carney acknowledges, however, that competition in the capital and
the chartering markets does constrain rent-seeking; he cites the vital role
played by the common markets in limiting the power of interest
groups.64 Accordingly, he argues that substantial benefits to interest
groups are to be expected in countries that employ tariff barriers to
evade product market competition and are able to stave off jurisdictional
competition by barring the egress of local firms. 65 His analysis of the
differences between American and European corporate law lead Carney
to conclude that the conspicuously more regulated European corporate
law has come about through the participation of interest groups -
creditors, managers, and employees - in the lawmaking process of the
European Community's company law directives.66
Finally, Mark Roe has recently revisited the role of Delaware in
shaping American corporate law, focusing on the public choice structure
of the relationship between Delaware and the federal government. 67 His
argument is that Delaware corporate law, which is designed to benefit its
primary interest groups, shareholders and managers, is constrained by
the threat of federal action that may "bring to the table players who are
cut out in Delaware.,
68
Roe's analysis emphasizes the importance of competition, albeit not
63. See Kahan & Kamar, The Myth of State Competition, supra note 53, at 727-38.
But see Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 53' at 584-85 (noting that the political
explanation offered by Kahan & Kamar regarding the disincentives of states to attract
corporation, while convincing with respect to large states, does not fully explain the
behavior of small states).
64. See Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, supra note 59, at 726-28, 754-
55; Carney, Political Economy, supra note 59, at 311-18. See also Kahan & Kamar, The
Myth of State Competition, supra note 53, at 739-41 (recognizing the constraints posed
by the chartering market and the threat of federal intervention, at least in the case of
Delaware).
65. See Carney, Political Economy, supra note 59, at 309-11 (noting that "[olnly a
system that insulated local corporations from product market competition would protect
corporations (at least in part) from the adverse effects of competition from firms
chartered under less costly legal regimes").
66. See id. at 318-29.
67. See Roe, supra note 54.
68. See id. at 2496.
2006] THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF 205
CORPORATE LEGISLATION
in the state-to-state level, but rather in the state-to-federal playing field.69
It also sharpens our understanding of the unique political structure of
Delaware and how the federal shadow brings about moderation in
Delaware and curbs managerial autonomy.70 Thirdly, Roe's analysis
sets the Delaware-to-federal relationship in a political theory context,
envisioning Delaware as an institutional mechanism that enables the
American polity to defer to managers and shareholders on most
corporate law issues.7'
In sum, from the existing literature on the political economy of
corporate law, it can be inferred that both the nature and the relative
strength of the various interest groups involved in the legislative process
significantly affect the outcome of the legislation. Within the sphere of
American corporate law, this influence usually is viewed as a form of
rent-seeking that produces inefficient and sub-optimal laws. As for
other nations, the implications of interest-group involvement for the
quality of their corporate laws hinge largely on a nation's socio-
economic and institutional characteristics, chief among these being
ownership structure; capital market magnitude and efficiency; existence
or lack of a market for corporate control; concentration of the economy
and degree of cross ownership; dominance of banks in the economy; and
the extent to which labor is organized.72 The three basic goals of this
69. Interestingly, although Roe questions the importance of competition in
comparison to the differing public choice array in Delaware and in Washington, see id.
at 2495-96, he concedes that Delaware has an interest in minimizing federal influence.
See id. at 2518-19.
70. See id. at 2500-02, 2504-11 (asserting that Delaware's franchise tax empowers
the interests of managers and shareholders while neutralizing other interest groups and
demonstrating that ultra-pro manager lawmaking will goad Congress to act). Note that
by "shareholders" Roe refers to institutional investors rather than the ultimate
stockholders. See id. at 2502 n.6 ("Delaware law may not correspond to what ultimate
investors would agree to with industrial managers. It is what investors' two types of
managers - financial and industrial - want.").
71. See id. at 2511-13,2540-41.
72. There is substantial financial literature relating several of these socio-economic
and institutional factors to the content of corporate and securities codes. See, e.g.,
Steven Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Comparison of
Germany, Japan and U.S., 9 J. APPLIED CoP. FIN. 86 (1997); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FINANCE 471 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et al.,
Corporate Ownership]; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer &
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paper are: to analyze how the above-cited characteristics foster the
dominance of various interest groups within an economy; to trace the
interplays among these groups and their shifting coalitions with respect
to a myriad of corporate issues; and to spell out some of the normative
implications of interest-group involvement in the legislative process. At
the paper's center, and serving as its case study, is the aforementioned
new Israeli corporate law, with the paper's general conclusions being
largely based on the findings with respect to that law and the placing of
these findings in a comparative context.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE NEW ISRAELI CORPORATE LAW: ECONOMY,
POLITICAL HISTORY, AND RELEVANT INTEREST GROUPS
Israel is an attractive case study of the political model for three
reasons. First, Israel can be seen as a hybrid of common law and
European market attributes. The 'old' corporate law was based upon the
English Act of 1929 and had been developed through independent
legislation, as well as through judicial precedents that were inspired by
English and American doctrines.73 However, the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange (TASE), the sole national exchange, was established in the
1930s by European immigrants, who brought with them the tradition of
the continental exchanges and banking laws. v4 The TASE Trading Rules
were later drawn after the London Stock Exchange Rules; the 1968
Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FiN. 1131 (1997);
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, NBER Working Paper No. W7403
(1999) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation];
Davide Lombardo & Marco Pagano, Law and Equity Markets. A Simple Model,
University of Salerno Working Paper No. 25 (1999). However, this literature does not
investigate the effect of these factors on the political process of corporate law
legislation, which will be the focus of this paper.
73. See, e.g., C.A. 817/79 Cosoi v. Y.L. Foictonger Bank Ltd., Piskey Din 38(3)
253 (Isr.); A.D. 39/80 Bardigo v. D.G.B. 9 Textile Ltd., Piskey Din 35(4) 197 (Isr.);
C.A. 524/88 "Pri Ha'emek" Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sde Yaacov,
Piskey Din 45(4) 529 (Isr.). Until 1980 the application to English Common Law and
Equity in case of lacuna was mandatory. This requirement was annulled with the
enactment of the Legal Foundations Law, 1980.
74. The legal entity "The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange Ltd." was incorporated some
20 years later, in 1953. See http://www.tase.co.il/html2/about/overview/history.htm;
Interview with Saul Bronfeld, Managing Director, the TASE, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July
17, 2002) (on file with author).
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Securities Law, which created the regulatory framework for the
operation of the TASE, was largely influenced by the American federal
securities regulation.75
Israel's market characteristics reveal a concentrated economy with
large, though ostensibly declining, government involvement.76 Market
mechanisms, intended to mitigate agency problems, are either non-
existent or poorly functioning.77  Given these market realities, an
examination of the interaction between markets and corporate law
legislation in the Israeli case can provide a base for fruitful comparative
research on the impact of different economic environments on legal
regimes and vice versa.
Second, the new corporate law is a comprehensive reform,
including both amendments to statutory provisions and codification of
judicial doctrines. 78  Thus, it enables not only the examination of
discrete corporate issues standing alone, but also their coherence and
reciprocity.
Finally, the unique drafting process of the new law, based on a
proposal by a prominent academic figure that was then refined by a
public committee and through the ordinary apparatus of a parliamentary
committee, facilitates tracking the influence of political forces at
different stages of the legislation and their ultimate impact on the
resulting statute.
This part lays the foundations for the analysis of the political
economy of corporate law legislation that is developed in the subsequent
part. It furnishes a succinct account of Israel's economy and market
structure as well as a description of the political history of the new
Companies Law. It further defines the relevant interest groups in the
Israeli context and depicts the participation patterns of each of these
groups in the legislative process of the new law.
75. Id.
76. See infra Part H.A.
77. See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A United States -
Israeli Comparative View, 6 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 111-16 (1998);
Procaccia, Crafting a Corporate Code from Scratch, supra note 7, at 639-40.
78. See infra Part III.A.
79. See Procaccia, Crafting a Corporate Code from Scratch, supra note 7, at 629
(discussing his personal involvement in the drafting process).
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A. Background on Israel's Economy8 °
Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the Israeli
economy has been characterized with high growth rates accompanied by
high state budget deficit. In the first twenty-four years of its existence,
the country absorbed 1.6 million immigrants, multiplied its population
by 3.5 and grew at an average annual rate of 8-9%. 8' It is noteworthy
that Israel, regardless of the avowed socialist policy that accompanied its
founding, was never truly a socialist country in the sense that the
government never gained control over the means of production or
resisted private entrepreneurship. However, the government did
conduct a centralizing policy and was deeply involved in the economy.
Owning the vast majority of the land83 and foreign capital, the Israeli
government intervened in the markets through an extensive system of
incentives, taxes, quotas, subsidies, appointments, and supervision. The
large bureaucracy thereby created often resulted in economic waste, a
misallocation of resources, and other vices. 4
In the years 1973-1985, the Israeli economy went through a severe
crisis. At its peak, annual inflation rates reached 500% and the external
debt comprised approximately 80% of the GDP.85 This predicament
came to an end in July 1985 with the implementation of the Economic
Stabilization Program, whose goals were the reduction of annual
inflation rates to 20% to 30%; the stabilization of the balance of
payments and the governmental deficit; and the decrease of the
80. For a formal account of Israel see THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL, MINISTRY OF
FINANCE, STATE OF ISRAEL, PROSPECTUS - 2000 (2000), available at
http://www.mof.gov.il/prospectusOO/mainpage.htm (description is dated as of June 13,
2001 and appears as Exhibit D to the State of Israel's Annual Report on Form 18-K to
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 2000).
81. See Sever Plutzker, The Success: The Growth The Failure - The Deficit, in
PERSONS AND DEEDS IN ISRAEL: THE JUBILEE BOOK (Sara & Meir Aharoni eds., 1998).
82. Id.
83. According to the official website of the Israel Lands Administration (ILA),
93% (or 5,750,000 acres) of the land in Israel is public domain, being either property of
the state, the Jewish National Fund (JNF), or the Development Authority. See
http://www.mmi.gov.il.
84. See Plutzker, supra note 81; Gadi Hazak, Brief History of the Israeli Economy
(2002) (unpublished course presentation, Ben Gurion University, on file with author).
85. See Hazak, supra note 84.
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government involvement in the economy. 86 Following the Stabilization
Program, the economy underwent structural changes that enabled it to
overcome the preceding crisis. The government, employing a
disinflationary policy, gradually pulled out of the markets and
encouraged the development of a liberal market economy. The
absorption of about one million immigrants from the former Soviet
Union during the 1990s coupled with the peace process expedited the
sectoral move from agriculture to technology and the exposure to
competition.87 The overall concentration rate of industry, defined by the
market share of the three largest factories in each industrial sector,
declined between 1990 and 2000 from 33.8% to 28.1%.88 These
processes have led the economy to high but volatile growth rates,
restrained inflation rates and external debt, and financial stability.89
Despite the gradual privatization of state owned enterprises and
deregulation during the last three decades, and especially since the
Stabilization Program, government involvement in the Israeli economy
is still evident, particularly in the public utilities fields, i.e., electricity,
communication, public transportation, shipping, and oil refining.90 From
a comparative perspective, although Israel has increased its economic
freedom since 1985, it did so at a slower pace than most other countries
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See http://www.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2002/23_02_76tl.htm.
89. See Hazak, supra note 84; see generally Avi Ben Bassat, The Obstacle Course
to a Market Economy in Israel, in THE ISRAELI ECONOMY, 1985-1998: FROM
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO MARKET ECONOMICS - ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PROF.
MICHAEL BRUNO 1-48 (Avi Ben Bassat ed., 2001).
90. According to the Official Report of the Government Companies Authority, in
1999, state owned enterprises (not including mixed companies where the state's control
is lower than 50%) constituted 7.4% of Israel's export, 2.25% of its employees, 9.47%
of the development's investments, and 3.45% of the GDP. See THE GOVERNMENT
COMPANIES AUTHORITY, THE STATE OF ISRAEL, 1999 REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT
COMPANIES (2000). For the difficulties involved in privatizing the public utilities sector,
see Reuben Gronau, Structural Changes in the Public Utilities Sector in Israel - The
Reform that Never was, in THE ISRAELI ECONOMY, 1985-1998: FROM GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION TO MARKET ECONOMICS - ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PROF. MICHAEL
BRUNO 382-431 (Avi Ben Bassat ed., 2001). See also Nehemya Shtresler, The Safe
World of the Monopolies, HA'ARETZ (Tel Aviv), June 5, 2002, at B 1 (exemplifying how
monopolies and cartels, mostly government owned, are able to raise prices even in
times of deep recession in the economy).
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with a similar starting point.91
A prominent feature of the modem Israeli economy has been the
high-tech sector. This sector has its roots in Israel's defense industries,
which sprouted even before the establishment of the state of Israel and
have developed ever since due to Israel's prolonged security situation.92
During the 1970s and 1980s, notwithstanding Israel's political and
economic turmoil, the high-tech sector kept growing due to the
development of the local industry and increasing inward investment by
international high tech companies, which recognized the potential and
the accelerated expansion of the sector.93 In the 1990s, the combination
of a vast number of skilled immigrants, extensive government support,
and political advance situated the high tech sector as a principal
exporter, establishing it as the driving force behind the Israeli
economy.94 These years brought about a significant growth in venture
capital and start-up companies, backed by foreign investment. 95 This
also resulted in dozens of Israeli high-tech firms going public on both
the TASE and foreign exchanges. 96 Since mid-2000, however, due to
91. The reference here is to the semi industrial and most South American countries.
See Ben Bassat, supra note 89, at 35-36.
92. See Dan Yachin, Israel's High Tech Jubilee: 53 (or More) Years of Zionist
Start Up Technology, ISRAEL'S BUSINESS ARENA, May 3, 2001; How Israeli High-Tech
Happened, GLOBES [ONLINE], Aug. 15, 2000.
93. Id.
94. In the years 1990-2000, the share of the Information and Communications
Technologies (ICT) in the exports rose from 14.0% to 32.1% and their share in the GDP
of the business sector (entire economy) rose from 8.1% (5%) to 18.6% (12.6%). See
http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton53/stl8_09.pdf. In 2000, Israel's national expenditure on
civilian R&D comprised 4.2% of the GDP, the highest in the world. See
http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton53/st28_1 5.pdf.
95. Between 1990 and 2000, Israeli venture capital funds raised an- overall of
$6.5B. See Yanay Alfassy, IVC Online: 3 Times More Venture Capital Raised in 2000
than in 1999, ISRAEL'S BUSINESS ARENA, Dec. 19, 2000. Annual foreign investment in
Israel grew from $0.4B in 1992 to $5.0B in 2000. See How Israeli High-Tech
Happened, GLOBES [ONLINE], Aug. 15, 2000. In 2000, 513 private Israeli high tech
companies raised $3. 1B from Israeli venture capital funds and other investors, mostly
foreign investment entities. See Globes Correspondent, IVC." Total 2001 VC Investments
in Israel Down 36% to $2B, ISRAEL'S BUSINESS ARENA, Jan. 27, 2002. The Global
Competitiveness Report 2000 ranked Israel, with 3,000 start-ups, second behind the
U.S. in the number of start-ups and first relative to population. See How Israeli High-
Tech Happened, GLOBES [ONLINE], Aug. 15, 2000.
96. See infra Part II.A.2.
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the global crisis in the high tech industry and the deterioration in the
security situation in Israel, the local high tech sector has experienced a
continuous decline in venture capital investments, massive layoffs, and a
sharp fall in the share price of Israeli companies listed on NASDAQ.97
Two other relevant characteristics of the Israeli economy are strong
labor organizations in most of the non high tech sectors and a strong
agriculture lobby that crosses political party boundaries.
According to the 2003 report of the U.S. Department of State,
"[t]he country has an advanced industrial economy with a relatively high
standard of living., 98 Israel has yet to cope, however, with the rise in
economic inequality that manifests itself in increasing disparity in
income, as well as the still relatively high government debt and current
recession.99
A. 1. The Israeli Capital Market
Until the mid-1980s, the financial system in Israel lacked
competitive traits due to deep governmental involvement in the
monetary, capital and foreign currency markets and an oligopolistic
structure of the financial intermediaries sector. By controlling the
internal and external capital raised, its cost, and allocation, the
government, in essence, nationalized the financial markets and brought
about a misallocation of resources in the economy. The main
instruments used by the government in the context of the capital market
were subsidized untradable government bonds that were issued to
provident funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and savings plans,
as well as "directed" government credit, i.e., subsidized loans that were
allocated to selected industries through the banking system."' 0
97. See Globes Correspondent, supra note 95; Yachin, supra note 92.
98. THE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES - COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES - 2003 (2004); see also INTERNATIONAL DIVISION, ISRAELI MINISTRY OF
FINANCE, THE ISRAELI ECONOMY AT A GLANCE (2001), available at
http://www.mof.gov.il/beinle/ie/israe 1.htm. For an international comparison of Israel's
GDP per capita, see http://147.237.248.51/shnaton54/g28b.pdf
99. The growth rate of the Israeli economy in 2003 was 1%. See
http://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/ factbook/geos/is.html.
100. See Oven Yosha & Asher Blass, The Reform in the Israeli Financial System
and the Flow of Funds of Publicly Traded Manufacturing Firms, in THE ISRAELI
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Moreover, the government intervention complicated the markets'
structure and reduced the efficacy of monetary policy, thereby
contributing to the inflation crisis in the years 1973-1985.01
Regarding the banking system, a small number of banks have
dominated the Israeli economy from its inception.'0 2 They have acted as
creditors, underwriters, brokers, investment managers, and investors,
both directly and through mutual funds and provident funds. 10 3 This
situation has resulted in conflicts of interest, as well as reduced
competition. 0 4 In addition, the exposure in 1983 of a price manipulation
scheme in the banks' shares led to the purchase of the majority of these
shares by the government. 10 5 This crisis prepared the ground for the
reforms.
In the years following the 1985 Economic Stabilization Program,
the government conducted reforms in the different financial markets. 10 6
With regard to the capital market, the reforms covered two primary
aspects: first, relieving institutional investors and banks from the
obligation to invest the vast majority of their resources in government
bonds, thereby creating a space for private sector companies to enter the
capital market; second, reducing the banks' involvement in the financial
system through spin-offs, privatization, and divestitures from non-bank
ECONOMY, 1985-1998: FROM GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO MARKET ECONOMICS -
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PROF. MICHAEL BRUNO 207,208-09 (Avi Ben Bassat ed., 2001).
101. See Ben Bassat, supra note 89, at 7-8.
102. Yosha & Blass, supra note 100, at 209, state that, in the beginning of the 1990s,
nearly three-quarters of the total assets of the banking system were held by the two
largest banks ("Hapoalim" and "Leumi") and that the five largest banks controlled 95%
of the banking activity.
103. The Israeli law, as opposed to the American Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
(abolished in May 1999), has never separated commercial banks from investment
banks. However, a policy of chinese walls is practiced in order to prevent the
conveyance of information. See Interview with Prof. Meir Het, former Bank
Supervisor, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 1, 2002) (on file with author).
104. For a theoretical explanation and reference to supporting empirical research,
see Asher A. Blass, Yishay Yafe & Oved Yosha, Corporate Governance in an
Emerging Market: The Case of Israel, 10 J. APPLIED. CORP. FIN. 79, 81-82 (1998).
105. For several years the banks manipulated the prices of their shares, which
comprised 17% of the public financial assets. Once the manipulation was discovered,
the shares' prices collapsed and the government bailed out investors by purchasing their
shares, thereby becoming the owner of the banks. See Yosha & Blass, supra note 100,
at 209.
106. For a summary of these reforms, see Ben Bassat, supra note 89, at 8-17.
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holdings.' °7 These reforms substantially changed the financial structure
of Israeli companies by facilitating their access to external capital, and
invigorated the Israeli stock exchange.'0 8 They also improved the
competitiveness of the securities industry.
10 9
However, the reforms have not brought a complete remedy for the
drawbacks of the Israeli capital market. First, pension funds are still
absent from the capital market arena due to government regulations
requiring them to invest between 70% and 93% of their funds in
subsidized government bonds. This situation results in a thin capital
market, inefficient allocation of resources, and continuous government
involvement in the economy."0 Secondly, a market for non-government
bonds never developed despite its necessity.'1 ' At the end of 2000, low-
liquid government bonds dominated about 93% of the bond market."
1
107. Following the Brodet Committee recommendations, bank corporations were
required to divest from their non-bank holdings so that by the end of 1998 they didn't
hold more than 20% of any non-bank entity. See THE COMMITTEE FOR EXAMINING THE
ASPECTS OF THE BANKS' HOLDINGS IN REAL CORPORATIONS, A REPORT (1995).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 124-128.
109. See Saul Bronfeld, The Decrease in the Big Banks' Weight in the Trade of
Stocks, 143 Q. BANKING REV. 69 (1999) (arguing that the decline of the five largest
banks' portion in the trade of stocks from 70% in 1992 to 55% in 1999 signifies an
increase in the competition in the securities industry); cf Yosha & Blass, supra note
100, at 215 (doubting the competitiveness of the commercial banking field).
110. According to Israel's central bank, in 2001, the pension funds, holding 10% of
the public financial assets, invested 92.5% of their resources in untradable government
bonds. See BANK OF ISRAEL, 2001 REPORT - STATISTIC APPENDIX (2002). In 1995, the
government decided on a substantial reform in the pension fund area that was based on
the principle of actuarial balance. While improving the economic incentive structure for
saving, the reform didn't bring about solutions at either the macroeconomic or the
microeconomic level. For a review and evaluation of the reform, see Avia Spivak, The
Reform in the Pension Funds, in THE ISRAELI ECONOMY, 1985-1998: FROM
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO MARKET ECONOMICS - ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PROF.
MICHAEL BRUNO 257-90 (Avi Ben Bassat ed., 2001); For a description of the
concentrated structure of the pension fund area in Israel and the current challenges it
faces, see Article Series, Who will Pay Us the Pension? A Crisis in the Pension Field,
HA'ARETZ (Tel Aviv), May 19-22, 2002.
111. See Saul Bronfeld & Kobi Abramov, The Golden Decade of the Stock Market:
Achievements and Misses, 146 Q. BANKING REV. 26, 36-37 (2001) (asserting that this
failure ensued from both technical and regulatory reasons).
112. Id.; INTERNATIONAL DIVISION, ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FINANCE, supra note 98, at
15. However, the turnover in the bond market has improved during the years 2001 and
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Thirdly, the banking system remained highly concentrated." 
3
Regardless of the noticeable need to separate the commercial banks from
their investment activities in order to reduce market concentration and
embedded conflicts of interest, 14 the banks still furnish a variety of
services and products to the capital market and maintain their dominance
in financing companies, especially through credit instruments." 5 No
other financial intermediaries or foreign banks entered the commercial
banking field. 1 6 Moreover, the privatization of the banks in the second
half of the 1990s and their forced divestment of non-bank holdings led
to the creation of holding companies that control commercial banks." 7
A. 2. The Stock Exchange
Founded in 1935 as the Exchange Bureau for Securities and
incorporated in 1953, the TASE acts as the sole exchange in Israel." 8
Among its members are most of the Israeli banks, including Israel's
central bank, the Bank of Israel, and major brokerage firms.'19 The
TASE members act as brokers and trade securities on behalf of the
investors in the TASE. 20  The Securities Law of 1968121 created the
2002. See infra text accompanying note 150.
113. See Ben Bassat, supra note 89, at 13 (stating that 2/3 of the overall assets of the
banking system are still held by the two largest banks and about 80% are held by the
three largest banks, a concentration rate that is among the highest in the western world).
114. See THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE IN THE MATTER OF THE ADJUSTMENT IN
THE BANKS' SHARES, REPORT (1986).
115. See Blass et al., supra note 104, at 81 (noticing that "the reforms that reduced
the government's role as a financial intermediary ended up actually expanding the
banks' role in allocating credit and, hence, the extent of their influence."). On the
control of the banks in the underwriting market, see Stella Korin-Lieber, Swallowing
Water from the Fear of the Banks, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Mar. 9, 2003.
116. See Yosha & Blass, supra note 100, at 215-17. In the years 1992-97 the annual
expansion rate of the bank credit was larger than the nominal growth in the GDP. Id.
117. See Zvika Robins, The Concentration Trend is Exacerbated: 77% of the Stock
Market is Held by Control Groups, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Aug. 2, 1999. Note
that this state of affairs might change if the recommendations of the Marani Committee
to the privatization of Bank Leumi through the stock exchange are implemented. See
Shlomi Shefer, Marani Committee: to Restrict the Cross Holdings of the Banks,
HA'ARETZ (Tel Aviv), Aug. 2, 2002, at C2.
118. See http://www.tase.co.il/html2/about/overview/history.htm.
119. See http://www.tase.co.il/html2/link/members.htm.
120. Currently, no market makers act on the TASE. This situation is expected to
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regulatory framework for the operation of the exchange and the
companies traded on it. 122  It also constituted the Israel Securities
Authority (ISA), an independent regulatory body, whose "function is to
protect the affairs of the securities investing public, as determined in the
law.' 23 The ISA is the Israeli equivalent of the SEC.
Prior to the abovementioned reforms in the capital market, the
TASE was small and lacked liquidity. With the improvement in
macroeconomic factors in the late 1980s, the removal of the restrictions
on investment and finance, and the privatization of state owned
enterprises, the annual trading volumes in the TASE increased
considerably, as did the relative weight of the stock market in the GDP.
Between 1988 and 1993 the annual turnover in the TASE grew tenfold
and exceeded $30B. The relative weight of the stock market in the GDP
rose from 7% in 1984 to 46% in 1992. 24 At the same time, the change
in personnel at the head of the ISA brought about a tremendous
improvement in the overseeing of the exchange and the enforcement of
securities regulation. Influenced by the American federal securities
regulation and the notion of fair disclosure, the Israeli regulator prepared
the ground for the development of a modem capital market. 12
5
In the decade between 1991 and 2000, the number of companies
traded on the TASE rose from 271 to 665 and market capitalization
multiplied by 6.126 At the end of 2000, the total value of the stock
change in the near future due the adoption of the recommendations of an internal
experts committee and the rules implementing these recommendations by the ISA. See
Yuval Mendelson, The ISA Adopted the Recommendation of the Hauser Committee for
the Regulation of Market Making Activity, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Dec. 22,
2002; http://www.isa.gov.il/news/news.asp?catid= 1 &id= 187&inPage=36&active=
pirsum.
121. The Securities Law, 1968, S.C. 234 [hereinafter the Securities Law].
122. For the legislative history of the law, see JOSEPH H. GROSS, THE NEW
COMPANIES LAW 3 (2d ed. 2000).
123. See http://www.isa.gov.il/english/template/default.asp?catld= 1 &active=prof.
124. See Yosha & Blass, supra note 100, at 211.
125. See Interviews with Saul Bronfeld, supra note 74; Dr. Shimon Wise, Legal
Adviser of the ISA 1984-99, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 31, 2002); Arie Mientkavich,
Chairperson of the ISA 1987-97, in Tel Aviv, Israel (Aug. 9, 2002).
126. See Bronfeld & Abramov, supra note 111, at 27. However, the turnover
velocity, i.e., the ratio of the annual turnover to the average shares' value, was volatile
during this period and fell behind the accepted level in other stock exchanges around
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market reached NIS 270B ($66B) and the total value of the bond market
reached NIS 167B ($41B). 127 On the supply side, the privatization of
government companies and banks increased the value of companies
listed on the stock market between 1991 and 2000 by the total sum of
NIS 78B ($19B). On the demand side, two major players entered the
TASE: institutional investors, most of which are run by banks, and
international investors. By the end of 2000, these investors held 10%
and 12%, respectively, of the market value of TASE listed companies.
28
However, the Israeli public is still, to a large extent, absent from the
stock market. 29 During this period of time, the percentage of floating
assets out of the overall market value of the outstanding shares did not
change dramatically and amounted to about 33%, out of which
approximately 60% are direct public holdings. 30
In conjunction with the rise in the supply of and demand for stocks,
the TASE itself has gone through a major change. It revisited its trading
rules and listing requirements, established a derivative market,
strengthened the reporting and capital requirements of its members,
adopted a sophisticated trading system that enables automated and
continuous trading, reduced its transaction fees and recently launched an
online reporting system.' 3' During this period of time, the ISA initiated
legislation and regulation that enhanced the transparency of traded
companies, the independence and expertise of accountants, investment
the world. Id. at 27 n. 1. This index pinpoints one of the major problems of the TASE,
namely tradability, which will be discussed below. For the World Federation of
Exchanges' comparative data regarding turnover velocity, see http://www.world-
exchange.org/ publication.TA1601.pdf.
127. See Kobi Abramov & Nurit Dror, The Securities Market in the Year 2000, 232
THIS MONTH IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE (2000).
128. See Bronfeld & Abramov, supra note 111, at 30-33.
129. Between 1997 and 2001, the public invested, on average, less than 20% of its
financial assets' portfolio in the TASE. See BANK OF ISRAEL, supra note 110. The
reasons for this ostracism vary and probably include preferable high-interest savings
alternatives, the global financial crisis, irresponsible investment advising by the banks,
and the bad reputation of the Israeli stock market. See Merav Arlozerov, Black
Monday, February 7, 1994, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Feb. 9, 1999.
130. Bronfeld & Abramov, supra note 111, at 33. The rest of the shares are held by
interested parties. For the distribution of the outstanding shares in the years 1997-2001
see BANK OF ISRAEL, supra note 110. An interest is defined by the TASE as holding of
at least 0.0 1% of a company's shares.
131. See Bronfeld & Abramov, supra note 111, at 34-35.
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advisers and portfolio managers, and the operation of mutual funds.
With an independent investigations department, it substantially
remodeled the enforcement of the Securities Law and the supervision of
the capital market. In addition, the ISA took it upon itself to regulate
some corporate governance issues previously handled by the TASE,
such as conflict of interest transactions with control holders, tender
offers, and equal voting rights. 3 2 Following this regulatory revolution,
the Israeli capital market purportedly became the world's second most
regulated market, lagging only behind its American counterpart. 33
As for ownership structure, in general, the Israeli marketplace is
highly concentrated. According to the data gathered by La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, at the end of 1995 only 5% of the
20 largest publicly traded firms in Israel were widely held, i.e., did not
have any controlling shareholders. 34  Control groups consisting of
businesspersons and a small number of families hold large proportions
of the stock market. 35  With the flourishing of the TASE at the
beginning of the 1990s there was an upsurge in the issue of shares of
subsidiaries and affiliated companies and in the purchase of traded
132. The substantive arrangements regarding conflict of interest transactions and
tenders offers can now be found in the Companies Law, 1999. However, the regulation
of these issues is still given to the ISA.
133. See Bronfeld & Abramov, supra note 111, at 35-36 (listing the major
regulatory innovations that occurred during this period). See also Interview with Arie
Mientkavich, supra note 125 (asserting that the real reform was the conception: the
Americanization of the market).
134. Controlling shareholder was defined by the authors as a shareholder whose sum
of direct and indirect voting rights exceeds a cutoff of 20%. By comparison, the
percentage of widely held firms in the U.K., the United States, and Germany was 100%,
80%, and 50%, respectively. The other 19 largest firms in Israel were controlled by
families (50%), the State (40%), and widely held corporations (5%), and in 60% of the
cases control was exercised through at least one publicly traded company, a structure
known as a pyramid. Moreover, a controlling family controlled, on average, 2.5 firms
out of those 20 largest firms. See La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 72,
at 492, 501.
135. In April 1999, 34 control groups, representing 220 companies, held 77% of the
market value. Out of 652 companies listed on the TASE at that time, only 345,
encompassing 18% of the market value, were entirely independent. See Kobi Abramov
& Yuval Zuk, Control Groups in the Listed Companies, 214 THIS MONTH IN THE STOCK
EXCHANGE 3 (1999). In their calculation, the researchers took into account the total
value of controlled companies and the relative value of dominated companies.
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companies by other traded companies. 136 Most firms that went public
offered 20% or less of their equity in the IPO.' 37 These trends increased
the concentration of control groups in the stock exchange. The
divestment of the banks' non-bank holdings further contributed to the
growth of pyramid structures in the market due to the creation of control
groups and holding companies, which either control banks or are held by
banks.'38 Correspondingly, the privatization of state owned enterprises
through the sale of control blocks to strategic investors, most of them
existing control holders, did not result in dispersed ownership
patterns. 13
9
Although in recent years there has been a noticeable decline in the
concentration of control groups, due to mergers, tender offers, and sale
of companies, they still predominate the market. 140  The same is true
with regard to the banks and government holdings.' 4' This situation
hinders the development of a real market for corporate control in Israel,
since the float of the shares of the vast majority of public companies
does not suffice for the execution of a takeover. That is, most structural
changes taking place in firms listed on the TASE over the last few years
did not involve an actual shift of control. Rather, they ensued from
internal efficiency considerations, such as removing double headquarters
or going private due to low market value, lack of tradability, high
136. Id.
137. Blass et al., supra note 104, at 86. The listing of hundreds of medium-size and
small companies, some of them also known as "bubble companies", and the sharp rise
in the market value in the years 1992-93 were followed by a crash of the stock market
in February 1994. See Bronfeld & Abramov, supra note 111, at 29, 37-38. For the
implications of this crisis see Arlozerov, supra note 129.
138. Blass et al., supra note 104, at 81 (noting the banks' "dominant role [of] all
facets of the of the capital market"); Robins, supra note 117.
139. Blass et al., supra note 104, at 85 (noting that the privatization process has not
been conducive to increasing the role of institutional shareholders other than "bank-
managed" funds).
140. By June 2002, 30 control groups, representing 214 companies, held 65% of the
market value. See Kobi Abramov & Yuval Zuk, A Decrease in the Concentration of
Control Groups in the Listed Companies, 251 THIS MONTH IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE
(2002).
141. The overall market share of the five largest banking groups declined from 20%
in 1999 to 19% in 2001. The market share of government and mixed companies
decreased from 15% in 1999 to 11% in 2001. This decline has not affected the ranking
of the government as the second largest control holder in the TASE. Id.
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maintenance cost, and the inability to raise capital.142  In practice,
transfers of control are being made outside of the stock exchange.
Another feature of the Israeli stock market is private placements.
These have dominated the primary market since 1999, comprising 60%
to 80% of the capital raised between 1999 and 2002.14' At the end of
2002, the TASE board removed a minimal float requirement to promote
private placements. 44  Although private placements are cheaper and
faster than public offers, possibly assisting companies to raise capital in
times when the economy is performing poorly, they also come with a
price. The shares sold in a private placement are blocked and are not
resalable for a period of time.
45
Despite the significant facilitation and improvement of the trading
system and of the supervision and regulation of the exchange by the
TASE and the ISA, the stock market characteristics mentioned above
result in a reduction in trading volume and number of traders, discourage
diversified portfolios, and increase volatility, thereby causing the Israeli
market to lag behind other developed capital markets. 1
46
From the last quarter of 2000 until February 2003, the activity in
the TASE slowed down due to the political situation, the economic
recession, and the falls in NASDAQ. 147 The daily turnover decreased
142. See id.; Shay Shalev, A Wave of Tender Offers: 48 Companies were Delisted in
the Last Two Years, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Nov. 25, 2002.
143. See Nurit Dror, An Increase in the Private Placements in the Stock Exchange -
1990 to 2002, THIS MONTH IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE, 255 (2002).
144. See id. Prior to its revocation, the minimal float requirement was a condition to
effecting a private placement.
145. Id. According to the Securities Law and its regulations, a private placement
requires a preliminary approval of an exchange for the listing of the offered securities.
The length of the blocking period varies with the type of the offeree. It is noteworthy
that, in order to encourage companies to raise funds in the capital market, the ISA
recently recommended to curtail the blocking periods that apply to private placements.
See Globes Service, The ISA Shortens the Blocking Period for Sophisticated Investors
who Hold Securities that were Issued Without a Prospectus, GLOBES ELECTRONIC
ARCHIVE, March 23, 2003.
146. See Abramov & Zuk., supra note 135; Arlozerov, supra note 129; Yaron
Friedman, Try to Sell in the Stock Exchange, Not Sure You will Succeed, GLOBES
ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, March 6, 2003.
147. At the end of 2001, the market capitalization of the 649 firms listed on the
TASE was equal to NIS 275B ($58.5B). By 2002, these numbers deteriorated to 625
firms and market capitalization of NIS 215 ($46B). See THE TASE, 4 THE BOURSE
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and the trading concentration grew significantly. 148 Foreign investors
withdrew their investments, and their market share, representing mostly
interested parties, declined by the end of 2001 to 10%. 149 The crisis in
the financial markets revitalized the bond market and in 2001, for the
first time, its turnover exceeded that of the stock market.15° During
2003, as a result of the receiving of U.S. loan guarantees and
improvements in the economy, there was a sharp rise in stock prices and
trading volume in the TASE."5' Taking advantage of the rise in stock
prices and trading volume, control holders and interested parties sold
large quantities of their shares, causing the holdings of the public to
reach a peak of 47% of the market value. 52 During this time there was
(2002).
148. The average daily turnover in the years 2000-02 was NIS 514B ($109B), NIS
293B ($62B), and NIS 243B ($52B), respectively. In 2000, the overall turnover in the
Tel Aviv-25 stocks, the 25 stocks with the highest market value, comprised 57% of total
market turnover. By 2001, it was equal to 73%, and by 2002 to 76%. See Nurit Dror,
The Securities Market in the Year 2001 - An Annual Survey, 244 THIS MONTH IN THE
STOCK EXCHANGE (2001); THE TASE, supra note 147. Similarly, the share of the 20
most traded stocks, not all of them necessarily included in the Tel Aviv-25 Index, rose
from 55%-60% in the years 1997-2000 to 74% in 2001, and to 74.5% in 2002. See
Kobi Abramov, An Increase in the Trade Concentration in the Stock Exchange in Tel
Aviv, 244 THIS MONTH IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE (2001); THE TASE, supra note 147.
For the World Federation of Exchanges' comparative data regarding average daily
turnover and trading concentration, see http://www.world-exchanges.org.
149. See Dror, supra note 148.
150. In 2001 and 2002, the average daily turnover in the bond market was NIS 595B
($127B) and NIS 766B ($163B), respectively. The issuance of non-government bonds
by the business sector rose sharply and equaled NIS 2.9B ($0.6B) in 2001 and NIS 4.7B
($1 B) in 2002. At the same time, however, the net amount raised by government bonds
climbed from NIS -8.5B ($-1.8B) in 2000 to NIS 13B ($2.8B) in 2001 and NIS 25B
($5.3B) in 2002. See THE TASE, supra note 147.
151. At the end of 2003, the market capitalization of the 577 firms listed on the
TASE was equal to NIS 300B ($68B) and the stock index increased by 50% compared
to 2002. The average daily turnover for that year was NIS 350B ($80B) and the share of
the 20 most traded stocks decreased to 68% of total market turnover. See ANNUAL
SURVEY 2003, 15 THE BOURSE (2003). Notice that although about 50 firms were
delisted from the TASE during 2003, their delisting was not detrimental to the capital
market since most of them were delisted due to tender offers which eliminated pyramid
structures or very small firms in which the public holding was less than minimal. See
KOBI ABRAMOV, DELISTING OF PUBLIC COMPANIES BY TENDER OFFERS IN THE YEAR
2003 (2004), available at http://www.tase.co.il/portal/pdf/pdf-m/83872.pdf.
152. See KOBI ABRAMOV, INTEREST PARTIES' SALES JUMPED UP THE PUBLIC
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also a decline in the supply of government bonds, which enabled the
business sector to substantially increase the issuance of non-government
bonds.'53
A pivotal phenomenon that should be mentioned here is the listing
of numerous Israeli companies on foreign exchanges, most noticeably on
NASDAQ. 15 4 In the years 1990-96, 56 Israeli companies, most of them
high tech oriented, issued stock in the United States, raising about
$1B. 155  Since then, their number almost doubled, making Israel the
second largest foreign issuer in the United States, after Canada. 156 In the
year 2002, there were 100 Israeli companies listed in the United States
and 30 companies listed in Europe. 57 As opposed to the concentrated
ownership that characterizes the TASE, the ownership of the Israeli
firms listed on foreign exchanges is fairly dispersed. 158  What is
interesting and unique about Israeli companies listed abroad is that most
of them are not listed on the TASE."5 9 That is, they trade exclusively on
HOLDINGS IN THE YEAR 2003 (2004), available at http://www.tase.co.il/portal/pdf/pdf-
m/82719.pdf. Note, however, that in only 23 firms, 14 of which are dually listed on the
TASE and in the U.S., the public holding exceeded 50%. Id.
153. In 2003, the government issued bonds in the amount (net) of NIS 20B (S4.6B),
and the business sector issued non-government bonds in the amount of NIS 5.9B
($1.3B), which represents a 25% increase compared to 2002. See ANNUAL SURVEY
2003, supra note 151.
154. For an overview, see Edward B. Rock, Greenhorns, Yankees, and
Cosmopolitans: Venture Capital, IPOs, Foreign Firms, and U.S. Markets, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 711 (2001).
155. See Asher Blass & Yishay Yafeh, Vagabond Shoes Longing to Stray: Why
Foreign Firms List in the United States, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 555 (2001).
156. In 2000 alone, Israeli companies raised $4.2 billion, mostly on NASDAQ,
although $800 million were raised on European exchanges. See How Israeli High-Tech
Happened, GLOBES [ONLINE] (Aug. 15, 2000) at http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/
globes/docview.asp?did=258771 &fid=954.
157. Telephone Interview with Kobi Abramov, Director of the Research
Department, the TASE (July 22, 2002) (on file with author).
158. In the years 1996-2001, interested parties held, on average, 8.7% of the Israeli
Companies listed abroad. See BANK OF ISRAEL, supra note 110.
159. Prior to October 2000, when mitigating regulations regarding dual listing came
into force, only 15 of the companies listed on foreign exchanges were listed also on the
TASE. These companies usually listed on the TASE first and only later raised money
in the U.S. See Shlomo Grinberg, Everything is Talking, GLOBES ELECTRONIC
ARCHIVE, Sept. 27, 2000.
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a foreign exchange. 160  Some of these companies even incorporated in
the United States.
161
Several explanations have been suggested to explain this trend.
62
One explanation is that the migration of Israeli firms to NASDAQ
ensued from the collapse of the TASE in 1994,163 which extinguished it
as a plausible exit option at a critical moment in the development of
Israeli venture capital.' 64  Once NASDAQ was established as the
preferred IPO exit market for Israeli firms, going public in a less salient
market, such as the TASE, might have sent a negative signal to
investors.1 65 A related theory, which is supported by empirical research,
is that there exists "a separating equilibrium, whereby high-quality IPOs
opt for U.S. equity markets, while less-promising firms remain in local
markets, and this is not necessarily a result of disclosure
requirements",' 66 This claim is based on the notion that the Israeli bank-
based financial system is less apt than the American market-based
system to finance innovative firms, due to its embedded corporate
governance deficiencies. 67  A third reason given for the lack of dual
160. Blass & Yafeh, supra note 155, at 556.
161. See Bronfeld & Abramov, supra note 111, at 38-39. These companies are
"Israeli" only to the extent that they usually have an Israeli subsidiary or their R&D
center is located in Israel. On the implications of the choice to incorporate in the U.S.,
see Rock, supra note 154, at 736-42 (suggesting that "foreign listing may reduce
barriers to foreign investors or improve [a] firm's reputation in foreign markets").
162. Note that the rationales for exclusive listing on a foreign exchange are
distinguished from those offered to explain the more common phenomenon of dual
listing. For a critical discussion of the latter, see Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and
Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141 (2003).
163. See supra note 137.
164. See Edward B. Rock, Coming to America? Venture Capital, Corporate Identity,
and U.S. Securities Law, at 8 (Feb. 7, 2002) (Research paper, U. of Penn., Inst. For Law
& Econ.); Amir N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign Listing: Some Direct
Evidence, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 325, 336-37 (2001).
165. See Rock, supra note 164, at 6-8 (arguing that after NASDAQ established
prominence in trading Israeli securities "the choice to go public" in another market
might create the impression that the issuers are sub-standard unless they offer a
"convincing explanation" for their choice).
166. Blass & Yafeh, supra note 155, at 570 (potential benefits related to listing in
the U.S. include investor recognition and recognition among potential clients).
167. See id at 558-59; Blass et al., supra note 104, at 80 (asserting that "it seems
plausible that U.S. and other foreign portfolio investors have shied away from the
Israeli stock market and chosen Israeli companies listed on the NASDAQ in order to
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listing is the effort made by some of the companies to conceal their
Israeli identity.168  The most popular argument, however, is that the
burdensome regulation of the stock exchange, the enactment of the new
corporate law, and mainly tax disincentives deter Israeli companies
listed on foreign exchanges from listing their stocks also on the
TASE.
169
In order to invigorate the Israeli stock exchange, in 2000, the
Knesset (the Israeli parliament) after years of debate passed an
amendment to the Securities Law that alleviated the listing requirements
on the TASE of companies listed on foreign exchanges. 170  Since
October 2000, when the legislation became effective, twenty-one
companies already listed on American exchanges were listed on the
TASE."7' Additionally, the implementation of an overall tax reform in
Israel in January 2003 has reduced the tax distortions regarding
companies that are incorporated outside of Israel.
172
avoid corporate governance problems associated with the TASE").
168. See Interview with Saul Bronfeld, supra note 74; Zvika Robins, Tel Aviv - New
York - Tel Aviv, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, July 27, 2002.
169. See Bronfeld & Abramov, supra note 111, at 38-39 (stating that the Israeli
Companies traded on the NASDAQ refused to bear the "double regulation" - Israeli
supervision in addition to the U.S. one); Grinberg, supra note 159. Cf Licht, supra note
164, at 346 (arguing that "[b]y listing, and remaining listed, only in the American
market officers and controlling persons of Israeli issuers were able to take advantage of
its more lenient disclosure regime").
170. See The Securities Law (Amendment No. 21), 5760-2000. The law currently
applies only to companies listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ-NM. For the
backdrop against which the amendment was enacted and the different views on the
issue, see Licht, supra note 164; Stella Korin-Lieber, Exactly like America, GLOBES
ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Feb. 20, 2000. Recently, the ISA further relieved the reporting
requirements for these companies in order to encourage the Israeli primary market. See
http://www.isa.gov.il/news/news.asp?ID=207&inPage=9&active=pirsum.
171. See ANNUAL SURVEY 2003, supra note 151. At the end of 2001, the market
share of these companies (than only 15) constituted 5.5% of the stock market. See
Dror, supra note 148. In the last quarter of 2003, the average daily turnover in the new
dual stocks was NIS 26.5B ($6B), in comparison with NIS lOB ($2.3B) in 2002 and in
the first three quarters of 2003. See KOBI ABRAMOV & NURIT DROR, A SHARP RISE IN
THE TRADING VOLUMES IN THE NEW DUAL STOCKS AT THE END OF THE YEAR 2003
(2004), available at http://www.tase.co.il/portal/pdf/pdf-m/82268.pdf.
172. As part of the reform it was suggested to exempt these companies from income
and capital gains tax resulting from the transfer of their activities or assets to companies
incorporated in Israel. In conjunction with the general decrease in capital gains tax, this
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B. The Political History of the New Corporate Law
The need to reform Israel's corporate law has been long established.
It was occasioned by two main factors.'73 First, largely based on the
English Act of 1929, the Companies Ordinance174 was anachronistic and
did not fit modem reality.175  Second, focused on procedure, the
Ordinance left the development of the substantive corporate law almost
exclusively to the courts. 76  This need for reform produced various
initiatives, which were, at least in part, translated into several
amendments but did not result in an overall reform until the recent
enactment of the new law. 1
77
The new Israeli corporate law came into force as of February 2000,
replacing the Companies Ordinance.1 7' The legislative process of the
new law lasted eighteen years. It began in 1982 with the Minister of
Justice's application to Professor Uriel Procaccia of the Law Faculty of
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, asking him to draft a new and
cohesive corporate code to replace the existing Ordinance. 7 9  It
continued in 1985 with a public committee, chaired by then Supreme
Court Justice Aharon Barak, basing its work on Professor Procaccia's
proposal. 80 The report of the Barak Committee, submitted in 1994, was
endorsed by the government and later by the Knesset, which referred it
policy is intended to encourage entrepreneurs to incorporate their companies in Israel.
See BARUCH LEVI, THE KNESSET - CENTER FOR INFORMATION AND RESEARCH, THE
EFFECT OF THE TAX REFORM ON THE HIGH TECH SECTOR (2002), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/doc.asp?doc=m00271&type=pdf.
173. See BARAK COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4-5.
174. The Companies Ordinance [New Version], 5743-1983, Nosah Hadash [ Israel's
New Version Lawbook] 716 [hereinafter the Companies Ordinance or the Ordinance].
175. See BARAK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4-5.
176. Id.
177. See Appendix A for the main amendments in the Israeli corporate law and the
legislative process of the Companies Law, 1999. It is worth mentioning, in this context,
the enactment of the Securities Law and the Government Companies Law, 1975,
S.C. 132 [hereinafter the Government Companies Law]. For an overview of the different
initiatives, see GROSS, supra note 122, at 1-4; BARAK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
8, at 6-8.
178. However, the new law does not concern bonds, liens, and dissolution. These
matters are still regulated by the Ordinance. See § 367 of the Companies Law, 1999.
179. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7; Procaccia, supra note 7.
180. See BARAK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8.
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to a parliamentary legislative committee.18' The Knesset passed the
Companies Law in 1999.182 But the process did not end there. It
continued in a parliamentary subcommittee that discussed the law's
regulations with respect to issues that were delegated to the Minister of
Justice and a bill amending the newly enacted law.'83
The philosophy underlying the new Israeli law, according to its
official written explanation, is the autonomy of private will. 84  Put
differently, the law assumes the existence of a free and fair marketplace
and interferes only when there is perceived to be a specific market
failure.
The law's loudest critics argue that, notwithstanding its declared
goal, the new law throws a wrench into the wheels of the free market by
over-regulating and encumbering the regular business operation of
corporations.'85 These critics, mostly representative of the industrial
sector and the high-tech industry, further claim that Israel would have
been better off adopting the Delaware General Corporation Law. 186 On
the other end of the spectrum, some academics argue that by ignoring
Israel's idiosyncratic characteristics, such as the centralized capital
market and the unspecialized court system, the new law puts misplaced
reliance on the presumption of market efficiency as the ultimate
181. See The Companies Bill, 1995 H.H., 2 [hereinafter the Companies Bill, 1995].
182. See Companies Law, 1999.
183. See The Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005, S.C. 238 [hereinafter the
Companies Law (Amendment No. 3)]. For the official explanation relating to the
amending law, see The Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002 H.H., 638 [hereinafter the
Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002] and the Companies Bill (Amendment No. 3)
(Qualification of Outside Directors), 2004 H.H.K., 4 [hereinafter the Companies Bill
(Qualification of Outside Directors 2004)].
184. The Companies Bill, 1995, at 6.
185. See Omri Yadlin, Corporate Law as a Product, 1 SHA'AREI MISHPAT 267
(1998) (Dr. Yadlin represented the Manufacturers' Association of Israel in the
Parliamentary Subcommittee meetings.); The Organization Representing Stock-
Exchange Firms Fears the New Corporate Law, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Oct.
12, 1997; Managers Against the Corporate Law, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, July 7,
1999.
186. See Zvi Lavi & Oma Raviv, Muzi Verthime: Does the Justice Ministry Seek to
Drive the Private Companies to the Stock Exchange or Abroad? GLOBES ELECTRONIC
ARCHIVE, March 26, 1997; Stella Korin-Lieber, The Jewish Head Invents Patents,
GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Dec. 23, 1999; Moran Bar Cohva & Hadas Magen, Her
Hand is Everywhere, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Dec. 26, 2000.
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guarantor of investor rights.'87 According to this view, to the extent that
the large concentration of ownership and the Israeli market's
deficiencies work to the detriment of small and unsophisticated
investors, a corporate law that assumes the existence of an efficient
market and judicial mechanisms heightens this effect.
These divergent reactions raise questions regarding the influence
exerted by different groups interested in the substance of corporate law
on the output of the legislative process. Who are these groups? In what
stage of the legislative process did they become involved? Were they
able to affect the outcomes of the process? And if so, in what respect
and to what extent?
In order to start answering these questions, this paper traces the
work of the different bodies that participated in the legislative process:
Professor Procaccia's elaborated proposal, the public committee's
discussions that resulted in a bill, and the parliamentary committee's
deliberations that created the law's final version. Using the committees'
minutes and formal protocols, as well as memoranda, newspaper
articles, and interviews with prominent figures involved in the process,
this paper aspires to portray a more complete picture of the legislative
process and to advance the understanding of its political aspects. What
follows, thus, is the story of the enactment of the new law.
188
B. 1. Professor Procaccia's Proposal
As mentioned above, the legislative process of the new corporate
law began in 1982 with Professor Procaccia's commission by then
Minister of Justice Moshe Nissim.189 That was not, however, the first
time in which a corporate law professor had been asked to prepare a
draft for a new corporate code to replace the Companies Ordinance.
187. See Zohar Goshen, A Critical Look at the New Companies Law: Corporate
Goal, Takeovers, and Class Actions, 32 MISHPATIM 381 (2002); Uriel Procaccia,
Behind the Scenes, 32 MISHPATIM 303 (2002). For a discussion of Israel's distinctive
characteristics that may necessitate mandatory interference, see Goshen, supra note 77.
188. This section of the paper is mainly based on a series of interviews conducted in
the summer of 2002 with key participants in the legislative process. For the full list of
interviews and meetings, see Appendix B.
189. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 1; Procaccia, supra note 7, at 629. The
commission was professional, in concurrence with the then Attorney General, and later
Supreme Court Justice, Prof. Isaac Zamir, and did not ensue from a political party
affiliation.
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Two earlier initiatives did not result in legislation. 9 ' This practice of
involving academics in the legislative process through drafting
preliminary proposals and/or working side by side with an appointed
public committee appears to be a common practice in legislating
extended codices in Israel.' 9'
The appointment letter of Professor Procaccia, if one existed, did
not include any specific directions regarding the contents of the proposal
or its structure. The only request the Justice Ministry made to Professor
Procaccia was that he would not settle for general principles but rather
submit a tentative draft. 192 Professor Procaccia toiled on his proposal
from 1982 to 1985.193 Whenever he finished writing a chapter, he would
send a timely draft to a wide correspondent list that included, among
others, the Israeli Bar, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the
Manufacturers' Association, the Banks' Association, and the Histadrut,
the largest workers' union in Israel, in order to receive their comments.
The responses were few. This tepid response might be explained by the
fact that these organizations believed that Professor Procaccia's work
would not result in legislation or that it would take a long time for it to
be realized. 94 Moreover, some of the groups that were later involved in
the process, such as the Association of Publicly Traded Companies, did
not even exist at the time when Professor Procaccia wrote his proposal.
B.2. The Barak Committee
In 1985, after Professor Procaccia completed his proposal, a public
committee headed by Justice Aharon Barak commenced its work.'95 The
190. See BARAK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6-8 (discussing the proposals
submitted by the late Professor Igal Yadin in 1957 and by Professor Aharon Barak in
1975. The former initiative was adopted by the Justice Ministry but never ripened into
legislation. The latter was cut off due to the appointment of Professor Barak as Attorney
General.).
191. For example, in the case of the codification of the civil law, the public
committee, also Chaired by Justice Aharon Barak, has been assisted by Professor
Miguel Deutch of Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law.
192. See Interview with Prof. Uriel Procaccia, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Faculty of Law, in Jerusalem, Israel (July 29, 2002) (on file with author).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Originally, the late Justice Isaac Kahan, retired Chief Justice of the Supreme
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idea was to create a professional committee that would create the best
corporate law for the State of Israel. According to the brief letter of
appointment, the Committee's task was to discuss the work of Professor
Procaccia. No other terms of reference were set in the letter. 196 Aware
of the failure of former initiatives, it seems that quite from the beginning
the Committee took it upon itself to create a quasi-statutory draft rather
than settling for a mere recommending explanatory format. This
approach was manifested in the Committee's agenda and final
account.197 Professor Procaccia usually opened the Committee meetings
with a presentation of the relevant topic, followed by an explanation of
the suggested legal provisions by the committee organizers. The
participants then entered into a prolonged discussion, whose resolutions
were later compiled by the committee organizers. The final report of the
Committee includes a detailed proposal, drafted as a bill.
Formally, the Barak Committee comprised seven members, among
whom only one was a government official,' 98 though experts and
interested parties were invited to the Committee meetings. Specifically,
Justice Ministry officials, the Head and the Legal Advisor of the ISA,
the Chairperson and the Managing Director of the TASE, and the Legal
Advisor of the Bank of Israel attended the Committee meetings on a
regular basis.' 99  Due to the working method of the Committee,
discussed below, all the participants, not merely the formal members,
Court, was appointed to chair the committee, but he passed away before the committee
convened. Justice Barak, who was a member of the committee, agreed to take his place
as the chairperson of the committee.
196. See Letter from Moshe Nissim, Minister of Justice, to Members of the
Committee (Feb. 12, 1985) (on file with author).
197. See BARAK COMMITTEE REPORT supra note 8.
198. The reference here is to the General Manager of the Justice Ministry, Meir
Gabay. The other members of the committee were: Prof. Joseph H. Gross of Tel Aviv
University Faculty of Law, who is also a practitioner; Amihud Ben-Porat, a practitioner
and a former chairperson of the Bar committee for corporate law legislation; the late Dr.
Eliyahu Lahovski, the legal advisor of the Jewish Agency; Prof. Meir Het, the
Chairperson of the TASE at the time of the appointment and later the Chairperson of
Bank Leumi; and Zeev Sher, then the Legal Adviser of Bank Leumi. The latter two are
former public servants and were appointed at the request (but not on behalf) of the
TASE and the Banks' Association. See GROSS, supra note 122, at 4 n,28.
199. See BARAK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-3. Other participants were
the Companies Registrar, and the Trademark Registrar. See THE JUSTICE MINISTRY, THE
COMMITTEE FOR THE PREPARATION OF A NEW COMPANIES LAW, A MEETING PROTOCOL
(Jan. 29, 1986) (on file with author).
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took part in the Committee's output.
The work of the Barak Committee lasted nine years, during which
the Committee convened more than fifty times.200 The meetings were
held approximately once a month. The discussions in the Committee
were of a highly intellectual nature. Some referred to them as an
extended course in corporate law. There were no hearings in the
accepted meaning of the term.201 The Committee invited a few external
experts to express their opinions before but most meetings were held in
the forum of the Committee members and abovementioned
participants. 0 2 Other interested parties, such as the Manufacturers'
Association or the Banks' Association, were not invited to give oral
presentations before the Committee but had an opportunity to comment
on the Committee's working drafts in writing.203 They also met formally
and informally with the representatives of the Justice Ministry and the
ISA. There was not, however, any real continuous dialogue with those
groups.
As for decision-making, there were no votes. Rather, decisions
were accepted by persuasion and compromise that led to unanimity.2 4
As was later described by Professor Procaccia:
200. See BARAK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-3. Only on the matter of
takeovers has the Barak Committee heard from international experts, such as Professors
Louis Loss and Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard, Professor Jim Gower of London, and
Professor Yaakov Amihud of Tel Aviv University and NYU. See GROSS, supra note
122, at 368 n.13.
201. That is, "[i]n legislative practice, any proceeding in which legislators or their
designees receive testimony about legislation that might be enacted". See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 725 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999).
202. In this context it is worth mentioning that on its third meeting the committee
decided not to divide its work among subcommittees but to sit in plenum. See THE
JUSTICE MINISTRY, THE COMMITTEE FOR THE PREPARATION OF A NEW COMPANIES LAW,
A MEETING PROTOCOL (Nov. 5, 1985) at 1 (on file with author).
203. See Interview with Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, organizer of the Barak
Committee and Justice Ministry representative to the parliamentary committee, in
Jerusalem, Israel (July 29, 2002) (on file with author).
204. Only three specific reservations were noted in the committee's § 420 proposal.
These were added by Professor Gross just prior to the submission of the final draft of
the committee's report to the Minister of Justice. legislation. See Interview with Michel
Ohayon, the Israeli Bar, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 23, Aug. 12, 2002) (on file with
author).
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In the Barak Committee votes never took place. Disputed matters -
and there were plenty of those - usually were not decided on the
spot, and their resolution was postponed to a later time. When the
later time arrived, the dispute was long forgotten, or the members
were exhausted discussing it, or the matter was postponed once
again. In the end consensus was achieved on all issues, despite the
severe disagreements among the members .... 205
The Committee's deliberations were not formal. Votes were not
cast. All participants, regardless of their designated status, received the
opportunity to express their views, and no practical distinction existed
between formal members of the Barak Committee and other participants.
Essentially, if not formally, the latter were part of the Committee.0 6
The organizers of the Barak Committee were representatives of the
Justice Ministry. 207  They distributed the preliminary materials,
summarized the Committee meetings,20 8 conducted additional research,
kept contact with interest groups, and drafted the Committee's final
report. Their work went well beyond procedure and had a significant
effect on the report's contents. Indeed, one of the conspicuous attributes
of Procaccia's proposal and the Barak Committee is that they
coordinated with the Justice Ministry for the whole way.20 9 In addition,
the Barak Committee Report was specific enough to be presented as a
statutory draft. These two qualifications, taken together with the
reputation of the Committee members, made it possible for the Barak
Committee Report to be adopted by the Ministers' Committee for
205. Procaccia, supra note 187, at 305 (translated freely by author).
206. See Interview with Prof. Uriel Procaccia, supra note 192.
207. See Bar Cohva & Magen, supra note 186; THE COMPANIES BILL, 1999 (SECOND
READING AND THIRD READING) (No. 287), D.K. (1999). The person who is identified
most with the legislative process of the new law is Davida Lahman-Messer, Deputy
Attorney General, who organized the work of the Barak Committee and later
accompanied the parliamentary committee' deliberations. Other representatives of the
Justice Ministry who took part in the process were Michal Agmon and later Eran
Rosman.
208. For the most part, the Barak committee's protocols consist of digests rather
than a word for word documentation.
209. For instance, in the introduction of his book, Professor Procaccia thanks
Professor Isaac Zamir, the Attorney General at the period during which the monograph
was written, for his aid in preventing opposing legislative initiatives. See PROCACCIA,
supra note 7, at 3.
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Legislation in about three hours. 210 The next stage was the Knesset.
Prior to discussing the parliamentary proceedings, a few words on
public advisory committees in Israel are apropos. 21' The use of advisory
committees in democratic countries has become a common practice in
the twentieth century.212 In Israel, at least 424 committees were
appointed between the years 1948 and 1980.213 These committees have
been appointed either on a permanent basis or ad hoc, and have usually
been assigned with one of six main tasks: studying and discussing
important policy matters; examining procedural proceedings with
respect to the implementation of laws; investigation committees;
nominations committees; arbitration; or researching into subjects that
require professional expertise (e.g., airplane crashes).2 4 Whereas the
authority, structure, and activity patterns of permanent committees were
set in the authorizing statute, no such rules or guidelines were set with
regard to ad hoc committees.
A study of ad hoc committees commissioned by the Ministry of
Finance and Ministry of Interior in the years 1970-79 identified several
characteristics of public advisory committees in Israel: 215 a committee
usually submits its report within one to two years; it typically consists of
five to eight members, about half of whom are public representatives;
decisions are usually reached through compromise and consensus; and
the supporting staff is seldom independent of the appointed ministry. As
for the chairperson, whereas most committees appointed by the Ministry
of Finance were chaired by an independent public figure, Ministry of
Interior officials chaired most committees appointed by that ministry.
Finally, from a closer scrutiny of the differences between the
committees appointed by the two ministries, the researchers reasoned
210. See Interview with Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203.
211. There has been little research on public advisory committees in Israel. A
relevant exception is: Ehud Harari & Menachem Hofnung, Advisory Committees for
Policy Making in Israel in a Comparative Perspective, 28-29 MEDINA, MIMSHAL
VIHAslM BENLEUMIYIM 39 (1988).
212. See id. at 39-40. For a list of references regarding research on the subject in
France, the United States, Sweden, Holland, Australia, Japan, and Denmark, see id. at
45.
213. Id. at 45-47.
214. Id. at41-42.
215. See id. at 47-64. To the best of my knowledge, no later empirical work on
public advisory committees in Israel exists.
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that the committees' instrumental functions varied.216 Whereas the roles
of Ministry of Finance committees were, first, the direction of policy,
and second, the incorporation of interest groups into policy making, the
roles of the Ministry of Interior's committees were mainly legitimizing
the policy adopted by the ministry and developing cooperation with
different groups whose support was required for the implementation of
the committee's recommendations.217
In view of these findings the authors concluded that evaluating the
contribution of public advisory committees according to the question of
whether their recommendations were implemented or not, is a common
mistake. This is so because the raising of new ideas in itself creates a
public discourse and openness that are crucial to policy making.21 8
Nevertheless, it would be proper to note that there are numerous
committees' reports that were never implemented, even more so when it
comes to overall reforms.1 9
Considering the attributes of the Barak Committee in light of the
aforementioned characteristics might lead to three conclusions. First,
the length of time the Barak Committee spent is extraordinary. There
are several reasons why it took the Committee nine years to complete its
work. The task the Committee undertook was gigantic.2 ' The
Committee did not settle for partial or limited revisions of the existing
Ordinance but aimed at writing a brand new corporate law from
scratch. 2 ' Its work, therefore, was much more extended than that of
216. Harari & Hofhung defined three possible instrumental roles of public advisory
committees: policy directing, i.e., providing the ministry with guidelines on a certain
issue; legitimizing the action or the inaction of the ministry; and the incorporation of
interest groups in order to give them representation in policy making processes, as well
as to encourage their support in the implementation of the committee's
recommendations. See id. at 42.
217. See id at 59-64.
218. See id. at 65-67.
219. See Interviews with Saul Bronfeld, supra note 74; Arie Mientkavich, supra
note 125. See also GROSS, supra note 122, at 2-3; BARAK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 6-7, for the futility of former public committees in amending Israeli corporate
law.
220. The Companies Law, 1999 is one of the longest statutes on the Israeli lawbook.
It consists of 378 sections. The committee's proposal consists of 420 sections.
221. See BARAK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8-9; Procaccia, supra note 7,
at 629-32. However, due to time constraints and overlapping with the Insolvency Law
Committee, the law does not concern bonds, liens, or dissolution.
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most other advisory committees. The intellectual disposition of the
meetings and their informal conduct further lengthened the process.223
In addition, the members of the Committee were engaged people who
essentially volunteered to serve on the Committee.22 4 Time became a
scarce resource under those circumstances. Apparently, there were no
significant pressures on the Committee to finish its work.225 In the
instances where market realities or political pressures did require a
reform, the Committee released partial amendments, which were later
incorporated in the new law.226
Second, the instrumental functions of the Barak Committee were
mainly the direction of policy and the incorporation of certain interest
groups that might affect the implementation of the future law. In that
sense, it resembled more the role of Ministry of Finance committees
than that of Ministry of Interior committees. Indeed, Professor
Procaccia's proposal is better seen as the baseline for the Barak
Committee's deliberations than as a binding policy, which was dictated
by the Justice Ministry and merely legitimized by the public advisory
committee.227 As for the policy directing function, it seems that the
Committee enjoyed maximal independence in its work and
recommendations. The loose language of the letter of appointment, the
formal skills of the Committee members, the availability of the
222. Indeed, two other committees that dealt with a task similar in size to that of the
Barak Committee, namely, the Civil Law Codification Committee, chaired by Justice
Barak, and the insolvency law committee, chaired by Justice Shlomo Levin, have lasted
comparable periods of time.
223. Although the Committee did not seem to reopen issues it already considered, it
was responsive to changing conditions in that it reorganized its agenda accordingly.
See Interview with Davida Lahman-Messer, Deputy Attorney General, the Justice
Ministry, in Jerusalem, Israel (Aug. 11, 2002) (on file with author).
224. See Interview with Prof. Joseph H. Gross, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law
and Gross, Klienhendler, Hodak, Halevy, Greenberg & Co. Law Offices, in Tel Aviv,
Israel (July 24, 28, 2002).
225. Compared to tax legislation that touches everyone's pocket, corporate law
legislation was perceived as less urgent.
226. The reference here is to the Securities Law (Amendment No. 9), 5748-1988,
which regulated class actions; the Law for Amending the Companies Ordinance (No. 4)
(functionary's accountability), 5751-1991; and the Securities Regulations (Limitations
on the Matter of Conflict of Interest between a Listed Company and Its Control Holder),
5754-1994.
227. See Procaccia, supra note 7, at 632.
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supporting staff, and the elaboration of the Committee's report, all point
in that direction.228  Moreover, the professional and academic
qualifications of the Committee members reinforced the perception of
the Committee as a body capable of policy guiding.229
As for the incorporation function, the participation of high level
officials of the Justice Ministry, the ISA, the TASE, and the Bank of
Israel, not only in the Committee's discussions but also in its decision-
making, increased the chances that these entities would support the
future legislation and its implementation. 23 Indeed, the abovementioned
institutions were crucial factors in the adaptation of the stock exchange
and securities regulation for a new corporate law. The compromise and
consensus in decision-making further enhanced the chance of successful
implementation, 23 although they did not prevent disagreements from
emerging in the subsequent stages of the legislative process.
2 32
Moreover, the limited inclusion of other interested parties, such as the
Bar, the Institute of CPA's, the Manufacturers' Association, the
Association of Publicly Traded Companies, and the Banks' Association
in the Barak Committee resulted in their later massive involvement in
the parliamentary committee, an involvement that affected the coherence
of the legislation and occasionally went against the Barak Committee
recommendations.233
Finally, with regard to legislation in general and corporate law
legislation in particular, it seems that Israel follows the English tradition
228. Cf Harari & Hofnung, supra note 211, at 61-62 (identifying these kind of
factors as indicators for the function of policy directing).
229. See id. (emphasizing the importance of formal qualifications for the projection
of a policy as appropriate). As was mentioned above, the Ministers' Committee for
Legislation adopted the Barak Committee's Report, as slightly revised by the Justice
Ministry representatives, after only three hours. The then Minister of Justice, David
Libaei, the head of the Ministers' Committee, declared that he was not about to
undermine the recommendations of the most prominent corporate law experts. See
Interview with Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203.
230. On the importance of the implementation of reforms, see Alex Radian & Ira
Sharkansky, Tax Reform in Israel: Partial Implementation of Ambitious Goals, 5 POL'Y
ANALYSIS 351 (1979).
231. See Harari & Hofnung, supra note 211, at 63.
232. See Interviews with Eran Rosman, Justice Ministry representative to the
parliamentary committee, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 22, 2002) (on file with author);
Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203.
233. See Procaccia, supra note 187, at 305.
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of assigning judges to chair public advisory committees.234 In that
respect, although contrary to the American doctrine of separation of
powers, appointing a justice to chair a public committee for reforming
corporate law made perfect sense in the Israeli context.235 What is more
unique in the case of Justice Barak is the deference that everyone
involved in the process awarded him. It seems that this deference not
only shaped the consensus in the Committee's recommendations but
also ensured that, as opposed to former attempts, this endeavor would be
fruitful and result in a new corporate law.236
234. By the end of the 19th century and during the first half of the 20th century, the
British Board of Trade conducted a practice of appointing advisory committees to
review and amend the Company Law every twenty years. See PAUL L. DAVIES,
GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 48-49 (6th ed. 1997). These
committees were usually chaired by a judge, e.g., the Cohen committee that submitted
its report in 1945 or the Jenkins Committee that reported in 1962. Similarly, the Law
Commissions for England and Wales and Scotland, an independent body established by
the British Parliament in 1965 to review the law and recommend reform when it is
needed, is chaired by a High Court judge who is appointed, like the other four
commissioners, by the Lord Chancellor. See http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/77.htm.
Furthermore, the recent Company Law Review, a three-year comprehensive attempt to
create a modem British corporate law, included among the members of its Steering
Group a High Court judge with a high reputation as a company lawyer. See Jonathan
Rickford, A History of the Company Law Review, in THE REFORM OF UNITED KINGDOM
COMPANY LAW 3, 8-11 (John de Lacy ed., 2002). A comparison between the British
Company Law Review and the Israeli initiative that resulted in the new corporate law
goes beyond the scope of this paper and will be left for a future time.
235. Out of more than twenty public legislation committees in Israel, only one, the
contract law committee, was not chaired by a judge. This committee was chaired by the
late Professor Gad Tadeski, a contract law expert. See Interview with Chief Justice
Aharon Barak, the Supreme Court of Israel, in New Haven, CT (Sep. 28, 2002) (on file
with author). See also THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS PRESIDENT
IN THE LEGISLATION WORK (No. 101), D.K. (2000) (responding to a MK's question, the
Minister of Justice acknowledged that Supreme Court Justices were always involved in
the groundwork of bills, and that there is no fault in this practice).
236. See, e.g., Procaccia, supra note 7, at 632 n.11 ("Justice Barak's contribution to
the final product was enormous. I am convinced that had it not been for his
inexhaustible patience and strong leadership throughout the committee's long journey,
the project would never have begun.").
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B. 3. The Parliamentary Process
The Barak Committee submitted its report to the Minister of Justice
at the end of 1994.237 Justice Ministry representatives further revised the
report, and the Ministers' Committee for Legislation then adopted it, as
any other governmental bill.238 At the end of 1995, the Knesset
endorsed the blueprint and referred it to the Constitution, Law, and
Justice Committee.2 9  Thereafter, the Constitution, Law, and Justice
Committee constituted the Subcommittee on the matter of the
Companies Bill, 1995, which prepared the bill for legislation. 40
Before describing the Subcommittee's deliberations, some
background on the working methods of parliamentary committees in
Israel is required. 24' The Knesset currently has twelve permanent
committees with fifteen to seventeen members each.242 The permanent
committees, of which the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee is
one, are free to appoint subcommittees to help them with their workload.
No guidelines exist with regard to the composition, duration,
membership, or competence of subcommittees. Similar to the rules
applied to the Knesset plenum and to the permanent committees, there is
no quorum requirement for subcommittees' deliberations or voting.243
When engaging in legislation, the Knesset committees (or
subcommittees) will usually invite official and unofficial representatives
to participate in their meetings.244 However, the committees differ with
237. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 2.
238. See id. (stating that the official explanation of the bill is mostly a literal
adaptation of the Barak Committee's Report). A bill memorandum that was distributed
by the Justice Ministry to all relevant parties prior to its approval as a blueprint resulted
in only few responses. See Interview with Davida Lahman-Messer, supra note 223.
239. The process in which the Knesset approves a governmental bill and refers it to
a parliamentary legislative committee is known as "first reading" - the first stage of a
tri-partite legislative procedure. See generally REUVEN Y. HAZAN, REFORMING
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES: ISRAEL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 55-57 (2001).
240. See THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, THE SETTING UP OF A
SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THE COMPANIES LAW (Dec. 13, 1995).
241. For an overview of the Knesset committees, see HAZAN, supra note 239, at 47-
74.
242. Id. at 61. The only exception is the Knesset (House) Committee, whose
maximum membership is set by the Knesset after each election. In the 15th Knesset,
this Committee comprised of twenty-five members. Id. at 53.
243. Id. at 52.
244. Id. at 55. Note that except for committees of inquiry, the Knesset committees
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regard to the part these representatives take in the discussions. While
the Finance Committee first hears the different representatives and later
conducts its deliberations in the presence of only the government
representatives, the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee discusses
and decides issues in the presence of all the invitees.245
No time limits exist for passing a bill through a committee, and the
procedural reporting requirements are easy to comply with. Hence, the
speed of the legislation is contingent upon "the nature, length, and
urgency of the bill, the committee's workload, and the committee
chairman. 2 46 Indeed, the chairperson dictates the agenda and the work
of the committee and has a crucial role in the legislative process of a
bill.2 4
7
As for the membership of Members of the Knesset (MK) on the
various Knesset committees (or subcommittees), it is hardly related to
MKs' professional expertise or experience in a committee. Moreover,
multiple committee membership coupled with the absence of a quorum
requirement has resulted in very low attendance rates and a reality in
which MKs show up in a committee only to cast their vote.248 Bearing
in mind the general change that the Israeli political environment has
gone through since the 1990s, and the role of the media in this
transformation,249 these participation patterns are consistent with the
general inclination toward "a reduction in the attention awarded to
important but either not newsworthy or long-term legislation, in
exchange for an appeal to the lowest common denominator, the
immediate and the popular.
250
Due to budgetary limitations, the independent counsel and
are not empowered to subpoena witnesses and documents.
245. See Interview with Eran Rosman, supra note 232.
246. HAZAN, supra note 239, at 55.
247. Id. at 69-70.
248. Id. at 66-69.
249. The reference here is to the two new Basic Laws concerning the judicial
branch; the introduction of direct elections for the prime minister (a reform that was
abolished following the 2001 elections): the adoption of primaries as the preferred
method of candidate selection; and new laws on parties and party finance. The
personification of the political discourse, that was one of the outcomes of these reforms,
was furthered by the introduction of cable TV and a second national channel which
provide politicians increasing opportunities for public exposure. See id. at 49-51.
250. Id. at 50.
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administrative measures available to the Knesset committees have been
quite restricted. In essence, the permanent committees (and their
subcommittees) are dependent on the government ministries for
professional knowledge and base their decisions, inter alia, on the media
and on reports of interested parties.251 Under these conditions, it is a
common practice for a committee to invite several interested parties in
order to create a conflict among them, with the hope that the conflict
would reveal the truth and compensate for inadequate research
expertise.252 However, the danger latent in this practice is that "without
the ability to access impartial research on important subjects, the
committee members might not possess the proper tools to evaluate the
evidence that is presented to them, and the debate might revolve around
contentious data. ' '253 In addition, the continuing reliance of the Knesset
committees on the executive for professional advice has given the
administration a significant informational advantage. 4
Against this backdrop, the attributes of the Subcommittee on the
matter of the Companies Bill, 1995,255 discussed below, seem in no way
unique and characterize quite fairly the common practice of the Knesset
committees and subcommittees.
The Subcommittee consisted of four MKs; none of them except for
the chairperson was present on a regular basis.2 56 In contrast, the
participation of interest groups, as invitees, was quite considerable.
Representatives of the Bar, the Institute of CPA's, the Manufacturers'
Association, the Association of Publicly Traded Companies, and the
Banks' Association were present at practically all meetings. Similarly,
representatives of the TASE, the ISA, and often the Companies
Registrar, the Ministry of Finance, and the Bank of Israel took part in
251. Id. at 73.
252. See Interview with Dr. Reuven Y. Hazan, The Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem
Dep't. of Political Science, in Jerusalem, Israel (July 9, 2002).
253. HAZAN, supra note 239, at 73.
254. More profound questions regarding the role of the bureaucracy in the modem
democracy go beyond the scope of this paper.
255. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 13TH KNESSET, 5TH
SESS., PROTOCOLS No. 1-7 (1995-1996) [hereinafter the Parliamentary Subcommittee or
the Subcommittee].
256. See id. According to the official protocols, no other MK was present in the first
seven sessions of the Subcommittee that took place during the 13th Knesset.
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the discussions.257 In addition, representatives of the Justice Ministry,
and occasionally Professors Procaccia and Gross of the Barak
Committee, attended the sessions.
The Subcommittee considered the Companies Bill for three years in
the course of two Knesset sittings, the 13th and the 14th. 258 During this
period of time it conducted thirty-seven meetings. 259 The work of the
committee was elaborate and extensive. It went article by article,
drafting the different arrangements into definite legislative language.
The sessions were conducted by the chairperson, who permitted the
participation of anyone who wished to appear before the Subcommittee,
not as a witness whose knowledge was crucial to the process, but rather
as a concerned party representing its own opinion or world-view.260
Observing the "negotiation" between the Justice Ministry
representatives and the other participants, the chairperson, a bit like an
arrest judge, a bit like a technical person, would separate the gist from
the trivial with the purpose of putting into effect a reasonable product.261
Usually, the other invitees would submit their comments to the Justice
Ministry representatives in advance. The latter would shape their stance
on the matter, so that the Subcommittee would dwell only on the
disputed issues. In this context, it is noteworthy that several agreements
and compromises, some of them on substantial issues, were reached
outside the Subcommittee's meeting room.262
257. Note that the Companies Registrar acts under the Justice Ministry and performs
an administrative function.
258. The length of the parliamentary process regarding the Companies Bill is
exceptional and ensued from the extent of the legislation. See THE CONSTITUTION,
LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, 14TH KNESSET, 4TH SESS., PROTOCOL No. 266, 3 (Dec.
1, 1998).
259. During the 13th Knesset, the Subcommittee, headed by MK Dan Meridor,
conducted seven sessions. In its next cadence, the Subcommittee was headed by MK
and later Deputy Minister Eliezer Sandberg and conducted another thirty sessions. Both
MKs possess legal education. For the full list of invitees to the Subcommittee
meetings, see infra Appendix D.
260. See Interview with Eliezer Sandberg, Chairperson of the Parliamentary
Subcomm. during the 14th Knesset, in Jerusalem, Israel (July 9, 2002) (on file with
author).
261. See id.
262. The reference here is to matters such as mergers and acquisitions, the
company's capital, and shareholder's fairness duty. See Interviews with Eran Rosman,
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After hearing the different participants, the Subcommittee members
would decide the issue. These were the instances where MKs, often
armed with pre-dictated responses, would storm into the meeting room
and express their reservations. That was when lobbying and logrolling
manifested themselves.263
Nevertheless, it seems that the Subcommittee's deliberations, taken
as a whole, ran effectively and were to-the-point. Following
professional lines, the Subcommittee was able to produce the bulk of the
legislation in a manner which all concerned parties found acceptable.
264
This is not to say that some insignificant issues from a corporate law
perspective did not gain exaggerated attention due to their effect on
special interest groups.
265
The main criticism or retrospective contemplation of the people
involved in the process has to do with the indifference of Subcommittee
members, with the input on which the Subcommittee based its decisions,
and with the tone of the discussion. More specifically, it was argued
that most of the Subcommittee members did not demonstrate seriousness
in their work, that they were not conversant in the issues and often more
interested in publicity than in substance, and that the information offered
to them by the invitees was partial and not always profound. It should
be emphasized, in this regard, that the Subcommittee did not summon
individuals or groups to appear before it. Rather, the people who asked
to be invited to the sessions, whose schedule was publicly known, had
an interest in opening the Subcommittee's eyes regarding the "right
way. 266 The flip side of this situation is that other parties with interests
supra note 232; Omri Yadlin, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law, representative of the
Manufacturers' Association of Israel to the parliamentary committee, in Tel Aviv, Israel
(July 7, 2002) (on file with author). For further discussion of these specific issues, see
infra Part III.B.
263. See Interviews with Eliezer Sandberg, supra note 260; Prof. Uriel Procaccia,
supra note 192; Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203.
264. See Interview with Eliezer Sandberg, supra note 260.
265. The two prominent examples for this phenomenon are the debates regarding the
definition of the company's external accountant, as distinguished from the company's
internal auditor, and regarding the question of who can audit companies' reports, only a
CPA or also, under certain circumstances, a tax advisor. Both issues were revisited in
the final meetings of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, before approving
the bill and forwarding it to the Knesset plenum. See THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND
JUSTICE COMMITTEE, supra note 258, at 10, 30.
266. See Interview with Eliezer Sandberg, supra note 260.
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that might have been pertinent to corporate law legislation, such as
institutional investors, small creditors, or workers' unions, did not
provide input to the Subcommittee.267
In addition, and as opposed to the Barak Committee, the
atmosphere surrounding the Subcommittee meetings was polemic, to say
the least. Power struggles, yelling, and aggressiveness were the nouns
mentioned in this context. In the words of Professor Procaccia: "Many
of the Knesset Members did not look favorably on the involvement of
the professional level, the Justice Ministry staff and the Barak
Committee's representatives, and often hushed them rudely. 268
B.4. Epilogue
Once the Subcommittee completed its work, the amended bill was
submitted to the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee for its
approval.269 The Committee discussed only a handful of issues that were
not resolved in the Subcommittee and returned the bill to the Knesset
plenum.270 On April 19, 1999, the Knesset passed the Companies Law
in a special session.271  The law came into force as of February 1,
2000,272 but the process did not end there. It continued in another
parliamentary subcommittee that discussed the law's regulations with
respect to issues that were delegated to the Minister of Justice2 73 and a
267. See Interview with Davida Lahman-Messer, supra note 223; cf Eliezer
Sandberg, Statement of the Head of the Legislative Subcommittee on the Companies
Bill, 1 SHA'AREI MISHPAT 261 (1998) (stating that in order to create a well implemented
law, the committee heard from representatives of various groups and organizations that
the committee considered to be the users of the new law, namely: the Bar, the
Association of Publicly Traded Companies, the Banks, the Institute of CPAs, expert
academics, the ISA, and the TASE. Institutional investors, consumer groups, and
academics or lawyers who advocate for small shareholders were not, however, included
among them).
268. Procaccia, supra note 187, at 305 (translated freely by author).
269. See THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, supra note 258, at 3.
270. See id.
271. The special session was required due to the Continuity of Bill Discussion Law,
1993, which enabled succeeding discussion of a bill in only one subsequent Knesset.
272. See Companies Law, 1999, § 377.
273. See Companies Law, 1999, § 366(b) (conditioning the regulations on the
approval of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee).
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governmental bill that resulted in a law amending the newly enacted
law. 74 The story of the amendment and related initiatives is discussed
in detail in Part III of this paper. 75
In order to evaluate main provisions of the new corporate law and
their responsiveness to various interest groups, the next section outlines
the relevant interest groups with respect to corporate law legislation in
the Israeli setting.
C. Relevant Interest Groups
Based on the characteristics of the Israeli economy and the
legislative process portrayed above, various groups might have been
expected to have a prominent interest in corporate law legislation. This
does not necessarily mean that all of them participated in the legislative
process. This section discusses the various interest groups and evaluates
their relative strengths and participation patterns.
C. 1. Regulators
Two distinct bodies of the Executive were deeply involved in the
legislative process of the new law: the Justice Ministry and the Israel
Securities Authority (ISA). Not only are these bodies separate
entities, 276 but they also differ in their goals and perception of corporate
law legislation, as well as in their situs in the political arena.
The Justice Ministry representatives perceive themselves as
representatives of the public at large and corporate law as a balancing
code among the different interests involved. These interests include not
only shareholders, but also customers, creditors, and employees. 77 The
Justice Ministry does not employ lobbyists in the Knesset. Its strength is
derived from the decisiveness and professionalism ascribed to its
personnel.2
78
274. The law includes both technical and substantial amendments and was passed by
the Knesset on March 7, 2005. See Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005.
275. See infra Part III.B.
276. Under the Securities Law, the ISA is an independent regulatory agency, whose
members are appointed by the Minister of Finance.
277. See Interview with Davida Lahman-Messer, supra note 223.
278. See, e.g., Bar Cohva & Magen, supra note 186; Ronit Vardi, Davida Lahman-
Messer and Her Fight Against the Lobbyists, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, June 13,
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Since legislation regarding Israeli corporations falls under the
authority of the Minister of Justice, representatives of the Justice
Ministry were involved in the legislative process from its inception.7 9
A review of the Subcommittee protocols indicates that the Justice
Ministry representatives usually received comments from the other
Committee's invitees in advance and introduced the issues discussed in
each Subcommittee meeting. In essence, they had considerable control
over the proportional weight given to each matter. The drafting task of
the bill was also left in the hands of the ministry representatives.
Likewise, they were responsible for the drafting of the law's regulations
and the Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002.80
As for the ISA, the Securities Law defines its role as the protection
of investors' affairs.2 1  The ISA interpreted this statutory provision to
mean that its role is the creation of a fair and functioning capital market.
Consequently, the ISA representatives emphasize the importance of
enforcement in encouraging investors' trust in the market. They
conceive economic legislation, including corporate law legislation, as an
ordering instrument that enables the economy to work, rather than as an
independent justice mechanism in its own right. 2  Moreover, unlike its
American counterpart, the ISA views the highly concentrated ownership
structure of Israeli companies as the unique and main problem of the
Israeli capital market. Accordingly, it justifies stricter rules as a means
to protect minority shareholders against control holders.283
Following the change of personnel at the head of the ISA in 1987
and the resultant rise in its status in the economy, the ISA became an
active participant in the legislative process of the new corporate law.
The Chairperson and the Legal Advisor of the ISA attended the Barak
Committee meetings on a regular basis. Representatives of the ISA
participated in all of the meetings of the Parliamentary Subcommittee
and kept in close touch with the Justice Ministry representatives.
Other regulating bodies, such as the Ministry of Finance and the
2002.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 207-208.
280. Drafts of the bill were published on the Justice Ministry website at
www.justice.gov.il.
281. See Securities Law § 2.
282. See Interview with Arie Mientkavich, supra note 125.
283. See id.; Interview with Dr. Shimon Wise, supra note 125.
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Bank of Israel took part in the legislative process to a much lesser
extent. Although their representatives were present at some Barak
Committee and the Parliamentary Subcommittee sessions, it seems that
their overall involvement in the process was relatively minor. 84 The
minimal involvement can be attributed to the allocation of authority
between the different governmental agencies and the ability of these
bodies to exert direct influence on other aspects of commercial
legislation, such as banking, tax, and capital market regulation.
C.2. Business Service Providers
Various service providers and intermediaries were involved in the
legislative process. Aside from the TASE, whose representatives
participated in the Barak Committee meetings, representatives of other
bodies, such as the Israeli Bar, the Institute of CPAs, and the Institute of
Internal Auditors only had a share in the Parliamentary Committee
meetings.
As mentioned above, the TASE heads were invited to take part in
the Barak Committee meetings. 85  In addition, the sole TASE
representative participated in the majority of the Subcommittee
meetings.
It is noteworthy that the TASE role in regulating the stock exchange
and the principal conceptions held by its Managing Director have
changed conspicuously in the course of the legislation of the new law.
With the empowerment of the ISA at the end of the 1980s and its taking
over the regulation of various issues of corporate governance, the TASE
has focused on facilitating the trade and listing of companies on the
exchange. Since the mid-1990s, when the listing of Israeli Companies
on the NASDAQ became a common phenomenon, 86 the TASE has
shifted its approach from a pro-investor, paternalistic position to a pro-
company, business-oriented one. TASE's explanation for this shift is
that, in the long run, the factor which dictates the size, the vitality, and
284. Each of these bodies was represented in less than half of the Parliamentary
Subcommittee meetings, usually by no more than one representative. For the sake of
comparison, the Justice Ministry and the ISA were represented in virtually all of the
Subcommittee meetings, each having, on average, three representatives. See Appendix
D for the full list of invitees to the Subcommittee meetings.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 154-157.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
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the contribution of the capital market to the economy is the supply of
companies rather than the demand of investors.287
As for the Israeli Bar and the Institute of CPAs, their
representatives participated in a considerable part in the Parliamentary
Subcommittee meetings. 88 While the Institute of CPAs used intensive
lobbying regarding its concerns, the Bar representation was regarded by
most other participants in the legislative process as trivial and lacked
strong professional backing by leading corporate lawyers.289 This might
have been the result of the fact that the Bar committee for corporate law
legislation is based on voluntary membership, met only sporadically
during the legislative process, and did not enjoy strong political support
or professional esteem.290
Other groups of service providers, such as the Institute of Internal
Auditors, the Tax Advisors Bar, and the Insurance Companies'
Association, sent their representatives to selected Subcommittee
meetings when their direct interests were at stake.
C.3. Shareholders, Managers, and Control Holders
Two bodies that represent shareholders, managers, and control
holders, the Association of Publicly Traded Companies and the
Manufacturers' Association, took part in the legislative process.
Although representing different segments of the economy, the interests
of these two bodies with regard to the new corporate law converged on
most issues.
291
287. See Interview with Saul Bronfeld, supra note 74.
288. The Bar representatives, usually one or two in number, participated in 34 (out
of 37) of the Subcommittee meetings. One to three representatives of the Institute of
CPAs participated in 18 of the Subcommittee meetings. See Appendix D.
289. See Interviews with Prof. Uriel Procaccia, supra note 192; Prof. Joseph H.
Gross, supra note 224; Eran Rosman, Justice Ministry representative to the
parliamentary committee, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 22, 2002). In the early stages of the
parliamentary process both the Bar and the Institute of CPAs were represented by
Michel Ohayon of the Israeli Bar. Later, Mr. Ohayon kept representing the Bar, on a
voluntary basis, as a member and later the elected chairperson of the Bar committee for
corporate law legislation. See Interview with Michel Ohayon, supra note 204.
290. For a comparison of the different roles the Bar plays in Israel and in the U.S.,
see infra text accompanying notes 716-27.
291. See also THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
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The Association of Publicly Traded Companies was established in
1991 by a group of Chairpersons and CEOs of public companies and
lawyers, as a response to strict regulation of the companies listed on the
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange by the TASE and the ISA.2 92 Aiming at
representing public companies before the executive and legislative
authorities, the Association aspires to be a balancing factor, which raises
the practical aspects and consequences of regulating different activities
of those companies. 293 Although formally acting for public companies
as a whole rather than for the shareholders, managers, or directors, in
essence, due to the concentrated ownership structure of the Israeli
capital market,294 the Association's interests usually coincide with those
of the control holders who dominate the market.
In a relatively short period of time since its inception, the
Association of Publicly Traded Companies became involved in
legislation concerning public companies.295 With respect to the new
corporate law, the Association sent its remarks to the Barak Committee
Report which was then distributed by the Justice Ministry to different
groups and organizations, prior to its approval as a blueprint. Later, the
Association representatives, usually 2 or 3 in number, participated in
each of the 37 meetings conducted by the parliamentary subcommittee.
In addition, the Association was one of the driving forces behind the
Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002.296
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 13TH KNESSET, 5TH
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 1, 29 (Dec. 24, 1995) (In his opening statement to the
Subcommittee, the representative of the Association of Publicly Traded Companies
noted that in order to facilitate the work of the committee, the two organizations had
agreed to coordinate their comments with regard to public companies.).
292. See http://www.e-good.org.il/about_us/default.asp.
293. See Interviews with Gad Soen, Managing Director, The Ass'n of Publicly
Traded Companies, in Tel Aviv, Isr. (July 8, 2002) (on file with author); Nathan Shilo,
Legal Adviser, The Ass'n of Publicly Traded Companies, in Tel Aviv, Isr. (July 14,
2002) (on file with author). The Association consists of 200 to 250 companies (out of
about 600 companies currently listed on the TASE). According to Mr. Shilo, due to the
prevalence of control groups, each holding several public companies, in effect, the
Association represents 400 to 500 listed companies.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 134-42.
295. See Interview with Gad Soen, supra note 293.
296. See, e.g., The Amendments to the Companies Law were Approved by the
Ministers' Committee of Legislation and Passed to the Knesset's Constitution
Committee, THE ASS'N OF PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES, PRESS RELEASES, May 1,
2002, available at http://www.e-good.org.il/news/content.asp?ID=93.
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The Manufacturers' Association was established in 1921, and its
goal is to represent the interests of the industrial sector in dealing with
governmental authorities and to improve its status. The Association's
members consist of 1700 factories, including the largest industrial
companies operating in the Israeli economy. In the past, a large part of
the Association's activity was directed towards the employment
relationship. Today, it has extended its interest to economic policy and
foreign trade and has taken a dominant role in lobbying with regard to
economic legislation.297
Similar to the Association of Publicly Traded Companies, the
Manufacturers' Association became involved in the legislative process
of the new corporate law in a more meaningful way once the Knesset
endorsed the Companies Bill, 1995, as a blueprint. It participated in 29
meetings of the Parliamentary Subcommittees and hired external legal
experts to represent its interests in those meetings.298 For the most part,
those interests corresponded to the interests of the business sector at
large, and in particular to the interests of managers and control holders.
The notion was to create a useful and efficient law.299  The
Manufacturers' Association also employed intensive political lobbying
with regard to certain issues that it conceived as significant and was
active in the post-enactment proceedings that resulted in the amending
law. 30
0
C.4. Creditors
The Banks' Association, in which all local banks are members, is
the main body that represented creditors in the legislative process of the
new corporate law.30  Despite the extensive role of banks in the Israeli
297. See Interview with Shuki Abramovich, Director of the Economy Division, the
Manufacturers' Ass'n of Israel, in Tel Aviv, Isr. (Aug. 12, 2002) (on file with author).
298. The Manufacturers' Association first hired the services of Dr. David Tadmor,
then a private lawyer. When Dr. Tadmor was appointed as the head of the Israeli
Antitrust Authority, he was replaced by Dr. Omri Yadlin of Tel Aviv University Faculty
of Law.
299. See Interview with Omri Yadlin, supra note 262.
300. See Interview with Shuki Abramovich, supra note 297.
301. See also Interview with Davida Lahman-Messer, supra note 223 (noting the
minor participation of the Bank of Israel and the fact that it protects only insured
creditors).
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economy and the multiple hats they wear, 0 2 the Banks' Association
primarily represented the interest of the banks as commercial banks; that
is, as creditors. 3
The Banks' Association was mostly involved in the parliamentary
stage of the legislative process.3°4 One or two representatives of the
Association were present in the vast majority of the Subcommittee
meetings and their work was considered serious and professional.
It is noteworthy that small creditors, such as suppliers and
consumers had no representation in the legislative process.30 5 Their
interests were considered to the extent that it was consistent with the
interests of the banks and as part of general interest in the importance of
protecting creditors in corporate law legislation.3 6
C.5. Non-Participating Groups
Two groups that might have been expected to take an active part in
the adoption of new corporate law were absent from the legislative
arena: institutional investors and labor organizations. Against the
background of the Israeli economy, their absence can be easily
explained.
With regard to institutional investors, the various limitations still
imposed by the government on pension funds and provident funds
discouraged them from taking an active role in corporate governance as
investors of the companies in which they invest. As a result, their
interest in corporate law legislation was limited.30 7  Moreover, the
302. See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
303. See Interview with Ruth Shikler, Deputy Chief Legal Adviser, Bank Leumi,
representative of the Banks' Association to the parliamentary committee, in Tel Aviv,
Israel (Aug. 13, 2002) (on file with author). Others interests in play were the interests
of the banks as shareholders, as companies, and as exchange members.
304. This is not to say that informal contacts with the banks did not exist during the
Barak Committee sitting. See Interviews with Dr. Shimon Wise, supra note 125; Judge
Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203.
305. See Interview with Davida Lahman-Messer, supra note 223.
306. See Interviews with Ruth Shikler, supra note 303; Eliezer Sandberg, supra note
260; Eran Rosman, supra note 232.
307. Notice that since Jan. 1, 2003, due to an amendment in the Income Tax
Ordinance, pension funds and provident funds are allowed to appoint directors and to
hold up to 50% of the shares of the companies in which they invest, as opposed to a
25% cap that was previously in effect. This amendment is expected to increase the
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dominance of the banks in the economy and the fact that they hold most
of the mutual funds might have neutralized the managers of those funds
from taking any active role in the legislation."' As mentioned above,
the Banks' Association first and foremost represented their interest as
creditors rather than shareholders.
As for labor organizations, although an extensive discussion of the
labor relationship in Israel is beyond the scope of this paper, it is
sufficient to note here that workers' organizations have traditionally
used the well developed system of Israeli labor law to protect their
interests.
30 9
C.6. Other Considerations
For the sake of completeness, two other factors that have shaped the
structure of the Corporations Law, 1999, should be pointed out prior to
analyzing the influence of interest groups on the legislative process.
First, as will be discussed in detail in the next part of this paper, the
new corporate law is an overall reform based on a proposal made by
Professor Procaccia. 10 This pattern by itself gave rise to numerous
criticisms by the business sector, which feared that the new provisions
(or the lack thereof) might expose it to new liabilities and
uncertainties.31' Creativity was not a virtue valued by the users of the
law.312
monitoring power of institutional investors. See Globes Service, Starting Jan.
Institutional Investors Could Hold up to 50% of a Corporation's Control Instruments,
GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE (Dec. 23, 2002).
308. At the end of 2002, the 25 largest mutual funds, which held approximately 50%
of the overall assets of the mutual fund industry, were affiliated with the three largest
banks: the Poalim, Leumi and Discount. See Daphna Zuker, The Assets of the 25
Largest Funds - 50% of all Funds, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, (Feb. 25, 2003).
309. For an elaborate discussion of the labor relationship in Israel, see MENACHEM
GOLDBERG & JOSEPH HAUSMAN, LABOUR LAWS, LAWS, REGULATIONS, ORDERS,
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS, PRECEDENTS, COMMENTARIES (38th ed. 2003).
310. See, e.g., Procaccia, supra note 7.
311. See Interviews with Shuki Abramovich, supra note 297; Ruth Shikler, supra
note 303; Saul Bronfeld, supra note 74; Arie Mientkavich, supra note 125.
312. See also Interview with Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203 (noting
that since the enactment of the new law judges base their decisions on practical issues
and avoid making a theoretical determination regarding innovative arrangements set by
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Second, during the legislative process, no extensive thought was
given to the ability of the Israeli court system to enforce corporate law
legislation and the implication of this matter for the drafting of different
provisions as standards or bright line rules.3" 3 In practice, however, an
unspecialized court system that cannot immediately meet the needs of a
vibrant business sector may result in a search for alternative solutions,
such as arbitration or mediation. These solutions, while furnishing an
immediate answer to the relevant parties, are less efficient for the
economy at large since they do not create binding precedents or norms,
which are important for a stable infrastructure for economic activity.
314
D. Summary
This part of the paper presented the course of the production of the
new Israeli corporate law. The accounts of Israel's economy, the
legislative process of the new law, and the relevant interest groups that
were laid out in this part provide the basis for the analysis of the political
economy of corporate law legislation developed in the following part.
In particular, examining the modifications of the law during the
legislative process in light of those accounts will enable us to assess the
responsiveness of different segments of the legislation to different
groups and interests.
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE LAW LEGISLATION
The aim of this part of the paper is to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the political aspects of the enactment of the new Israeli
corporate law. It consists of three sections. The first section reviews the
the new law).
313. See Procaccia, supra note 187, at 305-12 (noting that the lack of a specialized
court system in Israel and the reservations that the court has with regard to economic
considerations make it a less efficient producer of corporate laws). For the difference
between standards and bright-line rules, see infra text accompanying notes 523-28.
314. See Interviews with Arie Mientkavich, supra note 125; Davida Lahman-
Messer, supra note 223. Cf Ehud Kamar, Costs of Departures from Formalism:
Shareholder Litigation under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 887,
890 (1999) (arguing that litigation can reduce legal uncertainty since "[a]s decided
cases accumulate, the interpretation and proper application of fiduciary standards
become clearer, allowing directors and officers to estimate legal outcomes more
accurately and thus to behave closer to the social optimum").
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law's general characteristics and specific contents, as revised in the
course of the legislative process. The second section examines
empirical evidence regarding the actual impact of various interest groups
during the different stages of the legislation. In an attempt to evaluate
the effect of interest groups on the outcome of the Companies Law,
1999, and post-enactment proceedings, this section focuses on certain
defining mechanisms established by the new law and their
appropriateness for Israel's particular socio-economic and institutional
attributes. The last section sums up the findings and offers a political
theory framework of the Israeli corporate law.
A. The New Corporate Law - General Characteristics and Specific
Contents
The new corporate law is an extensive and general statute that
purports to modernize an anachronistic statutory setting and to codify
the essence of Israel's common law that was developed by the
judiciary. 3'5 Thus, the law redefines issues of incorporation, the legal
entity, majority rules, rights and duties of shareholders and directors,
allocation of authority, board structure and role, capital preservation,
mergers and acquisitions, and filing requirements. It also codifies for
the first time several issues regarding promoters, derivative action, and
piercing the corporate veil.316 Notably, the law is rich in standards, such
as 'good faith', 'accepted way' and 'fairness', and leaves the regulation
of various issues to the Minister of Justice.
A.]. General Characteristics
A number of principles formed the basis of Professor Procaccia's
proposal and were adopted by the Barak Committee, whose work is the
cornerstone for the new corporate law. First, the legal arrangements set
by the law are intended to intertwine with the wider array of Israeli civil
law and particularly with the general contract law.3" 7 Accordingly, the
company's bylaws are defined as a contract between the company and
315. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 2-5.
316. For a table comparing the Companies Ordinance and the prevailing common
law to the Companies Law, 1999, see GRoss, supra note 122, at 383-92.
317. PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 10-14.
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its shareholders, and among the shareholders themselves.3"8 Similarly,
when applying rights and duties toward the company and toward its
fellow shareholders, a shareholder is required to act in good faith and in
an accepted way and to avoid abusing its powers. 319 However, when the
corporate existence dictates a different kind of solution, the law diverts
from the general civil law and provides a special arrangement that will
fit the problem.32 °
Second, acknowledging the autonomy of private will, the law
favors an enabling model of legislation. That is, it presupposes that
enabling legislative arrangements are more efficient than mandatory
ones and therefore limits the use of mandatory provisions only to
extreme cases of market failure.3  More specifically, Professor
Procaccia's hypothesis is that the parties know best what is good for
them and, thanks to market forces, are expected to reach an optimal
solution. Based on interest-group theory, he contends that delegating to
the legislature the power to shape arrangements will result in
unnecessary burdens and costs that might be larger than the ones caused
by market failures.322  Regarding corporate law legislation, Professor
Procaccia infers from the American "race to the top" theory the efficacy
of enabling corporate law legislation in a monistic country like Israel.
His reasoning is that instead of American interstate jurisdictional
competition to assure an optimal legal product, the competition will
occur among the bylaws of the different corporations in a monistic
country.323 In addition, the freedom of corporations to migrate and
reincorporate in foreign countries reduces the gap between a federal
system, which enables interstate competition, and a monistic system,
which does not provide internal competition.32 4 However, and despite
his belief in the restraining power of the market, at least in the long run,
Professor Procaccia acknowledges the necessity of mandatory
legislation where market failures exist, such as in the case of
318. Companies Law, 1999, HH, § 17.
319. Companies Law, 1999, HH, § 192(a).
320. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 7.
321. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 14-23; Uriel Procaccia, Companies and Other
Firms in a Theoretical Scope, in MEMORIAL BOOK FOR GOALTIREO PROCACCIA - LEGAL
ESSAYS 217, 228-34 (1996).
322. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 17-18.
323. Id. at 20-21.
324. See Procaccia, supra note 321, at 231.
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externalities or collective action problems.325
Finally, the legislation is based not only on efficiency
considerations but also on principles of fairness and equality.326 Yet,
coinciding with the goal of the business corporation - the welfare of all
the company's shareholders327 - the principles of fairness usually
parallel those of efficiency. That is, they are most relevant in incidents
of market failure.
The Israeli law's architects thus envisioned a modem instrument
that is meant to facilitate commercial activity through efficient and just
arrangements. Notwithstanding Israel's own market realities, the
concept that steered the legislation is a liberal one, and the common
denominator of the abovementioned guidelines is that they all justify
legal intervention only on the basis of a perceived market failure.328
Under these assumptions, the significance of identifying specific
market failures and defining the mechanisms for overcoming them is
immense. An unidentified market failure may result in inefficient or
unfair allocation of resources, while over-regulation may hinder efficient
transactions. Similarly, an improper treatment of market failures may
cause various deficiencies, which are as acute as the market failures
themselves.
Obviously, different interests would gain from different legal
arrangements and, thus, might encourage the legislature to create
mechanisms that benefit them, regardless of their overall impact.
Section B attempts to trace this influence by analyzing the political
dynamics that affected the legislation in different stages of the process.
325. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 21-23; Procaccia, supra note 321, at 232-34.
326. See Procaccia, supra note 321, at 236-37; Davida Lahman-Messer & Eran
Rosman, Statement of the Justice Ministry's Representatives, 1 SHA'AREI MISHPAT 263
(1998). See also Procaccia, supra note 7, at 631 n.5 (noting that "it proved much easier
to sway the relevant advisory and legislative committees to adopt a given idea if it could
be shown that its rationale does not rest on economic analysis alone, but also on more
abstract 'legal' considerations, such as 'reasonableness', 'good faith', or sheer everyday
common sense").
327. Lahman-Messer & Rosman, supra note 326.
328. Indeed, in a lecture given in 1995 at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
Professor Procaccia stated: "I believe that Israel's future corporate code might be the
first major statute in any Western jurisdiction which was explicitly conceived and
designed to promote the 'Social Good', as interpreted with the aid of economic tools."
See Procaccia, supra note 7, at 631.
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A.2. The Companies Law's Content
The Companies Law, 1999, replaces the Companies Ordinance,
except for the provisions regarding bonds, liens, and dissolution that are
the subject of discrete ongoing legislative reforms.32 9 It applies to both
private and public companies, although its main focus is on the public
(traded) company due to its distinct attributes.33 ° Founded on the
doctrine of the company's separate legal entity and setting the limited
liability of the shareholders as a starting point, the new law is intended
to regulate the company's actions, structure, and governance, as well as
the relationship among the company's various constituencies."'
While generally based on Professor Procaccia's proposal, as revised
by the Barak Committee, the law diverges from these sources on certain
issues. The major modifications that occurred in the course of the
legislative process will be discussed subsequent to the overview of the
law's content.
The law consists of ten chapters.332 The first chapter includes
definitions of different terms used by the law. As part of the
coordination between the Companies Law and the Securities Law, there
exist cross-references regarding several definitions used by both, such as
control, holding, acquisition, subsidiary, and class action. The second
chapter is concerned with the incorporation of the company. Following
Professor Procaccia's proposal and the Barak Committee Report, the
new law has legitimized the one-person company, defined the company
as a legal entity and set its end, codified the matter of promoters,
abolished the ultra vires doctrine, and simplified the process of
incorporation by creating a single document, the bylaws, that can be
altered by a simple majority of the company's shareholders.333 It has
also codified the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, though the
329. See THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, 14TH KNESSET, 4TH
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 266, 4 (Dec. 1, 1998).
330. Id. at 5-6.
331. Id.
332. See generally id. at 6-10; THE COMPANIES LAW, 1999 (SECOND READING AND
THIRD READING) (NO. 287), D.K. (1999).
333. According to the Companies Ordinance, two different documents, the
memorandum and the bylaws, were required in order to incorporate. They were only
partially alterable and, if so, only through special majority rules. The Ordinance also
included, as its second appendix, a sample of bylaws, which served as a default for
limited companies.
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boundaries of the doctrine, its application, and its formulation have been
revised over and over during the different phases of the legislative
process, as will be discussed further below.
The third chapter of the law lays out the company's structure. It
sets out the company's organs and their authorities. These organs are:
the general meeting of shareholders, whose vote is required on
fundamental changes with respect to corporate structure or governance;
the board of directors, whose role is to set the company's policy and
supervise the management; and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who
runs the company on a day-to-day basis.334 Private companies are
relieved from some of the provisions in this chapter, such as the duty to
appoint a CEO.335 On the other hand, public companies are subjected to
additional provisions such as the postal vote or the prohibition against
the chairperson of the board acting as the CEO.336 Both of these latter
provisions were modified by the Subcommittee.
The fourth chapter discusses the company's administration. It
regulates the registration of shareholders (and block holders in public
companies), as well as reporting and auditing requirements.
The next chapter is concerned with the company's shareholders and
defines their rights and duties. It also codifies the areas of derivative
suit and class action.337 While adhering to the general notions of the
Barak Committee, the Subcommittee altered the scope of some of the
provisions in this chapter.
In its sixth chapter, the law deals with the company's managers and
directors. It preserves the mechanism that was set by the Ordinance
regarding the appointment of two independent directors to the board of a
public company. However, following the Barak Committee, it diverges
from the original arrangement with regard to the appointment method of
these directors. Similarly, the law adopts the provisions on the subject
of managers' and directors' rights and duties and conflict of interest
transactions that were recommended by the Barak Committee and
334. This is a variation from the Companies Ordinance that set the board of directors
as the organ who manages the company.
335. See § 119 of the Companies Law, 1999.
336. See §§ 87-89, 95 of the Companies Law, 1999.
337. The latter was temporarily codified in the Securities Law since 1988. See the
Securities Law (Amendment No. 9), 1988 H.H. 5748.
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incorporated into positive law prior to the Committee's final report.338
The Subcommittee clarified these provisions and modified some of
them.
The seventh chapter of the law regulates the company's capital. It
is founded on the concept of "distribution," a term set by Professor
Procaccia to include any reduction in the company's capital, be it
through dividend or the repurchase of the company's shares.339 The
eighth chapter discusses mergers and acquisitions. It establishes new
arrangements for statutory mergers and tender offers and prohibits street
sweeps that result in a control block. The details of these arrangements
have changed over the different stages of the legislation.
The ninth chapter consists of general provisions and is concerned,
among others, with the enforcement of the law through monetary
sanctions, an enforcement tool that was created by the Barak
Committee.34 ° It also deals with structural changes, other than the ones
discussed in the previous chapter, and delegates to the Minister of
Justice the right to regulate public companies that are listed outside of
Israel, as well as any other issue that is required for the execution of the
law. Finally, the last chapter of the law includes rules regarding the
transition from the Companies Ordinance to the new law.
A. 3. Major Modifications Occurring in the Course of Legislation
As mentioned above, notwithstanding the analytical framework
suggested by Professor Procaccia and adopted by the Barak Committee
and the Knesset Subcommittee, several of the actual legal arrangements
were modified and revised during the various phases of the legislative
process. Some of these revisions were technical or editorial, others were
substantive. What follows is a review of the principal changes made in
338. See Law for Amending the Companies Ordinance (No. 4) (functionary's
accountability), 1991 H.H., 5751. See also Securities Regulations (Limitations on the
Matter of Conflict of Interest between a Listed Company and Its Control Holder), 1994
H.H. 5754.
339. The term "distribution" is defined in § 1 of the Companies Law, 1999.
340. See Michal Agmon & Davida Lahman-Messer, The Enforcement Theory in the
New Companies Bill, 26 MISHPATIM 543, 578-682 (1996). See also Procaccia, supra
note 7, at 632 n.10 (stating that "[t]he single most important innovation proposed by
other committee members is the concept of 'monetary sanctions', a measure halfway
between criminal fines and civil damages").
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Professor Procaccia's original proposal. These will serve as a point of
reference for the political analysis drawn in the next part of this paper.
A summary table of the major modifications made during the legislative
process is also attached as an appendix to this paper.34" '
Piercing the Corporate Veil
Following the common law tradition, the Israeli corporate law has
adopted the concept of the company as a separate legal entity, having its
own duties and rights, distinct from those of its shareholders.3 42  The
Companies Ordinance did not refer to the general doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil, i.e., the attribution of the company's duties and rights
to its shareholders, but, rather, mentioned some particular cases in which
shareholders or managers should be held personally liable for their
companies' debt.3 43 The judiciary emphasized the general rule of limited
liability and used the doctrine of veil piercing only in exceptional cases.
The events that justified attributing duties of the company to a
shareholder, as were developed by the courts, included circumventing
the law; foiling legitimate expectations from a contract; fraud on
creditors; alter ego theory; principles of agency; and, to a limited extent,
the enterprise theory. 3" Undercapitalization was not recognized as a
sufficient independent cause for piercing the veil.
345
341. See infra Appendix C.
342. See C.A. 524/88, Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sde Yaacov, 45(4)
P.D. 529.
343. See §§ 99(b), 107 & 373 of the Companies Ordinance. Similarly, the Israeli law
outside of the corporate law regime acknowledges specific cases, such as for tax or
housing purposes, in which the traits of the company are attributed to its shareholders.
In other cases, such as in the instance of extended terms due to emergency service, the
law attributes a shareholder's traits to the company.
344. The enterprise theory enables the piercing of the corporate veil among
subsidiaries and related companies. For a review of the absorption of this theory by the
Israeli courts, see 1 IRIT HAVIV-SEGAL, CORPORATE LAW IN ISRAEL - AFTER THE NEW
CORPORATIONS ACT 260-67 (1999).
345. For a critical review of the judicial trends on the matter, see HAVIV-SEGAL, id.
at 245-56. Cf C.A. 2223/99 Krispi v. H. Electronica (1988) Ltd (unpublished),
available at http://www.court.gov.il (asserting that the Supreme Court, although not in a
positive and explicit manner, acknowledged undercapitalization as a cause for veil
piercing).
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In his proposal, Professor Procaccia suggested discarding the
existing statutory reasons for piercing the corporate veil and imposing
personal liability on managers and directors only in the case of
breaching the reporting duties of the company.346 Regarding the
legislation of the judicial doctrine, Professor Procaccia offered to add to
the existing causes of circumventing the law and creditors' deceit an
independent cause of undercapitalization, as well as introduction of the
doctrine of equitable subordination.347 He did not endorse the adoption
of the enterprise theory.348
The Barak Committee Report and the Companies Bill of 1995
included a specific section, titled "veil lifting," that defines the concept
and lists as non-exhaustive examples the cases in which the court may
pierce the corporate veil. "Veil lifting" was defined as "the attribution
of the company's rights and duties to its shareholder" or "the attribution
of a shareholder's traits, rights, and duties to the company. '349  The
scenarios for veil piercing included cases where there exists a statutory
stipulation, or intent to abuse the law or to deceive or deprive a
person. 350 They also recognized subordination of a shareholder's debt.35" '
While espousing the general reasoning of Professor Procaccia, the 1995
bill did not adopt undercapitalization as an explicit cause for piercing the
corporate veil.352 This cause was added in the new law's final version.353
In addition, contrary to Procaccia's proposal that established a closed list
of bright line rules, the bill and later the law established an open list of
346. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 47-51, 155-57.
347. See id. at 51-71. Under the doctrine of equitable subordination, the court can
treat a shareholder's loan to the company as equity that is subordinated to the debt of all
other company creditors.
348. See id. at 71-74; HAVIV-SEGAL, supra note 344, at 267-69.
349. See § 8(a) of the Companies Bill, 1995 (translated freely by author). The
official explanation accompanying the bill refers to the attribution of the company's
duties and rights to its shareholders as a "real veil piercing" and to the attribution of
shareholders' traits to the company as a "fictional veil piercing." It also notes that the
scope of the doctrine varies depending on the circumstances, so it can apply to all
shareholders or only to some of them. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 12.
350. See § 8(b)(1),(2) of the Companies Bill, 1995.
351. See § 8(b)(3) of the Companies Bill, 1995.
352. It was mentioned in the official explanation as a cause that has been recognized
by the judiciary and that would continue to be developed by it. See Companies Bill,
1995, at 12.
353. See §§ 6(c)(2), (d) of the Companies Law, 1999.
2006] THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF 259
CORPORATE LEGISLATION
causes for veil piercing, rich with standards that extend judicial
discretion on the matter.354
Regarding the personal liability of managers and directors, both the
bill and the law acknowledge the court's power to pierce the corporate
veil towards those persons for the same reasons that it may pierce the
corporate veil towards the company's shareholders.355 Moreover, the
law enables the court to restrict the future participation of shareholders
or managers and directors, to whom it attributes the company's duties.356
The official explanation accompanying the bill stresses that the
codification of the doctrine of veil piercing is not meant to limit its
development by the judiciary, but rather is intended to maintain the
courts' ability to continue to do so.357  This did not prevent the
Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005, from confining
considerably the contents and the application of the doctrine.358
According to the official explanation accompanying the amending
bill, some are of the opinion that the formulation of § 6 of the new law is
broad and unclear, creating uncertainty and unforeseen risks for the
business community.359 In order to clarify that the legislature did not
intend to extend the incidents in which the corporate veil will be pierced
beyond existing law, the amending law sets forth a reduced and
exhaustive list of cases for piercing the corporate veil, thereby limiting
the court's discretion. Along these lines, it provides that piercing the
corporate veil, in the case of undercapitalization, will occur only when
the company, through its authorized organs, acted in a way that harms
354. See Procaccia, supra note 187, at 315-18. Inter alia, the court is authorized to
pierce the corporate veil in circumstances where it is "just and fair" to do so. See § 8 of
the Companies Bill, 1995; § 6 of the Companies Law, 1999.
355. See § 77(b) of the Companies Bill, 1995; § 54(b) of the Companies Law, 1999.
As for the breaching of the company's reporting duties, the law did not follow Professor
Procaccia's proposal to impose personal liability on the directors in that case. It settled
for the ability to collect "monetary sanctions" from them. See § 360 of the Companies
Law, 1999.
356. See § 7 of the Companies Law, 1999. Under this section, the court may order
that, for a period of no longer than five years, the said persons could not act as director
or CEO of a company, or be involved in the incorporation or management of a
company.
357. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 12, 33.
358. See §§ 2, 3 & 10 of the Companies Law (Amendment No.3), 2005.
359. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 640.
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the company's interest and involves an unreasonable risk of
undercapitalization.360  Similarly, the amending law changes the
predicate of the provision that deals with piercing the corporate veil
when there was intent to deprive, from a "person" to a "creditor. 3 6' The
official explanation further details that when allowing for efficiency
considerations, the court is to examine the benefit for the economy from
the use of the limited liability principle. It goes on to explain that in
considering whether it would be "just and fair" to attribute the
company's duties to a shareholder, the court should take into account the
size of the shareholder's holdings and the fulfillment of the
shareholder's duties toward the company. The official explanation
suggests that when the size of the shareholder's holdings does not enable
it to effectively monitor the company's action, it would not be just and
fair to pierce the corporate veil towards such shareholder.362
Finally, the amending law abolishes the option of piercing the
corporate veil with regard to managers and directors. Nullification of
such a doctrine is said to reconcile the accountability of these persons
with their duties under the Companies Law, the Companies Ordinance
(including § 373 that permits piercing the corporate veil for managers
and directors when the company is dissolving), and the general law.363
Shareholder Activism
The Companies Ordinance was silent regarding voting by proxy at
the general meeting of shareholders. 364 Hence, the general principles of
agency applied to the situation.365 In practice, however, due to the fact
360. By comparison, the Companies Law did not require an actual harm to the
company's interest but just that the management of the company's business was not in
the company's interest.
361. The implication is that if the court endorses a formal or literal interpretation of
the text, involuntary creditors (i.e., tort claimants) or other third parties may be deprived
of a remedy.
362. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 640. The final version of the
amending law further adds a knowledge qualifier in connection with the attribution of
the company's duties to a shareholder. See § 2 of the Companies Law (Amendment No.
3).
363. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 640.
364. Although the sample of bylaws in its second appendix enabled the procedure.
365. On the problems ensued from applying general agency principles to the case of
shareholders' proxy voting, see PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 297-99; Agmon &
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that the ownership of the shares belonged legally to a registration
company rather than to the investors, voting of dispersed shareholders,
either in person or by proxy, was nonexistent.366
The Companies Bill, 1995, established the ownership right of an
investor in the shares.3 67 Following Professor Procaccia's proposal, it
also created a proxy process that regulates voting by proxy and enables
shareholder proposals and inspection rights in a manner similar to the
American arrangements on the issue.3 68  As opposed to Professor
Procaccia, however, who suggested making the proxy process
permissive,369 the bill makes it mandatory for public companies.
The Companies Law embraces a limited version of the mechanism
set forth by the bill.370 It confines the subjects on which shareholders of
a public company may vote in writing and leaves broad discretion to the
Minister of Justice to regulate substantive questions, such as who will
bear the costs of shareholder proposals, or which kind of companies will
be exempted and which kind of shareholders will be excluded from this
voting process.37' In addition, the mechanism is to become enforceable
only after the publication of the regulations regarding its
implementation.37 2 These were only recently approved by the Knesset
Committee.373
Finally, according to the new law, a shareholder in a public
company who wants to vote in the general meeting must prove to the
company its ownership ight in the shares in a way decided by the
Lahman-Messer, supra note 340, at 565.
366. See Agmon & Lahman-Messer, supra note 340, at 562-65 (discussing the
causes for market failure in the voting process in the general meeting of shareholders
and the need for creating a mechanism that mitigates this failure).
367. See Companies Bill, 1995, §§ 206-07.
368. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 297-302; the Companies Bill, 1995 §§ 107-17.
See also Agmon & Lahman-Messer, supra note 340, at 565-69.
369. PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 295-97.
370. See Companies Law, 1999 §§ 87-89.
371. According to § 89 of the Companies Law, 1999, in regulating this issue the
Minister of Justice should consult with the Minister of Finance and the SEC.
372. See Companies Law, 1999, § 377(1).
373. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, 16TH KNESSET, 4TH SESS., PROTOCOL No. 603 (Nov. 1, 2005) (discussing
the Companies Regulations (Postal Vote and Policy Statements), 5765-2005).
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Minister of Justice.374 This ownership is usually registered with an
exchange member.375 The regulations enacted on the matter require
ownership authorization by the exchange member.3 76 They are silent,
however, regarding the costs of the procedure. The official explanation
to the Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, suggests imposing the
authorization costs on exchange members, in light of practical
experience, and limiting their right to indemnification related to such
authorization.37 7 The rationale is to encourage dispersed shareholders to
participate in the decision-making process of the company.3 78  The
Companies Law (Amendment No. 3) gives the exchange members some
leeway in that it provides that the Minister of Justice may determine
circumstances in which ownership authorization will be subject to a
fee.
379
Chairperson/CEO
Prior to the enactment of the new law, it had been common practice
for public companies in Israel to have their chairperson act as their
CEO.3 8 ° Professor Procaccia's proposal reflects the notion that a
separation between the monitoring and executive branches of the
company is warranted.38  Although Professor Procaccia suggested an
enabling rather than a mandatory arrangement, the content of his
proposal was more restrictive than the one eventually adopted.
Specifically, he proposed that first, in any company (public or private)
that has more than three directors, the CEO would not act as the
chairperson; and, second, that in every public company, the chairperson
would be elected from among the independent directors.382 Moreover,
374. See Companies Law, 1999, § 71.
375. See Companies Law, 1999, § 177.
376. See Companies Regulations (Proving Ownership in a Share for the Purpose of
Voting in the General Meeting), 5760-2000.
377. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 641.
378. Id.
379. See § 14 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005.
380. The Companies Ordinance did not deal with the issue.
381. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 250-51; the Companies Bill, 1995, at 52. Both
sources note that the notion is drawn from the Government Companies Law.
382. According to the new law, as well as the Ordinance, any public company has to
appoint two independent directors for its board. See § 239 of the Companies Law,
1999; § 96b of the Companies Ordinance.
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he specifically denounced the current practice according to which the
chairperson is a paid officer, head of the company's administration. 3
The 1995 bill states that in a public company the board chairperson
will not act as the CEO and will not have the CEO's powers. 38 The new
law softens the provision by enabling a company to temporarily override
it by complying with a specified procedure. Under § 121(c) of
Companies Law, 1999, notwithstanding the said provision, the
shareholders at a general meeting may authorize the chairperson to act
as the CEO for a period of up to three years, provided that majority vote
on such authorization includes the vote of two-thirds of the non-
controlling shareholders.
Some scholars have emphasized that the rationale for separating the
chairperson from the CEO is an acknowledgment that there is a need to
prevent failure by the board to monitor the active management of the
public company, where the same individual is the CEO, the chairperson,
and sometimes also the control holder.38 5 According to the official
explanation accompanying the Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002,
however, the experience gained since the law came into force, as was
reported by different groups (without specification of who these groups
were), shows that the current rule set by § 121 (c) makes it difficult for
companies to approve a decision that authorizes a chairperson to act as a
CEO.386 The difficulty ensues, the explanation proceeds, from the fact
that in many cases non-control shareholders are not present in the
387thgeneral meeting. Hence, the amending law extends the override of the
prohibition on the chairperson from acting as a CEO also to cases where
the number of the dissenting non-control shareholders does not exceed
one percent of the overall voting rights in the company.388 It further
383. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 251, 193 n.l I (claiming that the phenomenon
does not reflect a conscious policy that anyone would defend but rather a practical
solution for occupation problems of excellent practitioners and suggesting to
immediately abolish this practice).
384. Cf The Companies Bill, 1995, §§ 142(a)(1), 145(b) (as opposed to Professor
Procaccia's proposal the bill bans independent directors from serving as the
chairperson); see id. §§ 142(a)(3), 270(a).
385. See GROSS, supra note 122, at 119-20, 385.
386. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 643.
387. Id.
388. See § 19 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005. The Companies
Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 643 states that this 1% rule is similar to the decision rules
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clarifies that the general meeting may use § 121 (c) repeatedly.
Delegation to Board Committees
The new corporate law establishes the concept of the board as a
monitoring rather than a managing body.38 9 Put differently, the law
acknowledges the importance of the board in solving the agency
problem between shareholders and managers. 390 Due to the prominence
of the board in making policy decisions and supervising management,
the law lists issues that the board cannot delegate to the active
management.391 It further lists issues that the board cannot delegate to
its committees, except for recommendation purposes. 392  The criteria
regarding this last matter are the danger of a conflict of interest in the
board and the significance of the issue. The more specific an issue is
and the greater the chances that a committee can mitigate a conflict of
interest, the more warranted a delegation to a board committee would
be.
393
Note, in that context, that Professor Procaccia did not elaborate in
his proposal on the issues that can or cannot be delegated.
39 4
Furthermore, he suggested that the law should not include a provision
that enables delegation but rather that a company that wishes to delegate
powers to a board committee must provide so explicitly in its bylaws.395
The Barak Committee and the Parliamentary Subcommittee chose the
opposite arrangement, according to which delegation is acceptable
set in §§ 239(b)(2) and 275(a)(3)(b) of the Companies Law, 1999. These sections
involve the appointment of outside directors and the approval of conflict of interest
transactions, respectively. It is noteworthy that the alternative decision rule set by these
sections is the inclusion in the majority vote of only one third of the disinterested
shareholders present in the voting, as distinct from the two-thirds requirement of §
121(c).
389. See Companies Law, 1999, § 122.
390. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 195-96; Companies Bill, 1995, at 46-47.
391. See Companies Law, 1999, § 92; cf Companies Bill, 1995, § 123. According to
the official explanation, the notion of a non-exhaustive list of issues is borrowed from
the Governmental Companies Law, 1975. See id. at 47.
392. See Companies Law, 1999, § 112; cf Companies Bill, 1995, § 139.
393. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 51-52.
394. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 308.
395. Id. at 248.
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unless the bylaws state otherwise.396 The significance of this change is
that under the latter structure the board committees become the common
forum for decision-making.
The amending law reduces the list of the issues that the board
cannot delegate to its committees.3 97 Specifically, it sets the terms under
which the board may delegate its powers to distribute the company's
equity to its employees and its subsidiary's employees.3 98 The official
explanation notes, in this context, the prevalence of the action and the
fact that the delegation is subject to a plan outlined by the board.3 99
More interesting, however, is another provision that appeared in the
earlier versions of the amending bill but was eliminated from its final
version, as was approved at first reading by the Knesset, and from the
amending law.4 °0 It had to do with the delegation of the board power to
approve financial reports.
According to the official explanation accompanying the bill's initial
version, experience shows that there is difficulty in complying with the
requirement to have the board approve the financial reports, due to the
time pressures and the possible need to reconvene the board at a later
date. Nonetheless, the suggested amendment included some checks into
the ability of the board to delegate its power of approving financial
reports.40 '  Finally, on May 19, 2002, following an appeal by the
Minister of Finance, the government rejected the Justice Ministry's
proposal concerning the delegation of the board's power to approve
396. See Companies Law, 1999, § 110; see also the Companies Law (Amendment
No. 3), 2005, § 21.
397. See Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005, § 23.
398. Under § 112 of the Companies Law, 1999, the board is not allowed to delegate
its power on this issue to its committees, except for recommendation purposes.
399. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 642-43.
400. The earlier versions of the amending bill were published on the Justice
Ministry's website (on file with author).
401. The original version of the memorandum of the Companies Law (Amendment),
5761-2001, required an authorization in the bylaws to delegate, and that one third of the
board members be members of said committee and present at the time the reports were
approved. The latter version additionally required that delegation occur only after
discussing the reports in the board and for special reasons, and that all the outside
directors be members of the said committee. Moreover, it required the distribution of
the reports to all members of the board immediately after their approval in the
committee.
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financial reports. n2
Shareholders' Duties
The Companies Ordinance did not impose any duties on the
company's shareholders except the prohibition to act in a way that
oppresses other shareholders. 40 3  The courts adopted the American
doctrine with regard to fiduciary duties that apply to control holders who
sell their shares.40 4 In addition, the Securities Law, following the Barak
Committee's interim recommendations later incorporated in the new
law, set a special procedural mechanism for approving irregular conflict
of interest transactions between a traded company and its control
holder.40 5
Professor Procaccia suggested requiring control holders to exercise
their control in good faith and in an accepted way.406 He further
proposed to apply the same duty to any shareholder or constituency
member whose actions are pivotal to the company's operation.4 °7
The Companies Bill, 1995, extended the duty to act in good faith
and with fairness to any shareholder in the company.40 8 It also
established that a shareholder should avoid using a company business
402. See Globes Correspondent, The Government Set: Only the Board of Directors
Will Approve Reports, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, May 19, 2002.
403. See Companies Ordinance, § 235 (according to the general norm, in exercising
its obligations a shareholder should act in good faith and in an accepted way); see also
The Contract Law (General Part), 1973, §39.
404. See C.A. 817/79 Cosoi v. Y.L. Foictonger Bank Ltd., 38(3) P.D. 253 (Isr.).
405. See Securities Regulations (Limitations on the Matter of Conflict of Interest
between a Listed Company and Its Control Holder), 5754-1994. According to the
regulations, these transactions had to be approved through a process that included the
board's audit committee, the board, and, in some cases, also the general meeting of
shareholders where the support of at least one third of the disinterested shareholders
was required. "Irregular transaction" was defined in § 96kd of the Companies
Ordinance and § 1 of the Companies Law, 1999 as a transaction conducted not in the
ordinary course of business or not under market conditions, or a transaction which may
substantially affect the company's earnings, assets or obligations.
406. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 352-73.
407. See id.
408. See § 227 of the Companies Bill, 1995. Neither the bill nor the law includes a
definition of the fairness duty. The law, however, specifies that a breach of the fairness
duty bears the same consequences as the breach of fiduciary duty by a manager or
director. See § 193(b) of the Companies Law, 1999.
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opportunity if it might harm the company.4 9 Lastly, the bill adopted a
procedural mechanism for approving irregular conflict of interest
transactions, not only with regard to control holders but also with regard
to any shareholder.1 °  According to the official explanation
accompanying the 1995 bill, the stricter requirement regarding control
holders was not recommended by the Barak Committee but was added
to the blueprint based on a joint suggestion by the Justice Ministry and
the ISA.41'
The new law differs from the 1995 bill in four main respects: first,
while maintaining the duty of any shareholder to act in good faith and in
an accepted way, the law extends the fairness duty only to control
holders and shareholders whose vote is decisive.412 Second, the law
omits the duty imposed on shareholders to avoid misusing the
company's business opportunities. Third, it applies the procedural
mechanism for approving irregular conflict of interest transactions only
to control holders rather than to any shareholder.413 Fourth, instead of
exempting from the special approval procedure a defined list of
transactions,414 the law delegates the authority to exempt certain types of
409. See § 230 of the Companies Bill, 1995. The bill did not adopt the arrangement
suggested by Professor Procaccia as to the allocation of opportunities within a group of
related companies. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 374-81.
410. See §§ 231, 232 of the Companies Bill, 1995. Note that the procedural
mechanism set by the bill is conditional on the substantial requirement that the
transaction does not harm the company's interest. According to § 231, an irregular
conflict of interest transaction with a shareholder that does not hurt the company's
interest requires the approval of the board; in cases where a majority of the board is
interested, additional approval by the audit committee is required; and in cases where a
majority of the audit committee is interested, approval by a general meeting, with the
support of at least one third of the disinterested shareholders, is required. According to
§ 232, where the irregular conflict of interest transaction involves a control holder, a
tripartite approval process is always required.
411. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 72.
412. See §§ 192, 193 of the Companies Law, 1999.
413. See §§ 270(4), 275 of the Companies Law, 1999. Section 275 enables an
alternative to the requirement of the support of at least one third of the disinterested
shareholders in the general meeting. It materializes where the number of dissenting
disinterested shareholders does not exceed one percent of the overall voting rights in the
company.
414. See § 233 of the Companies Bill, 1995.
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transactions to the Minister of Justice.
415
According to the Justice Ministry representatives who drafted the
law, the said provisions express both the starting point of the economic
approach, i.e., a market failure, and the aspiration to create fair
provisions that neutralize the fear that the majority will use its power to
the detriment of the minority.416 The specific fairness duty is intended to
deal with situations where a significant minority might misuse its power
in deciding crucial issues.
417
Finally, the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005, offers
some apparently cosmetic changes to the list of transactions that require
special approvals. Regarding a "material private placement" that
necessitates the approval of both the board and the general meeting of
shareholders,4 8 it replaces the current definition of that term with a
narrower one.419  The current definition of a "material private
placement" is "a private placement that will result in increasing the
holdings of a material shareholder 420 or in creating a material
shareholder." The new definition adds the requirement that the private
placement grants at least 20% of the company's voting power and that it
is either not under market conditions or that the consideration is not in
cash or listed securities.42" ' Alternatively, it defines a "material private
placement" as a private placement that will result in creating a control
holder. 422, 423
415. See § 284 of the Companies Law, 1999. Comparing the Companies
Regulations (Relief in Transactions with Interested Parties), 5760-2000, with the bill's
provisions indicates that the regulations are much broader. For a critical review of the
regulations, see Prof. Yossef Gross, Adv., New Reliefs in Approving Transaction With
Control Holders, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Feb. 18, 2002.
416. See Lahman-Messer & Rosman, supra note 326, at 265.
417. Id. at 265; Companies Bill, 1995, at 70-71.
418. See § 274 of the Companies Law, 1999.
419. See § 65 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005.
420. According to § 1 of the Companies Law, 1999, a "material shareholder" is a
shareholder who holds at least 5% of the company's shares or voting power.
421. See § 65 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005.
422. According to §§ 1, 268 of the Companies Law, 1999, a "control holder" is a
person who holds 50% of the means of control in the company, or a shareholder who
holds at least 25% of the company's voting power where no one else holds more than
50% of that power.
423. Notice that § 3 of the Companies Regulations (Relief in Transactions with
Interested Parties), 5760-2000, already exempts from the special approval process (by
the board and the general meeting) private placements that impart less than 20% of the
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According to the official explanation accompanying the amending
bill, it is suggested to narrow the definition of "material private
placement" similarly to the rules of the stock exchanges in the United
States and apply it only in special instances where, in addition to the
offeree being a material shareholder, there is a significant dilution in
shareholders' voting power.424
Derivative Suits and Class Actions
The Companies Ordinance did not include any provisions regarding
derivative suits or class actions. The derivative suit mechanism was
developed by the judiciary, which followed and expanded the English
doctrine on the matter.4 5 The class action mechanism was erected by
general civil procedure and later by the Securities Law that adopted the
Barak Committee's interim recommendations.426 However, due to the
lack of incentives for the plaintiff to bring a derivative suit427 and the
courts' restrictive interpretation of the Securities Law's class action
provisions,428 these mechanisms were rarely used.
The new law contains extensive provisions for derivative suits and
class actions in both public and private companies. 429 As for derivative
suits, following Professor Procaccia's proposal, the right to file a suit is
given to any shareholder or director. There is a demand requirement
and, contrary to former law, no contemporaneous ownership
prerequisite.43 ° Interestingly, the Parliamentary Subcommittee extended
to creditors the right to file a derivative suit in the specific case of a
company voting power, contingent on their offeree not being a director or a CEO and
that they do not result in the creation of a control block.
424. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 649-50.
425. See, e.g., C.A. 726/74 Neve Yam Hotels of Arsof Beach Ltd. v. Cohen, 30(2)
P.D. 517; C.A. 52/79 Sulimani v. Browner, 35(3) P.D. 617; C.A. 273/85 Gil v. Discount
Bank for Israel Ltd., 41(2) P.D. 294; C.A. 324/88 Barbalak v. Shavit, 45(3) P.D. 562.
426. See § 29 of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 1984; the Securities Law
(Amendment No. 9), 5748-1988.
427. For an analytical account of the optimal incentive, see PROCACCIA, supra note
7, at 397-400.
428. See Goshen, supra note 187, at 414-17.
429. See Companies Law, 1999, §§ 194-218.
430. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 400-08.
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prohibited distribution.43'
As for class actions, while the Companies Bill, 1995, adopted the
provisions of the Securities Law almost word-for-word,432 the new law
facilitates the submission of these suits, compared to the former
arrangement.433
Following Professor Procaccia, the Companies Law provides a
pecuniary incentive to file both derivative and class action suits to the
plaintiff itself rather than to its attorney.4 34'435 As opposed to Professor
Procaccia's proposal to set the reimbursement at a fixed rate, however,
the Barak Committee left the decision whether to grant reimbursement
to the plaintiff and the amount of reimbursement to the discretion of the
court.
4 36
The Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005, provides that the
fees of the plaintiff's attorney in a derivative suit will be set by the court
and paid by the company unless the court decides for special reasons
that the plaintiff should pay its attorney's fees.437  According to the
official explanation, this arrangement is similar to the legal situation in
the United States and is required in order to encourage potential
plaintiffs to use the tool of the derivative suit.4
38
Independent Directors
As conceded by Professor Procaccia, the most complex and
controversial issue regarding the structure of the board is the question of
431. See § 204 of the Companies Law, 1999. According to § 301(b), a prohibited
distribution is any distribution in breach of the law's provisions with regard to capital
preservation.
432. See particularly §§ 54b, 54c of the Securities law and §§ 248, 249 of the
Companies Bill, 1995.
433. See GROSS, supra note 122, at 231-36; Goshen, supra note 187, at 412-14.
434. See §§ 201, 215 of the Companies Law, 1999. Following the Securities Law,
the law further sets that in the case of class action the court will set the contingency fee
of the plaintiff's attorney. See § 214 of the Companies Law, 1999.
435. With regard to class actions the law adopts another incentive, that is, a
possibility that the ISA will fund the suit, under certain conditions. See § 209 of the
Companies Law, 1999. This incentive is taken after § 54g of the Securities Law.
436. See Procaccia, supra note 187, at 312-15.
437. See § 44 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005.
438. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 646.
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independent directors.439  The Companies Ordinance, in its 1987
amendment, laid out certain requirements regarding independent
directors.440 It required every public company to appoint at least two
independent directors to its board, have at least one independent director
on each of the board's committees, and have an audit committee
consisting of all the independent directors.4 An independent director
(titled by the Ordinance as "director from among the public") was
defined as a resident of Israel who did not have an economic relation to
the company or its affiliate(s) and did not have a substantial connection
to the company's business management. 442  The Ordinance further
established an external statutory committee composed of a judge, the
head of the ISA, and the chairperson of the TASE, whose role was to
authorize the appointment of independent directors nominated by the
company.443
After examining the pros and cons of the independent board,
Professor Procaccia reached the conclusion that a board of directors that
consists only of insiders is prone to creating substantial market failures.
Specifically, he explained how the proper functioning of the board and
the provision of current and updated information can be seen as a public
product, resulting in sub-optimal supervision of the board of directors
and aggravation of the agency problem between shareholders and
444
managers. Hence, his model for the public corporation included two
alternatives: a board in which the majority of the members are
independent; or a board with an all-independent monitoring committee
composed of at least three members, having the powers conferred under
American law to the audit, compensation, and nominations
committees.445 Moreover, when comparing the suggested model to the
439. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 227. See generally GROSS, supra note 122, at
261-78 for discussion of the development of the role of the independent director.
440. See The Law for Amending the Companies Ordinance (No. 2), 5747-1987. For
earlier legislative initiatives on this matter, see PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 227-29.
441. See Companies Ordinance §§ 96b, 96if. According to section 96ig of the
Companies Ordinance, the audit committee's roles are to review the company's
financial situation, internal audit, and business management deficiencies, and to
approve conflict of interest transactions.
442. See id. § 96b(c),(d). For additional restrictions, see sections 96c-96e.
443. See Companies Ordinance § 96f.
444. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 227-38.
445. Id.
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arrangement adopted in the Companies Ordinance, Professor Procaccia
clarified the inefficiency of the latter in that it enables the de facto
control of both the board and the audit committee by corporate
management.446 In contrast, the suggested model provides the company
with extended flexibility, allowing it to choose among the alternatives
while still furnishing it with true monitoring, through either an
independent board or through an independent monitoring committee
with wider powers than those of the audit committee.447
The Barak Committee did not adopt Professor Procaccia's proposal
on the matter. Instead, the Companies Bill, 1995, and the Companies
Law, 1999, adopted, in lieu of Professor Procaccia's proposal, an
arrangement that takes after the Companies Ordinance. The main
departure from the Ordinance deals with the appointment process of an
independent director (whom the bill and the new law entitled "outside
director").448 According to the official explanation accompanying the
Bill, the statutory nominations committee created by the Ordinance
experienced difficulty in identifying the relationships between suggested
candidates and the public company, and its work resulted in procedural
difficulties.449 Hence, the bill imposed the duty to appoint independent
directors on the company.450 The idea was that this move would prevent
companies from using the statutory committee as a rubber stamp.45 ' The
Companies Law went a step further. It established that the independent
directors are to be appointed by the general meeting of shareholders
under special rules.452 Interestingly, a bill submitted to the Knesset by
nine MKs in July 2001 suggested reverting back to appointing
independent directors by statutory committee.4 3
446. See also Procaccia, supra note 7, at 640.
447. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 238.
448. Compare Companies Ordinance with Companies Bill, 1995, and Companies
Law, 1999.
449. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 82.
450. According to § 267 of the Companies Bill, 1995, "an outside director would be
appointed in the way that was set by the company's bylaws and this law for appointing
directors" (translated freely by author).
451. See Agmon & Lahman-Messer, supra note 340, at 569-7 1.
452. According to § 239(b) of the Companies Law, 1999, the simple majority in the
general meeting has to include at least one-third of the disinterested shareholders.
Alternatively, the number of dissenting and disinterested shareholders should not
exceed one percent of the overall voting rights in the company.
453. See The Companies Bill (Amendment - Outside Director), 5761-2001,
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As for other differences occurring during the legislative process,
although according to the official explanation the 1995 Bill maintained
the qualifying conditions that prohibited any relation between the
independent director and the company,454 the law itself seems to mitigate
some of these requirements. Among others, the law abolished the
presumption found in the Ordinance and Bill according to which a
holding of at least 5% of the company's shares would be seen as a
prohibited business relation.455 It also abolished the limitation set by the
Ordinance and Bill with regard to the number of companies for which a
person is concurrently allowed to serve as a director.4" 6
The Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005, amends the new
law in two important respects. On the one hand, it further narrows the
list of people who cannot be appointed as independent directors because
of their relation to the public company. 457  First, it authorizes the
Minister of Justice to exclude certain matters from the definition of a
"relation" that disqualifies a person from being appointed as an outside
director.4 58  In addition, the amendment excludes, without any
explanation, members of the ISA and directors of an exchange in Israel
(as opposed to employees of these institutions) from the list of people
disqualified to serve as outside directors.459
Hatza'at Chok No. 2916, submitted to the Knesset Approval on July 24, 2001, available
at http://www.knesset.gov.il/privatelaw/data/2916.rtf. The bill was rejected on Feb. 13,
2002. See THE COMPANIES BILL (AMENDMENT - OUTSIDE DIRECTOR), 5761-2001
(PRIVATE BILL) (NO. 285), D.K. (2002).
454. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 82-84.
455. Compare Companies Ordinance § 96b(d) and Companies Bill, 1995, § 268(b),
with Companies Law, 1999, § 240(b).
456. Compare Companies Ordinance § 96i and Companies Bill, 1995, § 273(a), with
Companies Law, 1999, § 240(c).
457. See § 55 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005.
458. To exemplify this point, the official explanation suggests that a person should
not be prevented from becoming an outside director of a company controlled by the
state just because his or her relative has working relations with the state, which do not
raise the danger of a conflict-of-interest. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at
647. Note that section 17a of the Governmental Companies Law, 1975, disqualifies a
person whose relative is a director or a CEO or a senior employee of the company from
serving as a director. Note further that § 96c(c) of the Companies Ordinance authorized
the Minister of Justice to set additional occupations that disqualify a person from being
appointed as an independent director.
459. By comparison, § 96c(b) of the Companies Ordinance and § 240(e) of the
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On the other hand, following the trend in the United States and
other Western countries to strengthen board independence and its ability
to oversee the company's performance, the amending law provides that
at least one of the outside directors appointed by a public company
should have accounting and financial expertise and that the rest of the
outside directors should have a professional qualification.460
Managers' and Directors' Duties and Rights
Professor Procaccia's proposal regarding the rights and duties of the
company's managers and directors was influenced by the American
concepts of these issues.461 These notions have gradually diffused into
Israeli law. In 1984, the Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged the
fiduciary duties that managers and directors owe to the company.462 The
independent directors' right to information and experts' aid was added to
the Ordinance in 1987.43 Fiduciary duties, indemnification, and
insurance rights became a part of the Ordinance in 1991, following the
Barak Committee's interim recommendations.M With respect to
Companies Law, 1999, disqualify members and employees of the ISA as well as
members of the board and employees of an exchange in Israel from serving as
independent directors.
461. See §§ 51, 55 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005. See also the
Companies Bill (Qualification of Outside Directors), 2004. The amending law provides
further that in a public company the board is to determine the minimal number of
directors who possess accounting and financial expertise based, among other things, on
the type and size of the company, as well as on the range and complexity of its activity.
The law clarifies that the appointment of directors who have accounting and financial
expertise or a professional qualification does not change the legal liability imposed on
such directors or the other directors. See §§ 18, 58 of the Companies Law (Amendment
No. 3), 2005.
461. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7 at 319-51, 387-96.
462. See C.A. 817/79 Cosoi v. Y.L. Foictonger Bank Ltd., Piskey Din 38(3) 253
(Isr.).
463. See Companies Ordinance §§ 96jb, 96jc.
464. See The Law for Amending the Companies Ordinance (No. 4) (functionary's
accountability), 5751-1991. See also The Law for Amending the Companies Ordinance
(No. 5), 1991, 5751-1991; The Law for Amending the Companies Ordinance (No. 6),
5752-1992; The Law for Amending the Companies Ordinance (No. 7), 1992 5752-
1992. According to Professor Procaccia, the need for early legislation ensued from the
fact that some of the issues at stake, mainly the indemnification and insurance of
managers and directors, were considered "urgent" in the business community. See
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fiduciary duties, the Ordinance provided that managers and directors
owe the company a duty of care as defined by the Tort Ordinance, and
that they should perform their duties with reasonable care and
expertise.465 It further stated that managers and directors owe the
company a duty of loyalty and should act in good faith for the benefit of
the company and avoid conflicts of interest. 466  Nevertheless, the
company could authorize such conflict of interest transactions through a
special approval mechanism.
467
The 1995 bill and the new law largely copy the provisions set forth
in the Ordinance with regard to fiduciary duties of managers and
directors, and improve the procedural mechanism for approving conflict
of interest transactions.46s However, a provision regarding the duty of
loyalty in the special case of affiliated companies, which was suggested
by the Justice Ministry in consultation with Professor Procaccia and was
added to the Companies Bill, 1995, prior to its approval by the
Ministers' Committee for Legislation, was eliminated at the end of the
parliamentary process. 469  The only remnant of this provision is the
exclusion from the definition of a "personal interest" of a manager or
director in a transaction - an interest that necessitates a special approval
mechanism for the transaction; a situation where he or she serves on
both a company and its fully owned subsidiary. 470 The Companies Law
(Amendment No. 3), 2005, further excludes from the above definition
Procaccia, supra note 187 at 320 n.33.
465. See Companies Ordinance, §§ 96ke-96kf.
466. See id. at § 96kg.
467. See id. at § 96kh.
468. See Companies Law, 1999, §§ 252-57, 268-84. Similar to the approval
mechanism with regard to control holders, conflict of interest transactions with
managers and directors should be approved through a process that includes the board,
the board's audit committee, the general meeting of shareholders, and, in some cases,
also requires the support of at least one-third of the disinterested shareholders or,
alternatively, that the number of dissenting disinterested shareholders not exceed one
percent of the overall voting rights in the company.
469. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 85. According to section 280 of the bill, the office
of a manager or director in a number of related companies is not, in itself, a conflict of
interest action. In addition, the provision enabled managers and directors to consider the
interests of the group of companies, as long as it does not harm the interests of the
company on whose board they serve.
470. See Companies Law, 1999, § 270(1).
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situations where a manager or director in a fully owned subsidiary holds
shares or options in the parent company, or where a manager or director
serves on a number of fully owned subsidiaries of the same company.4 '
The 1995 bill and the new law also enhance manager and director
rights. For example, the law expands the right to information and
experts' aid for all directors, not only independent ones.472 It also gives
directors the right to sue in case of a breach of fiduciary duty by a
manager or director.473 Moreover, it enables the company to exempt
managers and directors from liability for damages caused by a breach of
the duty of care.474 Note that contrary to the Barak Committee's interim
recommendations, this exemption mechanism was rejected by the
Knesset when it amended the Companies Ordinance in 1991.475
Permissible and Prohibited Distributions
The Companies Ordinance did not explicitly order the preservation
of the company's capital, dealing with the issue only sporadically.476 It
established that a dividend can be paid only out of profits and that a
company cannot repurchase its own shares.477
The Barak Committee and the Parliamentary Subcommittee
adopted the general framework proposed by Professor Procaccia,
according to which the law should first define the actions that are
considered a dilution of the company's capital, be it through dividend,
allocation of shares without an appropriate return, or the purchase of
shares by the company itself These will be referred to as a
"distribution."4 78 Second, the law should establish which distributions
471. See § 65 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005.
472. See Companies Law, 1999, §§ 265-66.
473. See Companies Law, 1999, § 267. In return, the law extends the duty to report
any legal breach or harm to business practice from independent directors to all
directors. See Companies Law, 1999, § 257.
474. See idat § 259; See Companies Bill, 1995, § 297.
475. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 85; GROSS, supra note 122, at 296. Cf
PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 390-91 (revoking the exemption apparatus-set-by-the
Ordinance prior to its amendment in 1991).
476. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 479-80.
477. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 100; § 98 of the sample of bylaws in the
Ordinance's second appendix; Companies Ordinance, § 139.
478. See Companies Law, § 1, 1999. For the theoretical implications of the term,
see PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 480-96.
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are permissible and which are prohibited, such as distributions that result
in the reduction of the company's capital below a certain threshold set
by the law.479
It is in the definition of the threshold of the capital that cannot be
distributed - i.e. the creditors' minimal safety cushion - that the Barak
Committee and later the law diverged from Professor Procaccia's
proposal. Professor Procaccia set the threshold on the sum of the
company's liabilities and "stated capital," which includes the stock's par
value in addition to any portion of the premium that the company did not
exclude and any capitalized profits. 480 The Barak Committee chose a
more restrictive threshold; that is, the return received from the allocation
of the company's shares (including the premium) and any profits that
were capitalized.48
In addition, contrary to Professor Procaccia's proposal that the law
clearly define that funds can be distributed, the 1995 Bill and the new
law settled for a reference to "accepted accounting rules" in defining
distributable profits, thereby causing the courts to rely upon the
testimony of experts in this field rather than on bright line rules.482
Lastly, while the Barak Committee embraced the two additional
requirements offered by Professor Procaccia for capital preservation
purposes, namely solvency and liquidity,483 the new law eliminates the
liquidity test and delegates to the Minister of Justice the authority to set
legal presumptions and exemptions with regard to permissible
distributions.4 84
As for the liability of directors with regard to prohibited
distributions, the 1995 Bill and the new law adopted the arrangement
offered by Professor Procaccia. 485 According to this arrangement, the
relevant basis of accountability in the case of a prohibited distribution is
479. As mentioned above, under section 301(b) of the Companies Law, a prohibited
distribution is any distribution in breach of the law's provisions with regard to capital
preservation.
480. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 508-13.
481. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 101.
482. See Procaccia, supra note 187, at 318-19; PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 500-03.
483. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 503-08; Companies Bill, 1995, at 101.
484. See Companies Law, 1999 § 302.
485. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 519-21; Companies Bill, 1995, § 359;
Companies Law, 1999, § 311.
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guilt. However, in cases where the director opposed the distribution and
did all that could be done to prevent it, where the director relied in good
faith on misleading information that would otherwise warrant the
distribution or where he or she did not know and did not have reason to
know about the distribution, the presumption of breach of duty of loyalty
would not apply.
486
The Companies Act (Amendment No. 3), 2005, diverges from the
current provisions in that it extends the legal presumption regarding the
type of duty breached in the case of a prohibited distribution to also
487include a duty of care. It ensures, however, that in this case,
companies will not be able to exempt a director in advance from
liability.48 8 According to the official explanation accompanying the
amending bill, situations may arise where a prohibited distribution is the
result of breaching a duty of care rather than a duty of loyalty.489 Thus,
it is suggested to leave the decision to the court in specific cases. The
upshot, the explanation proceeds, is that a company would be able to
insure against a manager or director breaching a duty of care in the case
of a prohibited distribution. 490  However, in this case, creditors are
protected despite a reduction in their safety cushion since a company is
prevented from exempting a director from liability.
491
The Regulation of the Market for Corporate Control
Mergers and acquisitions issues were only dealt with partially and
indirectly by the Companies Ordinance. Following the old English
model, mergers were governed by general provisions of "compromise
and settlement" that were not apt to accommodate modem merger
law.492 Since 1994, tender offers in traded companies were governed by
the Securities Law, which among others prohibited the adoption of
486. See id.
487. See § 74 in the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005.
488. See § 59 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005.
489. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 648.
490. This was not possible otherwise, since the duty of loyalty is usually not
insurable. See Companies Law, 1999, § 261.
491. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 648.
492. See Companies Ordinance §§ 233, 234, 236. For an elaborate analysis of these
provisions, see Yedidia Z. Stem, Merger of Companies In Israel, 20 MISHPATIM 73, 99-
109 (1990).
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poison pills once an offer has been made and regulated freeze out
mergers.493
Professor Procaccia's proposal included comprehensive and
detailed legal requirements for corporate acquisitions. 94 Guided by the
goal of economic efficiency, and assuming that the company's shares
were widely held prior to the acquisition, Professor Procaccia advocated
the regulation of any acquisition resulting in de facto control. 495 More
specifically, his proposal prohibited the acquisition of defacto control in
a company in ways other than through a merger or tender offer. For
example, obtaining control through piecemeal purchase of shares was
prohibited. These provisions were attributed to the alleged negative
effect of such purchases on shareholders who were not a party to the
transactions and who found themselves in the position of minority
shareholders 496  Professor Procaccia's proposal facilitated mergers,
including statutory mergers,4 97 and offered a new model for takeovers
based on the unforced acceptance of offers by the majority of the
shareholders.498 It also regulated freeze out mergers in cases of forced
sales of shares to control holders by granting appraisal rights to minority
shareholders holding less than 10% of the company's shares. 499 Finally,
based on the assumption that no market failure exists in this situation,
the proposal does not regulate the private sale of control.500
493. See Securities Regulations (Tender Offer), 5754-1994. Following the
enactment of the new law, these regulations were replaced by the Securities Regulations
(Tender Offer), 5760-2000.
494. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 565-91.
495. See id. at 566-70. Defacto control was defined as the holding of at least 25% of
the company's overall voting rights. See Companies Law, 1999, § 1.
496. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 585-87.
497. See id. at 571-76.
498. See id. at 576-85. The takeover model was jointly formed by Professor
Procaccia and Professor Lucian Bebchuk and inspired by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REv.
1693 (1985). As mentioned by Professor Procaccia, the Israeli arrangement uses the
notion of a second opportunity to accept rather than the two-tiered voting procedure
offered by Professor Bebchuk. See Procaccia, supra note 7, at 645 n.55.
499. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 588-90. Interestingly, Professor Procaccia
seems to later on change his mind. In a recent article, he described the freeze out
merger mechanism of the new law and criticized its appraisal remedy. See Procaccia,
supra note 187, at 323-26.
500. See Procaccia, supra note 7, at 637-38.
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The Barak Committee widely embraced Professor Procaccia's
proposal.50 For example, it adopted a rule according to which the
shareholders' vote on a merger or tender offer cannot include the votes
held by the offeror. 0 2  According to Professor Procaccia,
notwithstanding the contrary common law tradition, this rule is
warranted since the vote of an offeror (or its control holder) has an
inherent conflict of interest and does not carry any informative value.0 3
In two respects, however, the Barak Committee diverged from
Procaccia's proposal. First, it enabled a creditor of the company to
petition the court to delay or prevent a merger.50 4 Second, it extended
the appraisal right of minority shareholders to any case of a merger or
tender offer by an existing control holder.5"5
The Parliamentary Subcommittee substantially revised some of the
1995 Bill's provisions. With regard to mergers the new law requires
approval of the merger by the boards of those companies in addition to
the approval by the shareholders in each of the merging companies.
Board approval would not be given if a reasonable doubt exists with
regard to the solvency of the acquiring company following the merger.
0 6
In addition, a merging company would be required to send the merger
proposal to its secured creditors and notify its unsecured creditors.50 7
Similar to the 1995 Bill, the new law enables creditors to oppose the
merger by applying to the court.50 8
With regard to takeovers, the new law narrows down the
requirement that acquisitions of a control block be conducted
exclusively by way of a tender offer.509 It applies the provision to only
501. See Companies Bill, 1995, §§ 362-96 and the accompanying official
explanation, id. at 104-14.
502. See Companies Bill, 1995, §§ 369, 380, 390.
503. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 571-72.
504. See Companies Bill, 1995, § 364.
505. See id. § 392. In the case of a freeze out merger, the bill granted only the
offeror the right to apply to the court in the case of dissenting minority shareholders.
See Companies Bill, 1999, § 393.
506. See Companies Law, 1999, §§ 314-15.
507. See id. § 318. See also id. § 325 (regulating the issue of floating liens of the
merging companies).
508. See id. § 319.
509. It is noteworthy that although the official explanation accompanying the
Companies Bill, 1995, at 108, explicitly stated that the legal arrangements regarding
tender offer will only apply to situations where prior to the acquisition the company did
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two cases: where no other person already holds a control block, or where
as a result of the purchase, the holdings of the acquirer will exceed 45%
and no other shareholder holds more than 50% of the company's voting
rights.5t In addition, the law explicitly exempts from the application of
this provision the purchase of shares in a private placement.51 It also
conditions a special tender offer on the acquisition of at least 5% of the
company's voting rights. 2 As for poison pills, the new law adopts the
arrangement in the 1995 bill, under which managers and directors are
limited to negotiating the improvement of a tender offer or searching for
a "white knight."5" 3  The new law omitted Professor Procaccia's
proposal, however, to ban specific actions, so as to reduce deliberation
regarding the purpose of the action (prohibited defensive tactic or
permissible business action) that was part of the 1995 Bill.5 1 4
With regard to shareholder votes on mergers or tender offers, the
new law follows the 1995 Bill in that the votes of each participant in the
merger (or its control holder) in the case of a merger, and the votes of
the offeror (or its control holder) in the case of takeover, not be included
in the shareholders' vote. 5  Finally, the new law provides for appraisal
rights for minority shareholders only in the case of a freeze out merger,
not have a control holder, section 394 of the bill prohibited any acquisition of a control
block other than in the way of a merger or tender offer, regardless of whether prior to
such acquisition the company was controlled by a control holder.
510. See Companies Law, 1999, § 328(a). The law refers to this arrangement as a
"special tender offer".
511. See id § 328(b). Although not clearly stated, it seems that the section also
meant to exempt the private acquisition of control. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 107;
GROSS, supra note 122, at 373. But see Goshen, supra note 187, at 402-03 (asserting
that the requirement of a special tender offer applies also to private purchasing
transactions).
512. See Companies Law, 1999, § 332.
513. See id. § 330.
514. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 582-83; Companies Bill, 1995, § 384. Note
that as opposed to the Securities Regulations (Tender Offer), 5754-1994, that included a
similar provision, the Securities Regulations (Tender Offer), 5760-2000, which replaced
them, do not. See also Goshen, supra note 187, at 404 n.56 (stating that the new
regulations omitted the provision with regard to existing control holder's prohibited
actions).
515. See Companies Law, 1999, §§ 320, 331. See also Goshen, supra note 187, at
406 n.64 (suggesting that although not stated explicitly in the law, the same rule applies
to the case of a tender offer that may result in a freeze out merger).
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i.e. the forced sale of shares to a control holder who holds more than
90% of the company's shares. 16
The Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005, provides further
modifications to the regulation of mergers and acquisitions. For
acquisitions of a control block, it clarifies that such an acquisition need
not be conducted by way of a tender offer, if it is a private purchase of
control." 7 In addition, it requires the acquirer of more than 45% of the
company's voting rights to do so by way of a tender offer only if there is
no other person who holds the same number of voting rights." 8
According to the official explanation, the rationale is to equate this last
situation to the acquisition of a control block where another person
already holds a control block in the company.
1 9
Moreover, the amending law revises the shareholders' voting rule on
mergers, so that shareholders' approval is not required in a fully owned
subsidiary merging into its parent. In addition, shareholder approval is
not required in a surviving entity if the merger does not involve
amending the company's bylaws, if the surviving company does not
allocate more than 20% of its voting rights and such allocation would
not result in creating a control block, and if no cross ownership exists
between the merging companies.5 20 The amending law further provides
that the mere holding of shares in a merging company that holds shares
of the other merging company would not count as a holding in the other
company, a holding that bans the shareholder from voting on the
merger.52
516. See Companies Law, 1999, § 338.
517. See § 78 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005. As the official
explanation stresses, in the case of a private acquisition of control, there is no effect on
dispersed shareholders and the control holder still bears duties to the company. See
Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 651.
518. See § 78 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005. The Companies
Law, 1999 conditioned the application of the provision on the other person holding
more than 50% of the company's voting rights.
519. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 652.
520. See § 75 of the Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005. These revisions
were added to the final version of the amending law.
521. See id. The official explanation clarifies that when a shareholder in a merging
company that controls the other merging company votes to approve the merger in the
general meeting of shareholders of the controlling company, its interest is identical to
the interest of the other shareholders. Therefore, no indirect holding of the controlled
company should be ascribed to such shareholder and the said decision rule should not
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B. Interest Groups'Impact on the Israeli Corporate Law and its
Implications
This section attempts to trace the influence of interest groups on the
outcomes of the new corporate law by analyzing the political dynamics
that characterized the different stages of the legislative process. In order
to facilitate the analysis, the major modifications that occurred in the
course of the legislation discussed above have been grouped according
to defining aspects: the transformation of bright line rules into standards;
the conversion of enabling provisions to mandatory ones; the inclusion
of mitigating provisions; and the delegation of authority to the Minister
of Justice.52 2
B. 1. The Shift from Rules to Standards
The legal literature has long deliberated the legislature's choice
between the use of abstract rules (standards) and the use of bright-line
rules (rules). Commonly, standards are defined as giving content to the
law ex post, whereas rules are defined as ex ante law that leaves only
factual issues for the adjudicator.523 The debate over the choice between
standards and rules has far reaching economic and moral implications.524
For example, from an economic point of view, which takes into account
legal costs and the extent to which an individual's behavior conforms to
the law, the choice between rules and standards should be contingent on
the frequency with which the law is expected to apply. The greater the
frequency, the more desirable rules tend to be relative to standards. 25 In
a similar manner, the choice between rules and standards should also
depend upon the question of who is the more efficient producer of laws,
apply. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 651.
522. For a summary table of the major modifications made during the legislative
process, see Appendix C.
523. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992).
524. See, e.g., id; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
525. See supra note 523, at 567-77 (basing this conclusion on the notion that rules
cost more to promulgate; standards cost more to enforce and rules are easier to comply
with).
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the legislature or the court.5 26 This question, in turn, is a function of the
specialization of the court and its accessibility to technical expertise.
Thus, if in resolving complex technical issues a specialized court that
possesses greater expertise and information than the legislature may
reach more educated decisions, the production of laws through standards
should be preferable. 27 In contrast, a court that lacks expertise is likely,
to the extent possible, to shun from engaging in substantive technical
deliberations, making it an inefficient producer of legal precepts.5 28
From a political theory perspective, however, the choice between
standards and rules is likely to be affected more by the regulator's
institutional dynamics than by plain policy choice.529 Standards provide
courts with wider discretion in resolving disputes compared to rules.53 °
With regard to Delaware corporate law, some commentators assert that
open-ended legal standards enable Delaware to enhance its competitive
advantage over other U.S. states531 and exploit its market power through
price discrimination.532 These commentators allege that Delaware law is
more indeterminate than it could be because of the influence of the
corporate bar, judicial preferences, and a court-centered legal culture.533
In response to these allegations, other commentators emphasize the
economic usefulness and superiority of Delaware's judge-made
corporate law.534 These commentators explicitly link the virtues of the
526. See Procaccia, supra note 187, at 305-06.
527. See id. at 306-10.
528. Id.
529. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995). See also Kaplow, supra note 523, at 608-
11.
530. Kamar, supra note 314, at 888-89.
531. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908 (1998).
532. See Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 53, 1232-37 (arguing
that the reliance of Delaware law on standards-based tests is one of the features that
make it litigation intensive, and that the litigation intensive structure of Delaware law
results in social waste).
533. See Kamar, supra note 531, at 1939-46.
534. See Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 51, at 519-26
(2001) (noting, in n. 352, that "the use of a standard is most plausibly integrally
connected to the nature of the legal issue to be decided rather than the strategic
motivations of adjudicators in relation to chartering revenues"); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Delaware 's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel
or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar's Price Discrimination in
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Delaware model to its specialized judiciary, well developed case law,
and predictability.535
The empirical evidence from the Israeli case seems to sustain, at
least to some extent, the political theory explanation regarding the
choice between standards and bright-line rules. Reviewing the
modifications made during the legislative process reveals a
transformation from bright-line rules to standards in major areas such as
piercing the corporate veil; 536 the addition of the fairness duty owed by
shareholders towards the company;537 the reimbursement rate given to
the plaintiff in a derivative or class action;538 and the definition of
creditors' minimal safety cushion in the context of prohibited
distributions.539 This shift took place mostly during the deliberations of
the Barak Committee. That is, the Barak Committee Report and the
Companies Bill, 1995, turned (or extended) the bright-line rules
suggested in Professor Procaccia's Proposal into standards, which leave
ample discretion to the court.
While in certain contexts, such as fiduciary or fairness duties, the
use of standards is considered more efficient and is sometimes inevitable
due to the idiosyncratic and infrequent behaviors that fall under these
rubrics, 540 the use of standards with regard to other issues is more
questionable. When unspecialized courts are authorized to pierce the
corporate veil in circumstances where it is "just and fair" to do so, or are
required to evaluate expert testimony with regard to complex technical
issues such as distributable profits, the resulting law might be
unpredictable and inefficient.5 41  Similarly, when the setting of the
the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1257, 1272-82 (2001) (questioning
the efficiency of adopting bright-line rules for regulating complex human behavior in
the context of Delaware's standards-based approach that furnishes workable guidance
to practitioners while enabling the flexibility required for economic innovation).
535. See Romano, The Needfor Competition, supra note 51, at 520-23; Strine, supra
note 534, at 1263-64.
536. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
537. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
538. See supra text accompanying notes 434-36.
539. See supra text accompanying note 395.
540. See Kaplow, supra note 523, at 599-600; Romano, The Need for Competition,
supra note 51, at 523-24. Note that even in these instances Professor Romano
conditions the desirability of the use of standards on the expertise of the court. See id.
541. See Procaccia, supra note 187, at 315-19. See also Kaplow, supra note 523, at
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reimbursement rate in a derivative or class action is left to non-expert
courts, which tend to use general principles of justice rather than
efficiency considerations that require technical expertise, the plaintiffs
incentives to file suits or settle might be non-optimal. 42
Scrutinizing the Barak Committee's protocols with regard to some
of these issues5 43 as well as the participant's testimonies in the legislative
process makes it safe to assume that the internal dynamics in the
Committee and principal differences in doctrinal approaches rather than
efficiency considerations, account for at least some of these
modifications. In particular, members of the Barak Committee rejected
an economic approach in favor of more flexible and pragmatic solutions
that leave the development of substantive law to the courts. 5 4 4  Still,
tracing the existing protocols indicates that the ability of the court to
enforce corporate law legislation efficiently was not a factor in choosing
between bright-line rules and standards. 45
These patterns reconcile the notion expressed by Alan Schwartz and
Robert E. Scott, according to which legislative bodies produce either
605 (stating that due to individuals' risk aversion, the value of precision with which
laws are actually applied, as well as the value of less expensive legal advice, is greater
than it otherwise would be, making rules a favorable option).
542. See Procaccia, supra note 187, at 312-15. See also Interview with Judge
Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 223.
543. As was mentioned above in Part II, a large part of the Barak Committee's
protocols consist of digests rather than a word-for-word documentation. However, I
was able to locate relatively elaborate protocols on the matters of veil piercing,
derivative suit, class action, and capital preservation. See THE JUSTICE MINISTRY, THE
COMMITTEE FOR THE PREPARATION OF A NEW COMPANIES LAW, MEETING PROTOCOLS
(Jan. 20-21, 1989) at 5-14; (Jan. 22-23, 1987) at 10-11, 22-23; (Feb 19-20, 1988) at 27-
35 (on file with author).
544. For instance, when debating the matter of piercing the corporate veil, members
of the Barak Committee and in particular Chairperson Barak commonly referred to a
general "justice" requirement that ought to be left to the discretion of the court. It is
noteworthy that the Barak Committee was aware of the difficulty in codifying the
matter of veil piercing and the need to adjust the relevant provisions to a changing
reality. The use of standards might be seen, in that respect, as a necessary compromise
between the desire to codify corporate law and the acknowledgement of the
indispensability of its flexibility.
545. See also Procaccia, supra note 187, at 312 (stating that the deficiency of the
Israeli court system in producing efficient corporate laws induced him to include in his
proposal bright-line rules, but that the dynamics behind the scenes of the legislative
process resulted in the alteration of some of these rules to standards).
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rules or standards "in consequence of a particular institutional dynamic
and not because of their intrinsic virtues as instruments for social
control. 546 Similar to Schwartz and Scott's predictions, on many issues,
the Barak Committee appeared to prefer standards to the production of
bright-line rules, thereby allowing courts broad discretion to follow their
own policy rather than a policy set by the legislature.5 47 This propensity
can be explained by the common law tradition that characterized the
Israeli corporate law prior to its codification,5 48 as well as by the general
deference given to the judiciary during the legislative process.549
Whereas the use of standards in the context of Delaware's
specialized court system may have benefited both managers and
shareholders by producing predictability and flexibility that encourage
business activity, notwithstanding the possible creation of some side
benefits to the corporate bar, managers and control holders were the big
losers of the shift from bright-line rules to standards in the Israeli
context. This can be attributed to the use of standards with respect to
546. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 529, at 651. Although Schwartz & Scott's
article focuses on private law-making groups, such as the ALI and NCCUSL, and that
their membership and procedures result in strong status quo bias and a possible capture
by interest groups, its implications may apply also to public legislative bodies, to the
extent that those bodies share similar structural features. Moreover, public committees
such as the Barak Committee resemble private legislatures at least in the sense that their
members are considered to be disinterested experts.
547. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 529, at 615-16, 621-24. A more elaborate
analysis of the consistency of the structural features of public committees in Israel with
the formal model offered by Schwartz and Scott is beyond the scope of this work and
will be left for a future time.
548. This tradition is considered to be efficient with regard to different corporate law
issues, such as fiduciary obligations. See Romano, The Need for Competition, supra
note 51, at 519-20.
549. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text. Interestingly, in their
interviews, some of the participants in the legislative process acknowledged that
regardless of the statutory provisions, the ultimate reformer of corporate law would be
the court. See Interviews with Prof. Uriel Procaccia, supra note 192; Shuki
Abramovich, supra note 297. See also Irit Haviv-Segal, The New Companies Law: the
End of the Limited Liability Era? (Dec. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.israelbar.org.il (asserting that the review of court decisions regarding veil
piercing shows that the increase in the number of cases since the enactment of the new
law is not related to the specific contents of the legislative arrangement but rather
ensues from the fact that the doctrine was codified).
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issues such as veil piercing, shareholder duties, and distribution, which,
in an overloaded unspecialized court system has resulted in
unpredictability and greater exposure of managers and control holders to
liability.5  The absence of the Association of Publicly Traded
Companies and the Manufacturers' Association from the Barak
Committee meetings and their later extensive involvement in the
Parliamentary Subcommittee's proceedings are consistent with this
conclusion.
It should be emphasized that the point of departure for the
deliberations of the Parliamentary Subcommittee was the provisions of
the Companies Bill, 1995, as rephrased by the Justice Ministry
representatives. 51  The original legal arrangements suggested by
Professor Procaccia, although available and accessible,552 were not
offered as a viable alternative to the Barak Committee Report. Rather,
during the Subcommittee meetings, Professor Procaccia represented the
Barak Committee and espoused its decisions. As a result of this
situation and the general tendency towards allowing for the court's
discretion, in instances where the Parliamentary Subcommittee inclined
towards rule-like solutions, it narrowed the already existing standards
rather than creating new alternative bright-line rules. 553  These
amendments aimed at limiting the court's discretion and were more
likely driven by political concerns rather than the efficiency
considerations offered by economists for the choice of rules over
550. Part of managers' criticism of the new law has touched exactly upon this point.
See, e.g., Managers Against the Corporate Law, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE (July 7,
1999); Stella Korin-Lieber, The Jewish Head Invents Patents, GLOBES ELECTRONIC
ARCHIVE (Dec. 23, 1999).
551. See Interview with Eran Rosman, supra note 232.
552. See PROCACCIA, supra note 7.
553. For example, with regard to veil piercing, the Subcommittee limited the general
provision set by the Companies Bill, 1995, and enabled the court to pierce the corporate
veil only in "exceptional cases" and due to "special reasons." See THE SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE
COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 13TH KNESSET, 5TH SESS., PROTOCOL No. 3, 15, 21-22
(Jan. 14, 1996). Similarly, the fairness duty that was imposed by the Bill on all
shareholders was confined by the Subcommittee to control holders and shareholders
whose vote is decisive. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND
JUSTICE COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 14TH
KNESSET, 2ND SESS., PROTOCOL No. 14, 2-12 (Aug. 6, 1997).
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standards.554
Parenthetically, it is noteworthy that the choice between bright-line
rules and standards is distinguishable, at least in the analytical sense,
from the choice between enabling and mandatory provisions, which are
discussed next.
B.2. The Conversion of Enabling Provisions to Mandatory Provisions
In general, modem corporate law is conceived as a standard form
contract, which combines permissive mechanisms aimed at lowering
transaction costs for various economic players, with regulating
mechanisms that are intended to solve structural flaws embedded in the
corporate entity. 555 The use in corporate law legislation of mandatory
provisions, as opposed to enabling ones, has been widely debated by
legal scholars.556 As was mentioned in the previous part of this paper,
the new Israeli corporate law is said to be based on the notion of the
autonomy of the private will and, therefore, favors the enabling model of
legislation. Under this approach, mandatory rules are justified only to
the extent that they are required for the protection of third parties or for
the correction of market failures.557
When reviewing the modifications to the original draft proposal in
the course of the legislative process, it is noticeable that some
substantive provisions articulated as enabling or at least as optional in
Professor Procaccia's proposal were transformed into mandatory
provisions in the Companies Bill, 1995.558 In particular, this tendency
554. Cf Kaplow, supra note 523, at 599-601 (noting that the choice between rules
and standards is one of degree and that the desirability of adopting presumptions or
ruling certain options in or out depends upon the frequency of behavior with the
relevant common elements).
555. See, e.g., PROCACCIA, supra note 7, at 16-17; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 40, at 22-35.
556. For a summary of the arguments in the mandatory-enabling debate, see
ROMANO, supra note 48, at 86-91. See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1395 (1989).
557. See supra text accompanying notes 321-25; Agmon & Lahman-Messer, supra
note 340, at 544-48. See also ERAN ROSMAN, SHAREHOLDERS IN THE COMPANY - A
BUSINESS COOPERATION IN THE FACE OF THE COMPANIES LAW, 1999, 29-33 (1999).
558. Indeed, that was one of the main critiques of the 1995 Bill. See Yadlin, supra
note 185 (demonstrating three faults of mandatory corporate law legislation: an
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was evident in the issues of voting by proxy;559 the separation between
the chairperson and the CEO of the company;5 60 conflict of interest
transactions; 56' and independent directors.
562
An examination of the changes discloses a complex political reality
rather than pure efficiency considerations. The common denominator of
all of them is pressure exerted by MKs and the ISA as a response to
market scandals that were uncovered during the 1980s.
In chronological order, the exposure of a lengthy price
manipulation scheme in the banks' shares in 1983,563 together with other
scandals that involved inflated salaries and theft by bank managers,
including Bank Leumi, the second largest bank in Israel, resulted in
extensive media coverage and an outcry for governmental involvement
in the capital market.564 One of the reactions was a bill initiated by MK
Ariel Weinstein 565 that created the legal institution called "director from
among the public. 566  The bill was incorporated in the Companies
Ordinance as an amendment in 1987.567 When the Barak Committee
inefficiency caused by inflexibility; costs and wastefulness that are the result of
contracting around mandatory provisions; and the difficulty it raises for Israeli
companies that are listed abroad).
559. See supra text accompanying notes 367-69.
560. See supra text accompanying notes 380-84.
561. See supra notes 410-11, 383 and accompanying text.
562. See supra text accompanying notes 439-53.
563. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
564. See id.
565. The late MK Weinstein, who was a member of the Knesset during its 10th to
13th sittings, was a member of the Likud, the major right wing party in Israel. The
Likud first came to power in 1977 after 29 years of Labor domination. The
involvement of MK Weinstein in corporate law legislation can be seen as part of a
greater move of Likud MKs towards getting a foothold in the Israeli economy that was
previously associated with the labor party. Moreover, MK Weinstein's background as
an economic reporter and editor of economic journals, together with his membership of
the Knesset's Economics Committee, made him well versed in the subject matter of the
proposed legislation.
566. See BILL FOR AMENDING THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE (No. 2), 5746-1986
(FIRST READING) (No. 282), D.K. (1987). Prior to this initiative, the issue was regulated
by the TASE rules, which required traded companies to appoint to their boards at least
one director who is not related to the control holders of the company.
567. See The Law for Amending the Companies Ordinance (No. 2), 5747-1987.
Note that under Israeli law, a bill that is initiated by an MK rather than by the
government is referred to as a "private bill" and is required to pass a "primary reading"
by the Knesset prior to entering a tripartite legislative procedure, similar to the one
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discussed the issue of independent directors, it did so in light of this
provision.5 6' Notwithstanding the acknowledgment of the deficiencies
of the statutory arrangement, the Committee decided to accept the
amendment as an existing fact and settle for working on its
improvement. 569 Regardless of the call of the ISA Chairperson for a
timely amendment, the Justice Ministry officials and Chairperson Barak
were inclined towards revising the arrangement as part of the final report
of the Committee. 70
The same market realities described above were the driving force
behind the regulation of conflict of interest transactions. In this case,
however, the dynamic was more complex. Once again, it began with a
bill initiated by MK Weinstein. The bill raised the issue of
indemnification and insurance and was proposed in response to the
exposure of managers and directors to fiduciary duties. Prior to the
submission of the bill to a "primary reading" in the Knesset,57 2 the Barak
Committee took it upon itself to create and pass as an amendment to the
Companies Ordinance an entire chapter that deals not only with the
rights but also with the duties of managers and directors.573 It therefore
regulated the issue of indemnification and insurance and, for the first
time, codified the issue of fiduciary duties, making the Weinstein bill
redundant.574
While deliberating the issue of fiduciary duties, the Barak
applied to governmental bills.
568. For the contents of the arrangement, see supra text accompanying notes 440-
43.
569. See THE JUSTICE MINISTRY, THE COMMITTEE FOR THE PREPARATION OF A NEW
COMPANIES LAW, MEETING PROTOCOL (Jan. 22-23, 1987) at 26-34 (on file with author).
570. See THE JUSTICE MINISTRY, THE COMMITTEE FOR THE PREPARATION OF A NEW
COMPANIES LAW, MEETING PROTOCOL (May 26, 1989) at 1-4 (on file with author). See
also Interview with Arie Mientkavich, supra note 125.
571. See Interview with Prof. Joseph H. Gross, supra note 224 (noting the Cosoi
Case where the Israeli Supreme Court, referring to American law, imposed fiduciary
duties on managers and control holders, and the Delaware Court decision in Smith v.
Van Gorkom).
572. See supra note 567.
573. See Interview with Davida Lahman-Messer, supra note 223.
574. See THE JUSTICE MINISTRY, THE COMMITTEE FOR THE PREPARATION OF A NEW
COMPANIES LAW, MEETING PROTOCOLS (Feb. 19-20, 1988) at 1-16, (Mar. 18-19, 1988)
at 1-32 (on file with author).
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Committee was reacting to a number of high-profile conflict of interest
transactions that took place in the market at that time. 575 Against this
background, the Committee's recommendations included an elaborate
mechanism for approving conflict of interest transactions that involves
the approval of the transaction by the board, the board's audit
committee, the general meeting of shareholders and also, in some cases
one-third of the disinterested shareholders.576 This mechanism, and
specifically the disinterested shareholder requirement, was considered
necessary by the ISA due to the highly concentrated ownership structure
of Israeli companies and the danger of the possible looting of companies
to the detriment of the minority shareholders.577
The interim recommendations of the Barak Committee regarding
managers' and directors' duties and rights were added as an amendment
to the Ordinance in 1991, and in 1994 the mechanism for approving
conflict of interest transactions was applied to control holders through
the Securities Law. 78 These interim recommendations, including the
ones that were not endorsed by the Knesset when it legislated the
amendments, were incorporated into the Companies Bill, 1995. 579 In
addition, due to the recommendations of the Justice Ministry and the
ISA, the 1995 bill included stricter requirements with regard to control
holders than those proposed by the Barak Committee.58
Lastly, the preclusion of the chairperson from acting as the
company's CEO was influenced by existing legal provisions regarding
575. See Interviews with Davida Lahman-Messer, supra note 223; Judge Michal
Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203. Prior to the Barak Committee's interim
recommendations, these transactions were regulated by the TASE and reported to the
ISA.
576. For a description of the mechanism, see Procaccia, supra note 187, at 320-23.
577. See Interviews with Arie Mientkavich, supra note 125; Dr. Shimon Wise, supra
note 125.
578. See The Law for Amending the Companies Ordinance (No. 4) (functionary's
accountability), 5751-1991; the Securities Regulations (Limitations on the Matter of
Conflict of Interest between a Listed Company and Its Control Holder), 5754-1994. See
also the Law for Amending the Companies Ordinance (No. 5), 5751-1991; The Law for
Amending the Companies Ordinance (No. 6), 5752-1992; The Law for Amending the
Companies Ordinance (No. 7), 5752-1992.
579. See supra text accompanying notes 468-70; Interview with Judge Michal
Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203.
580. See Companies Bill, 1995, at 72; Agmon & Lahman-Messer, supra note 340, at
550.
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government companies and banks.581 Although the theoretical and
practical question of the efficacy of the separation between the
chairperson and the CEO was debated until the final meeting of the
Barak Committee, the possibility of making the arrangement enabling
rather than mandatory was not considered by the Committee as a
feasible option.582 Similarly, the issue of voting by proxy was regarded
as a solution for a market failure that is inherent in the voting process in
public companies and as such, required a mandatory intervention." 3
The political science literature's analysis of the effect of salience on
legislation helps explain the conversion of different enabling provisions
into mandatory ones. The legislation in these instances was a response
to well-reported market crises, as well as to the influence of regulatory
agencies, such as the ISA. More specifically, the Israeli experience
shows that once market scandals make the front page of the newspaper
and are put on the public agenda, the legislature will react.584 That is,
when a major problem is recognized, regulation will follow.585
What is more interesting, however, is that the implications of the
regulation as well as its efficiency seem to be ancillary to the legislative
act itself. In the context of corporate law, this notion means that when a
crisis arises, the emphasis of market failures might be a pretext for
increasing mandatory regulation.586 Indeed, the market scandals of the
581. See § 24(b) of the Government Companies Law; BANK OF ISRAEL, THE
SUPERVISION OF BANKS, PROPER CONDUCT OF BANKING BUSINESS REGULATIONS,
Regulation No. 301-17(c), available at http://www.bankisraelgov.il/deptdata/pikuah/
nihul takin/eng/main.htm. See also Interview with Saul Bronfeld, supra note 74
(noting that the banks' regulations were in response to the crisis that followed the
exposure of the price manipulation scheme in the banks' shares).
582. See Letter from Michal Agmon to Members of the Barak Committee (Mar. 3,
1994) (on file with author); Interview with Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note
203.
583. See Agmon & Lahman-Messer, supra note 340, at 561-69.
584. On the other hand, as discussed later in this part, once the media turmoil
dissipates, different groups act to reshape and mitigate the legal arrangements in order
to preserve some of their interests. See infra Part III.B.3.
585. The Enron episode and the resulting Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are perfect
examples to illustrate this point. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005). See also
Roe, supra note 54, at 2528-30 (noting scandals as the most important trigger for
federal intervention in corporate law).
586. See Interviews with Davida Lahman-Messer, supra note 223 (noting that the
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1980s, the active participation of the ISA representatives in the Barak
Committee meetings since 1987, and the responsiveness of the
Committee to legislative initiatives by MKs resulted in a bill that
includes many more mandatory provisions than the proposal on which it
was based.587 In addition, in some instances where the Barak Committee
endorsed permissive provisions or avoided regulation altogether,
mandatory provisions were imposed through the conduit of securities
regulation or related laws.588 It is noteworthy that the involvement of the
ISA with corporate law legislation continued during the Parliamentary
Subcommittee meetings as well as in the post-enactment period.58 9
To the extent that mandatory regulation educates the market and
improves the accountability of managers and directors, such regulation
may be warranted. In a market where no other mechanisms exist, it may
even be crucial.5 90 However, when such regulation discourages the
final product of the legislation is mandatory to a greater extent than Professor
Procaccia's proposal since it responds to more market failures than the ones Professor
Procaccia was willing to acknowledge); Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203
(mentioning that the mandatory legislation was the outcome of the prevalent perception
at the time when the legislative process took place, according to which, both
shareholders and managers are indecent).
587. This is not to say that either Professor Procaccia's proposal or the Companies
Bill, 1995, are normatively superior. My claim here is only that the shift from enabling
to mandatory arrangements was driven, at least partially, by political realities.
588. The reference here is primarily to the issue of "one share, one vote." While the
1995 Bill and the Companies Law allow the issue of shares with different voting rights,
the Securities Law proscribes this practice. Compare the Companies Bill, 1995, § 327,
and the Companies Law, 1999, § 285, with the Securities Law § 46b. For the
theoretical, practical, and political aspects of the debate, see Procaccia, supra note 7, at
635-37; Interviews with Arie Mientkavich, supra note 125; Saul Bronfeld, supra note
125. See also THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 13TH KNESSET, 5TH
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 1, 6-7 (DEC. 24, 1995) (as part of his statement to the
Subcommittee, Professor Procaccia discussed the issue of "one share, one vote" and
summed up with the words, "this is a war in which we [the Barak Committee] fought,
and we lost.") (translated freely by author). Another important provision that was
initiated by the ISA compels managers of mutual funds to participate and vote in the
general meetings of companies whose shares they hold if the issue decided on might
harm the interest of the fund's unit holders. See § 77 of the Joint Investment Trust Law,
1994.
589. See infra notes 662-69 and accompanying text.
590. See Interviews with Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203 (asserting
that since the amendment of the Companies Ordinance with regard to fiduciary duties,
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development of competition among companies' bylaws and other market
mechanisms, and specifically when the circumstances are such that it
makes the regulation more susceptible to interest group pressures,
59
'
there is a danger that once the media amplifier has died out, different
groups that were affected by the mandatory regulation will act in order
to reverse or mitigate the effect of the regulation in ways that might
prove more harmful than the original flaws the mandatory regulation
was intended to overcome. 592 The next subsection examines these
trends.
B. 3. Mitigating Provisions
As mentioned in Part II, the business sector's main criticism of the
1995 Bill and the Companies Law, 1999, was with its ostensibly over-
regulatory nature.5 93 Professor Procaccia addressed this criticism at the
first meeting of the Parliamentary Subcommittee. After presenting the
general principle of freedom of contract and regulatory intervention that
is limited to situations of market failure, he continued:
However, there are more than a few cases.., in which we [the
Barak Committee] intervened and here the burden of proof is on us
to explain with regard to each and every case why we chose to
directors became more professional and accountable); Davida Lahman-Messer, supra
note 223 (noting that this amendment was initiated by market demand and that
nowadays people do not realize how it was possible to live without it).
591. See Interviews with Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203 (noting that
starting with the amendment of the Companies Ordinance with regard to fiduciary
duties, interest groups "discovered" the Barak Committee. Although not allowed to
participate in the Committee meetings, they would communicate their comments to the
Justice Ministry representatives and later took an active role in the Parliamentary
Subcommittee's deliberations).
592. In a Conference of the Center for Ethics held in conjunction with the
Association of Publicly Traded Companies on the matter of "the Board of Directors'
failure" that was held in Jerusalem on Mar. 31, 2003, Saul Bronfeld, the Managing
Director of the TASE, stated that "we are dealing with a sophisticated community of
business persons and accountants that are able to overturn any regulation" (translated
freely by author). See A Summary of a Conference Day "The Board's Failure", THE
ASS'N OF PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES, BACKGROUND MATERIALS, Apr. 3, 2003,
available at http://www.e-good.org.iUmaterials/research.asp?ID=4&linkA=material.
593. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
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intervene. I allow myself to assume that a large part of the debates
that will take place here, in the Constitution Committee, will deal
specifically with this matter. Because if we chose not to intervene, I
do not imagine that a lot of pressure groups, legitimate interests, will
say: "why did you decide not to intervene, please do."
594
Interestingly, most modifications made to the 1995 Bill, to the
Companies Law, 1999, and later to the Companies Bill (Amendment),
2002, did not directly convert mandatory provisions into enabling ones
but rather alleviated certain legal arrangements, and made others
disappear altogether. Considering that the basis for the Subcommittee's
discussions was the Companies Bill, 1995, that Professor Procaccia's
original proposal was no longer on the agenda, and that the legal
provisions set by the Subcommittee were the outcome of concessions
among the different interests involved in the process, this tendency is
quite self-explanatory. The processes that led to the Companies Law,
1999, and post-enactment developments are discussed in turn.
(a) The Parliamentary Subcommittee's Proceedings
During the Parliamentary Subcommittee meetings, the shift towards
mitigating provisions was prevalent in the fields of voting by proxy,5 95
the separation between the chairperson and the CEO,5 96 shareholder
duties, 597 and the qualifications of independent directors.
5 98
From the Subcommittee's protocols and interviews with the
participants in the process, it can be deduced that this mitigating
mechanism was used by different groups to preserve some of their
interests, marginalized in the previous stage of the legislative process.
For example, limiting the proxy mechanism to postal vote and policy
statements was the result of an understanding between the Justice
Ministry, the TASE, and the Association of Publicly Traded Companies
with regard to the costs of the mechanism. 99 The separation between
594. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 13TH KNESSET, 5TH
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 1, 8 (Dec. 24, 1995) (translated freely by author).
595. See supra text accompanying notes 370-71.
596. See supra text accompanying notes 384-88.
597. See supra notes 408-11 and accompanying text.
598. See supra text accompanying notes 454-456.
599. See Interview with Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203; THE
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the chairperson and the CEO was an initiative of the Manufacturers'
Association.60 °
On other issues, like shareholder duties, conflict of interest
transactions or the qualifications of independent directors, the legal
arrangements in the Companies Law of 1999 are a compromise between
the ISA and the Association of Publicly Traded Companies, in which the
Justice Ministry acted as a mediator.60'
It is important to note that on some matters the Justice Ministry
representatives presented to the Parliamentary Subcommittee, legal
arrangements that differed substantially from the 1995 Bill represented a
starting point. That was the case with regard to loyalty duties by related
companies, 60 2 the omission of the liquidity test with regard to capital
preservation,6 3 and the chapter on mergers and acquisitions.6 4 While
some of these issues were hotly debated in the course of the
subcommittee meetings, their core remained intact.
Specifically, on the issue of related companies, the Subcommittee
and later the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee accepted the
Justice Ministry's opinion that the issue could not currently be regulated
due to the difficulty in defining the concept of related companies.6 5 On
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER
OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 14TH KNESSET, 2ND SESS., PROTOCOL No. 11, 24-
30 (June 18, 1997).
600. See Interview with Omri Yadlin, supra note 262; THE CONSTITUTION, LAW,
AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, 14TH KNESSET, 4TH SESS., PROTOCOL No. 266, 21-28, 38-39
(Dec. 1, 1998).
601. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 14TH KNESSET, 2ND
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 14 (Aug. 6, 1997); 14TH KNESSET, 3RD SESS., PROTOCOL No. 27,
2-44, (Aug. 23, 1998); 14TH KNESSET, 3RD SESS., PROTOCOL No. 19, 18-33 (Feb. 8,
1998). See also Interview with Eran Rosman, supra note 262.
602. See supra notes 469-71 and accompanying text.
603. See supra text accompanying notes 476-77.
604. See supra notes 501-08 and accompanying text.
605. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 14TH KNESSET, 3RD
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 20, 25 (Feb. 19, 1998); 14TH KNESSET, 3RD SESS., PROTOCOL No.
26, 104-106 (Aug. 13, 1998); 14TH KNESSET, 4TH SESS., PROTOCOL No. 30, 7-8 (Oct. 27,
1998); THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, 14TH KNESSET, 4TH SESS.,
PROTOCOL No. 266, 17-20 (Dec. 1, 1998). For criticism of this decision, see Interviews
with Prof. Joseph H. Gross, supra note 224; Ruth Shikler, supra note 303.
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the issue of mergers and acquisitions, the bulk of this chapter was passed
rather hastily in a meeting that was chaired by MK Yona Yahav, who
substituted for the chairman of the Subcommittee, MK Eliezer
Sandberg, and in which both Professor Procaccia and Dr. David
Tadmor, then head of the Israeli Antitrust Authority, were active
participants.6 °6 Later endeavors by the ISA to repeal the tender offer
requirement in cases where there already exists a control holder, arguing
that this requirement discourages takeovers in the concentrated Israeli
marketplace, were mostly unsuccessful due to the objections of the
Justice Ministry representatives. 6 ' At the same time, efforts by the
Banks' Association to reinforce the status of creditors in the case of
mergers, which had been reduced in comparison to the legal situation
under the Companies Ordinance, were relatively successful.60 8
(b) Post-Enactment Developments
A major part of mitigating legislative revisions that may be
attributed at least in part to interest-group activity occurred after the
final approval of the new corporate law by the Knesset in 1999. An
investigation into the process that resulted in the Companies Law
(Amendment No. 3), 2005, and other related initiatives, can demonstrate
the patterns of action that interest groups use and their effect on the
Israeli political system.60 9
606. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 14TH KNESSET, 3RD
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 25, 2-41 (July 21, 1998). See also Interview with Eran Rosman,
supra note 262.
607. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 14TH KNESSET, 3RD
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 29, 106-116 (Oct. 1, 1998); 14TH KNESSET, 3RD SESS., PROTOCOL
No. 30, 17-20 (Oct. 27, 1998).
608. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 14TH KNESSET, 3RD
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 24, 34-56 (July 14, 1998); 14TH KNESSET, 3RD SESS., PROTOCOL
No. 25, 2-8, 13, 19-20 (July 21, 1998). See also THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, 14TH KNESSET, 4TH SESS., PROTOCOL No. 266, 14-17 (Dec. 1, 1998) (A
suggestion by the Banks' Association to impose on companies a duty to consult with
their creditors prior to deciding a merger was rejected by the Committee).
609. As mentioned in Part II, the amending law was passed by the Knesset on
March 7, 2005. See Companies Law (Amendment No. 3), 2005.
2006] THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF 299
CORPORA TE LEGISLATION
In the last meeting of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee
that preceded the passing of the new law in the Knesset Plenum, it was
agreed that, if necessary, the law would be amended in the near future.61 °
This did not prevent certain groups, even prior to the date on which the
law became effective, from trying to influence then Prime Minister Ehud
Barak to revoke or postpone the application of the new Companies
Law.611
Once this attempt failed, the Manufacturers' Association dispatched
a policy paper to the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Finance
regarding required revisions to the Companies Law and the Mergers
Law in order to make them more suitable for the needs of Israeli high
tech companies.612 The claim was that, without these revisions, high-
tech companies would leave Israel and act or incorporate in other
jurisdictions. 63  At the beginning of September 2000, following the
submission of the policy paper, Prime Minister Ehud Barak convened
with the Ministers of Justice, Finance, and Industry, in order to discuss
what legal amendments were necessary to induce high-tech companies
to stay in Israel. Subsequently, the Justice Ministry drafted a bill
610. See Interview with Gad Soen, supra note 203; see also Interview with Davida
Lahman-Messer, supra note 223.
611. See Stella Korin-Lieber, The Jewish Head Invents Patents, GLOBES
ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE (Dec. 23, 1999) ("A quiet activity, in which senior officials in the
public sector, academia, and the legal-business world are taking part, is occurring these
days in an attempt to prevent the full application of the new Companies Law, that is
supposed to come into force on February 1. All agree that the law is innovative,
creative, and special, but what about the practice? The big fear is that the law will
increase the flight of companies out of Israel.") (translated freely by author).
612. The following description is based on Ora Koren, The Industrials Act to Adapt
the Companies Law to High Tech, HA'ARETZ INTERNET EDITION, Sep. 10, 2000; Ora
Koren, Additional Alterations to the Companies Law: "Piercing the Corporate Veil"
Toward Functionaries Will Be Cancelled, HA'ARETZ INTERNET EDITION, Dec. 12, 2000.
It is unclear if the Minister of Justice, who is the minister in charge of the Companies
Law, was an addressee of this policy paper.
613. The revisions were also suggested with regard to low tech companies, although
it was acknowledged that the ability of these companies to physically emigrate is
substantially lower, due to their dependence on physical assets. See The Amendments to
The Companies Law were Approved by the Ministers' Committee of Legislation and
Passed to the Knesset 's Constitution Committee, Press Release, The Ass'n of Publicly
Traded Companies (May 1, 2002), available at http://www.e-good.org.il/news/
content.asp?ID=93.
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memorandum that dealt with most of the issues raised by the
Manufacturers' Association and other bodies, such as the Association of
Publicly Traded Companies. The first draft of this bill memorandum
was presented to the Prime Minister in December 2000, and its final
version was approved by the Ministers' Committee of Legislation in
April 2002.614 The governmental blueprint passed the first reading in the
Knesset on July 1, 2002.615
Interestingly, the revisions suggested by the amending bill were not
limited to high tech companies (in fact, the official explanation did not
even mention this sector), nor were they supplemented by a serious
discussion of their repercussions.616 Instead, the official explanation
accompanying the bill settled for general statements regarding the
protection of shareholders and the necessity to adopt a regulatory
framework similar to that in western countries.
617
While the Justice Ministry representatives were working to amend
the bill and incorporate the comments of different bodies, a businessman
named Yossie Hollander entered the legislative process.618 Unsatisfied
with the amendments suggested by the Justice Ministry, Mr. Hollander
approached different legislative bodies and employed lobbyists in the
614. See The Amendments to the Companies Law were Approved by the Ministers'
Committee of Legislation and Passed to the Knesset's Constitution Committee, THE
ASS'N OF PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES, PRESS RELEASES, May 1, 2002, available at
http://www.e-good.org.il/news/content.asp?ID=93.
615. See THE COMPANIES BILL (AMENDMENT), 5762-2002 (FIRST READING) (No.
324), D.K. (2002).
616. The foreword of the official explanation accompanying the amending bill states
that in the course of the implementation of the new law, some issues that necessitate
clarification or alteration were raised due to, inter alia, public discussion regarding the
law's provisions. The bill, the official explanation proceeds, includes the main
suggested amendments and is principally meant to amend substantial problems that
were brought up. So, for instance, it is suggested to repeal the ability to attribute the
company's duties to managers and directors, and to permit the insurance of directors
against breach of 'duty of care' claims in case of a prohibited distribution. Moreover,
additional amendments are suggested owing to comments received from different
bodies, or for clarification purposes. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 638.
617. See generally id.
618. See Vardi, supra note 278. Mr. Hollander, an entrepreneur in the high tech
sector, was among the founders of New Dimension Software, Ltd., a company that was
acquired by BMC Software Inc. in 1999 for $675 million, and is currently the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors of Jacada Ltd. See http://www.jacada.com/
news/fact sheet.htm.
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Knesset to further relieve investors and managers from over-
regulation.619 Once again, the claim was that a complicated and
bureaucratic corporate law might cause entrepreneurs to incorporate
their companies elsewhere. 620 His efforts resulted in a private bill that
was signed by thirteen MKs and submitted to the Knesset on June 3,
2002.621
Envisioning a global competitive market for corporate charters, this
bill reduced shareholder and director duties, as well as the doctrine of
veil piercing, well beyond the relevant provisions in the governmental
bill.622' In doing so, the official explanation accompanying the private
bill was that no similar legal provisions exist in Delaware's General
Corporation Law.62 3 The bill also made the separation between the
619. See Vardi, supra note 278.
620. See A Group of Business Persons from the High-Tech Sector Asks MK Eitan to
Amend the Corporations Law (Feb. 9, 2002); MK Eitan will Initiate an Amendment to
the Corporations Law (Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://www.miki.org.il; Moti Arad,
Adv., The Companies Law Hinders Growth, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE (Jul. 16,
2002).
621. See The Companies Bill, 5762-2002, p/3792, available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/privatelaw/data/15/3792.rtf. An identical bill was
resubmitted to the subsequent Knesset on Mar., 26, 2003, by ten MKs. See The
Companies Bill (Amendment - Encouragement of Incorporation in Israel), 5763-2003,
p/267, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/privatelaw/data/16/267.rtf. [hereinafter
the Companies Bill (Encouragement of Incorporation), 2003]. As was mentioned
above, private bills, i.e., bills that are initiated by MKs rather than by the government,
are required to pass a primary reading by the Knesset prior to entering a tripartite
legislative procedure, similar to the one applied to governmental bills.
622. With regard to shareholder duties, it eliminates the duty to act in good faith or
with fairness. It also establishes that a showing of a legitimate interest will overcome
any claim of abuse of power by a shareholder. With regard to directorial duties, it also
enables the insuring of directors for breach of duty of care when they acted recklessly.
With regard to veil piercing, it creates an inclusive list of exceptional circumstances in
which the court may lift the corporate veil towards the shareholders. This list consists
of two causes: where there was an intent to abuse the law or to deceive a person, or
where the company was managed intentionally against its interest. See Companies Bill
(Encouragement of Incorporation), 2003.
623. See id In the foreword, the official explanation notes that Delaware's
corporate law is considered the most advanced law in the world and hence the Israeli
corporate law should be examined in its light. No attention is given to the differences
between the two jurisdictions.
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chairperson and the CEO optional rather than compulsory.624 In
addition, the bill exempted companies that are traded on foreign
exchanges, notably in the German Neuer Markt, from certain
registration requirements 625 and regulated special forms of mergers, such
as short-form mergers and mergers with foreign entities.626 The private
bill passed the primary reading at the Knesset on May 21, 2003, and, in
agreement with the government and the initiating MKs, it was referred
to the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee to be prepared for
legislation, in conjunction with the governmental amending bill. 627
The Subcommittee of The Constitution, Law, and Justice
Committee, on the Matter of The Companies Bill (Amendment)
conducted 20 meetings discussing the governmental bill (the Companies
Bill (Amendment), 2002), as well as the private bill mentioned above
(the Companies Bill (Encouragement of Incorporation), 2003) and the
Companies Bill (Qualification of Outside Directors), 2004.628
The resulting law, which passed the second and third readings on
March 7, 2004,629 includes both technical and substantive amendments.
Among others, it restricts the contents of the doctrine of veil piercing
and annuls its application to managers and directors;630 it further erodes
the prohibition of the chairperson from acting as the CEO of the
company; 631 it extends the list of issues that the board may delegate to
committees; 63 2 it narrows the definition of material private placement
that requires special approvals; 63 3 it imposes legal fees of a plaintiff in a
624. See id See also Moti Arad, Adv., The Companies Law Hinders Growth,
GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE (Jul. 16, 2002).
625. See Companies Bill (Encouragement of Incorporation), 2003.
626. Id.
627. See THE COMPANIES BILL (AMENDMENT - ENCOURAGEMENT OF
INCORPORATION IN ISRAEL), 5763-2003 (No. 24), D.K. (2003).
628. The Companies Bill (Qualification of Outside Directors), 2004 was based on
two private bills that passed the primary reading by the Knesset on Feb. 18, 2004. See
Prof. Yossef Gross, Membership on the Board of Directors - Not only a Respected Way
to Retire, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Mar. 23, 2004.
629. THE COMPANIES BILL (AMENDMENT No. 3), 5765-2005 (SECOND READING AND
THIRD READING) (No. 230), D.K. (2005).
630. See supra notes 352-63 and accompanying text.
631. See supra notes 406-09 and accompanying text.
632. See supra notes 418-23 and accompanying text.
633. See supra notes 439-44 and accompanying text.
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derivative action on the company; 63 4 it further reduces the limitations on
the individuals who are qualified to act as independent directors because
of their relation to the company but at the same time it sets certain
professional qualifications for such directors; 635 it excludes additional
situations from the definition of a "personal interest" of a manager or
director that necessitates a special approval mechanism; 636 it relieves
directors' duties in the case of a prohibited distribution;637 and it
638modifies certain issues of mergers and acquisitions.
As already stated, the most common claim in favor of mitigating
the mandatory provisions set by the new law, or limiting their
application, emphasized the fear that Israeli companies would migrate to
other countries, most notably the United States.63 9 Practically, this
migration could take two forms. 64 0 First, companies could incorporate in
Israel and list their securities, exclusively or complementarily, on a
foreign stock exchange.641 Second, Israeli companies could incorporate
in a foreign country.642 While facilitating legal arrangements concerning
companies that are incorporated in Israel but are listed abroad is
essential, notwithstanding the complexity of the contents of such
643arrangements, an overly broad revision that is driven by an amorphous
634. See supra text accompanying notes 461-62.
635. See supra notes 479-82 and accompanying text.
636. See supra text accompanying note 496.
637. See supra text accompanying notes 509-13.
638. See supra notes 539-46 and accompanying text. These issues include
narrowing down the definition of acquisitions that are required to be effected by way of
a tender offer and foregoing shareholders' approval of certain types of mergers.
639. See, e.g., Yadlin, supra note 185, at 273.
640. See generally Rock, supra note 154.
641. See Coffee, The Future as History, supra note 3, at 673-76.
642. The Israeli corporate law, like its American counterpart and as opposed to
European corporate laws, applies the "state of incorporation" doctrine and not the "real
seat" doctrine to the corporation's internal affairs. Thus, it enables corporate migration.
For the differences between the two doctrines and the implications of the European
Court of Justice 1999 Centros decision for the availability of regulatory competition in
the European Union, see Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance:
Convergence of Form or Function, Columbia Center for Law and Economics 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 329 (2001).
643. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, FOR REGULATIONS UNDER THE COMPANIES LAW, 15TH KNESSET 2ND SESS.,
PROTOCOL No. 10 (JAN. 11. 2000) (discussing the Companies Regulations (Companies
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concern over reincorporation abroad raises some doubts regarding its
motives. This is because such a concern ignores the complex set of
factors that affect a company's decision of incorporation or
reincorporation. In a nutshell, these factors include tax considerations,
costs of incorporation in a foreign country, the political issue of being
affiliated to Israel, and the overall business environment, of which the
Companies Law is only a secondary component.644
In addition, since labor law and bankruptcy law are indifferent to
the question of incorporation,645 in order for companies to evade the
Israeli "over-regulation," they should not only incorporate outside of
Israel but also physically relocate their activity abroad. This option is
less viable to low-tech companies due to lower labor mobility and
country-specificity of assets.646
Finally, the ownership structures of Israeli companies that are
listed, and perhaps also incorporated in the United States, are
significantly less concentrated than those of Israeli companies listed
only on the TASE.64 7 As noted, one of the explanations given to the
unique phenomenon of Israeli companies listed exclusively on foreign
exchanges was the signaling of these companies that their quality is
superior to their TASE-based counterparts. 648  This fact makes the
argument that under-regulation will improve the quality of Israeli
companies logically incoherent. Under current market conditions, it is
unlikely that less regulation will result in dispersed ownership and better
corporate governance, at least not in the short term.649
whose shares are listed for trade on a foreign exchange), 5760-2000).
644. See Interviews with Saul Bronfeld, supra note 74; Shuki Abramovich, supra
note 297; Prof. Uriel Procaccia, supra note 192; Dr. Shimon Wise, supra note 125.
645. See Interview with Davida Lahman-Messer, supra note 223.
646. See Coffee, The Future as History, supra note 3, at 654-57; see also Caries
Boix & Luis Garicano, Democracy, Inequality and Country-Specific Wealth (2002)
(Leitner International Political Economy Workshop), available at
http://www.yale.edu/leitner/pdf/PEW-Boix.pdf.
647. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
648. See the discussion in Part II, supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text. See
also Coffee, The Future as History, supra note 3, at 676 (noting that the difficulty of
these companies in effecting an IPO in Israel may reflect the lack of sufficient minority
legal protections to attract equity investors).
649. Cf Licht, supra note 162 (arguing that cross listing is commonly motivated by
access to cheaper finance and enhancing the issuer's visibility but that it is no quick-fix
for corporate governance self-improvement. The latter must be achieved through
2006] THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF 305
CORPORATE LEGISLATION
Considering the amendments to the Companies Law, 1999, in this
setting gives rise to the argument that major innovations in the new law
that were deliberated and discussed at length by the Barak Committee
and the Parliamentary Subcommittee were perhaps discarded due to
narrow political interests. 650 Thus, control holders and managers made
sure that their liability and accountability in managing the corporation
would not extend beyond the legal situation that preceded the legislation
of the new Companies Law (and in some contexts would even be
curtailed). At the same time, at least according to media reports, then
Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who spurred the governmental amending
bill, and some of the MKs, who initiated the private bill, honestly
believed in the necessity of the revision in order to prevent the migration
of high tech companies out of Israel, and in the balance it is supposed to
set between business flexibility and the protection of parties that might
be hurt, such as minority shareholders.651
These developments clearly demonstrate one of the mechanisms
through which interest groups can gain influence on political actors,
namely by controlling their flow of information. In a reality where MKs
do not have access to independent sources of information,652 the media
coverage of corporate law issues is rather superficial, 653 and business
persons have a direct route to MKs and government members, including
the Prime Minister, the ability of business groups to influence
legislators' decision-making is quite extensive.654 This is all the more so
regulation in firms' home countries).
650. Cf Zvi Lavi, Professor Procaccia and His Fight Against the Lobbyists,
GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE, Sep. 11, 2003 (reporting on a letter that was sent by
Professor Procaccia to the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, in which
Professor Procaccia protests against the amendments suggested in the private bill and
claims that the lobbyists' aim is to tilt the law in favor of managers and control holders
of distressed companies, at the expense of investors and creditors).
651. See Koren, supra note 612.
652. See supra text accompanying note 251.
653. See infra text accompanying notes 741-42.
654. See, e.g., A Group of Business Persons from the High-Tech Sector Asks MK
Eitan to Amend the Corporations Law, Feb. 9, 2002, available at www.miki.org.il, the
official website of MK Eitan who initiated the private bill (stating that "[t]he current
situation in which Israeli Companies prefer to register abroad constitutes a severe
danger to the State of Israel. Registration of companies abroad causes reduction in
employment, fleeing of capital, brain drain, and substantial decrease in the tax base....
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when the political power of the government officials who are supposed
to give a counter balance to the business sector is quite limited. 655 By
manipulating the public discourse and preventing in depth systematic
discussion, interest groups are able to portray to the legislature realities
and facts that in essence serve their own interests, rather than the
interests of the general public.656
Moreover, the story of the amendment of the bills, especially the
Companies Bill (Encouragement of Incorporation), 2003, stresses the
importance of procedural process, substantial deliberation, and wide
representation of all relevant parties in reducing or balancing interest-
group pressure on political actors. At least to a certain extent, these
factors seemed to exist in the formal stages of the legislation of the
Israeli corporate law. Their absence from some of the initiatives to
amend the law lays bare their significance.651 In this context, Professor
Procaccia's letter to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee that
prepared the bills for legislation 658 may be seen as an attempt to create a
wider dialogue regarding the core principles of the legislation. Indeed,
this call seems to resonate in the meetings of the Subcommittee of The
Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, on the Matter of The
Companies Bill (Amendment) that discussed amendment of the bills. 65 9
Therefore, the adjustment of the Companies Law is a Zionist, national, and necessary
action for preserving the competitiveness of the Israeli Market") (translated freely by
author).
655. See Interview with Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, supra note 203. See also
Licht, supra note 164, at 336-41 (describing the caving in of the ISA in the face of
continuing pressure from the TASE and prominent business persons in the case of the
dual listing project).
656. Cf Macey, supra note 23, at 231 ("[T]hus, the cost of obtaining and
disseminating information about legislative issues often results in passage of special
interest legislation by legislators who really believe they are acting in the public
interest.").
657. Cf Hadas Magen, MK Rassabi: The Companies Law Deters Entrepreneurs due
to the Ease of Piercing the Corporate Veil, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE (Nov. 20,
2003) (quoting Davida Lahman-Messer, Deputy Attorney General, who argues that the
governmental bill was formed after hearing from the representatives of the
Manufacturers' Association and other groups and considers the comments raised by
those groups while preserving the interests of investors at large. The private bill,
according to Lahman-Messer, is a move that circumvents the compromise made by the
Justice Ministry and pronounces one-sided interests).
658. See supra note 650.
659. See, e.g., THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
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The final product of this Committee, the Companies Law (Amendment
No. 3), 2005, took after the more balanced government bill on most of
the issues discussed by the Committee.660
Lastly, it is important to note that since the enactment of the new
law, the ISA has taken an effective role in regulating public companies
according to the law. Acting on the interface between The Companies
Law and The Securities Law, it has used its power to interpret different
provisions of the Companies Law.66 1 In this capacity, it held that voting
agreements among shareholders might preclude those shareholders from
being counted in the one-third of disinterested shareholders that is
required for the approval of certain conflict of interest transactions. 662 It
also decided that the phrase "irregular transaction of a public company"
includes irregular transactions that are performed by a fully owned
663private subsidiary of the public company. In addition, it has
encouraged the use of class actions by investors and made use of the
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL (AMENDMENT), 5762-2002, 16TH
KNESSET, 1ST SESS., PROTOCOL No. 1 (Sep. 7, 2003); 16TH KNESSET, 2RD SESS.,
PROTOCOL No. 3 (Nov. 16, 2003).
660. Compare Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002 with Companies Law
(Amendment No. 3), 2005. This fact did not prevent MK Michael Eitan, the head of the
Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, from thanking Yossie Hollander from the
podium following the enactment of the amending law. See THE COMPANIES BILL
(AMENDMENT No. 3), 5765-2005 (SECOND READING AND THIRD READING) (NO. 230),
D.K. (2005), AT 51-52.
661. The ISA is not authorized to enforce the Companies Law, 1999. Nevertheless,
since certain of the Companies Law's provisions and regulations concern the ISA's
activity, the ISA often interprets different provisions of the Companies Law in
connection with its authority under the Securities Law to enforce disclosure
requirements. For information about the ISA in general, see About ISA,
http://www.isa.gov.il/english/template/default.asp?textSearch=&catid= 1 &pageld=7&ac
tive=prof (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).
662. See the ISA News Releases dated Jan. 23, 2002; Feb. 11, 2002; Feb. 26, 2002,
available at http://www.isa.gov.il//news/defaultnews.asp?catid= I &activepirsum.
663. See the ISA News Releases dated Feb. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.isa.gov.il//news/defaultnews.asp?catid=l&active=pirsum. Note that this
interpretation was explicitly rejected by the Parliamentary Subcommittee that prepared
The Companies Law for legislation. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION,
LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995,
14TH KNESSET, 3RD SESS., PROTOCOL No. 22, 16-23 (Mar. 15, 1998); 14TH KNESSET,
3RD SESS., PROTOCOL No. 29, 91-94 (Oct. 1, 1998).
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authority given to it under section 209 of the Companies Law, 1999, to
subsidize those suits.
664
However, the ISA is not empowered to directly enforce the
provisions of the Companies Law. At most, it can demand that violating
companies disclose "incriminating" information.665 Pointing to the
current situation of recurring violations and lack of real enforcement, the
ISA has lately suggested to the Justice Ministry to establish and operate
an enforcement mechanism for overseeing certain provisions in the
Companies Law, such as the appointment of independent directors and
an internal auditor, the approval of conflict of interest transactions, and
the acquiring of control by means of a tender offer.666 Moreover, it has
suggested modifying the Companies Law in order to expand the
definition of "personal interest" with regard to conflict of interest
transactions, and to increase the percentage of uninterested shareholders
required for the approval of these transactions, from one-third to one-
half.
667
Finally, although not authorized to set the qualifications of
directors, the ISA drafted guidelines, according to which public
companies will have to disclose, as part of their board's annual report,
whether they employ directors who have financial and accounting
664. See the ISA News Releases dated Dec. 18, 2002; Dec. 19, 2002; Dec. 23, 2002;
Aug. 3, 2003, available at http://www.isa.gov.il/news/defaultnews.asp?catid=l&
active=pirsum. Between the years 2000, when the Companies Law came into force,
and 2002, the ISA has participated in subsidizing seven class action suits. See ISRAEL
SECURITIES AUTHORITY, FINAL REPORTS 2000-2002. I was not able to locate the overall
number of derivative suits and class actions submitted to the courts at that period of
time. Nonetheless, correspondence with the ISA shows that between 2000 and Sep.
2002, the number of class action suits that were reported to the ISA was fifteen, out of
which eight passed the primary stage of approval as a class action by the court. See
Email from Shelly Udvin-Aharoni, Adv., Director of Class Actions and Public Inquiries
Department in the ISA (Sep. 9, 2002) (on file with author).
665. See Interview with Amir Sharf, Deputy Director of the Legal Department, the
ISA, in Tel Aviv, Isr. (July 12, 2002) (on file with author).
666. See Globes Service, Israel Securities Authority Initiates a Revision That Would
Authorize It to Enforce Part of the Companies Law's Provisions, GLOBES ELECTRONIC
ARCHIVE (Apr. 7, 2003).
667. See the ISA News Releases dated Apr. 8, 2003, available at
http://www.isa.gov.il/ news/news.asp?ID=174&inPage=123&active=pirsum; see also
the ISA News Releases dated Jan. 14, 2004, available at http://www.isa.gov.il/
news/news.asp?ID=22 1 &inPage=71 &active=pirsum.
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skills.668 The ISA hopes that setting this disclosure rule will have an
actual effect on the structure of the board of directors in public
companies.669 In a similar manner, the ISA approved a draft of an
amendment to the Securities Regulation compelling public companies to
disclose whether they have adopted an ethical code regarding the
behavior of officers, directors, and employees of the company.670 It
further appointed a public committee for examining a possible corporate
governance code for public companies in Israel.67'
It seems that the ability of the ISA to go ahead with these initiatives
stems from the exposure of numerous accounting and corporate scandals
in the United States and in Israel over the past few years, as well as from
cooperation with business groups.672  This did not prevent the
Association of Publicly Traded Companies from criticizing these
suggested reforms as over-regulating. 673 The overall outcome of the ISA
initiatives remains to be seen, but some of their impact was already felt
in the Companies Law (Amendment No.3), 2005, most notably with
respect to the provisions requiring directors to possess certain
professional qualifications.
67 4
668. See the ISA News Releases dated Sep. 7, 2003, available at
http://www.isa.gov.il/news/news.asp?ID=197&inPage=95&active=pirsum.
669. Id.
670. See the ISA News Releases dated Oct. 19, 2003, available at
http://www.isa.gov.il/news/news.asp?ID=200&inPage=89&active=pirsum.
671. See the ISA News Releases dated Sep. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.isa.gov.il/news/news.asp?ID=260&inPage=34&active=pirsum.
672. For example, the regulations regarding the ethical code were drafted in
cooperation with the CFO Forum - The Israeli Forum of Chief Financial Officers. See
id.
673. See Amir Licht, Cadbury is Not Always a Sweet Chocolate, GLOBES
ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE (Dec. 8, 2003).
674. The official explanation relating to those provisions explicitly refers to the
ISA's guidelines on the issue. See Companies Bill (Qualification of Outside Directors),
2004. Another modification made by the amending law as a result of the ISA's input is
the application of the special approval mechanism required with respect to the
employment of a control holder by the company also to the employment of a relative of
such control holder. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL (AMENDMENT), 5762-2002, 16TH
KNESSET, 2ND SESS., PROTOCOL No. 14 (Aug. 12, 2004).
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B.4. Delegation to the Minister of Justice
The last group of modifications that occurred in the course of the
legislative process is characterized by the delegation of authority to
regulate different issues, some of them substantive, to the Minister of
Justice, the minister responsible for corporate law legislation under the
Israeli political configuration.
Political theory deals extensively with the issues of delegation and
the theory of bureaucracy.675 For current purposes it is sufficient to note
that a decision to avoid delegation may ensue from a legislature's wish
to limit discretion and minimize abuse of powers, and a decision to
delegate authority may result from the legislature's desire to avoid
accountability, not from efficiency considerations.676 Moreover, the
delegation of authority to regulators who act within existing legislation,
as opposed to legislators who vote on the legislation, raises questions
regarding the motives of the regulators, their sources of information, and
their susceptibility to interest groups.
6 7 7
Examining the modifications made during the legislative process
shows that the delegation of authority to the Minister of Justice mostly
occurred during the parliamentary stage of the legislative process.6 78
Among others, the Minister was delegated the authority to regulate
substantive questions with regard to the issue of postal vote and policy
statements; 679 to exempt certain types of transactions from the conflicts
of interest approval mechanism; 680 and to set presumptions and
exemptions with regard to permissible distributions.68'
The Subcommittee's protocols with regard to these issues
demonstrate that the delegation technique was used, among others, to
create gradual change and overcome potential impasses in the
675. See, e.g., RODNEY KIEWIET & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF
DELEGATION (1991); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 359-71 (2003).
676. See Kaplow, supra note 523, at 610 & nn. 141-42.
677. See Jack Hirshleifer, Comments, 19 J.L. & ECON. 241 (1976).
678. The reference here is to specific instances of delegation, beyond the general
provision that authorizes the Minister of Justice to regulate matters that are required for
the implementation of the new corporate law. See Companies Bill, 1995, § 425;
Companies Law, 1999, § 366.
679. See supra text accompanying notes 370-73.
680. See supra note 415 and accompanying text.
681. See supra text accompanying note 482.
2006] THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF 311
CORPORATE LEGISLATION
Subcommittee.682 For example, delegating to the Minister of Justice the
authority to regulate the issue of postal vote and policy statements was
meant to facilitate the launching of an innovative mechanism in the
Israeli law by gradually imposing it on the law's users.683 Enabling the
Minister to have discretion with regard to permissible distributions was
the resolution for a disagreement between the representatives of the
Justice Ministry and the Institute of CPAs about the definition of
"profits" and application of the solvency test.68 4 Similarly, the fact that
the Minister was authorized to exempt certain conflict of interest
transactions from the application of the statutory approval mechanism
only after consulting with the ISA,685 may suggest that this provision
was drafted in concurrence with the ISA.
As opposed to the shift from bright-line rules to standards that
occurred during the deliberations of the Barak Committee and that was
driven, inter alia, from a doctrinal approach that espoused leaving wide
discretion to the court, the delegation to the Justice Ministry during the
parliamentary stage of the legislative process seems to have ensued from
the practical understanding that this technique would allow for the
resolution of unsolved specific disputes among the relevant disputant
parties at a later time . Moreover, the Justice Ministry might have been
expected to be more responsive to different interest groups and better
versed in technical issues, such as postal voting or distribution, than an
unspecialized court.686
On first impression, authorizing the Minister of Justice to
exempt certain types of transactions from the conflict of interest
approval mechanism and the set presumptions and exemptions with
respect to permissible distributions may seem to benefit managers
682. See also Interview with Prof Joseph H. Gross, supra note 224.
683. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 14TH KNESSET, 2ND
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 11, 24-27 (June 18, 1997); 14TH KNESSET, 3RD SESS., PROTOCOL
No. 26, 61-64 (Aug. 13, 1998). As mentioned above, the regulations with regard to
postal vote and policy statements, which are a prerequisite for the application of the
mechanism, were only recently approved by the Knesset committee.
684. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 5755-1995, 14TH KNESSET, 3RD
SESS., PROTOCOL No. 23, 52-66 (July 7, 1998).
685. See § 284 of the Companies Law, 1999.
686. See Kaplow, supra note 523, at 608-11.
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and control holders, since they have a direct route to affect regulation
that can mitigate the stricter provisions set by the law.687 However,
taking into account the role of the Justice Ministry and the ISA in the
legislative process, the delegation of these matters to the Minister of
Justice is better seen as a practice that ensures future oversight by the
regulators of substantive legal changes. With regard to postal vote
and policy statements, the fact that the application of the law's
provisions on these issues is contingent upon the enactment of
regulations which were only recently approved, demonstrates the
subtle way in which the TASE and the Association of Publicly
Traded Companies were able to postpone costly regulation,
notwithstanding the negative effect of the absence of such regulation
on shareholder activism. Similarly, on the issue of the costs of
ownership authorization, the Banks' Association was able to bypass
the governmental amending bill, which suggested imposing such
costs strictly on exchange members,688 by suggesting to delegate to
the Minister of Justice the authority to regulate ownership
authorization as well as the circumstances in which such
authorization will be subject to a fee.689
C. Political Theory Framework of the Israeli Corporate Law
Generally, the legislative process of the new Israeli corporate law
seems to be consistent with the interest-group theory of legislation, as
developed in this essay. That is, the game played is not "all or nothing,"
but rather a more subtle one, where the influence of interest groups is
less noticeable by, and less objectionable to the general public. This is
true especially with regard to a complex overall reform that receives
salience mainly in professional circles. Thus, the new Israeli corporate
law is indeed an extensive code revision adopted for modem times. It
abolishes anachronistic legal arrangements and adjusts the law to current
market realities and needs. 690 It codifies common law doctrines, such as
687. Cf Hirshleifer, supra note 677.
688. See Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, at 641-42.
689. See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL (AMENDMENT), 5762-2002, 16TH
KNESSET, 3RD SESS., PROTOCOL No. 12 (Jan. 26, 2005).
690. Examples include: legalizing the one person company; modifying the majority
rule required to amend the documents of incorporations by setting the default rule at
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those relating to derivative suits, piercing the corporate veil, and
dividend policy, and gathers previously scattered legislation, such as
agency rules regarding promoters, and class action suits.
But it does more than that. In the name of the autonomy of private
will and the freedom of the market, it claims to enforce mandatory legal
arrangements only when these are needed to protect investors
(shareholders and third parties) from market failure. 69  And these
junctions - that is, the identification of a market failure, the study of its
attributes, and mostly the legal arrangements offered to overcome it -
are exactly the places in which interest groups can capture marginal
benefits (or prevent marginal losses).
As detailed in the previous section, the dynamics in the course of
each stage of the legislative process and the identity of the participants
in each stage had a clear effect on the outcomes of the legislation. More
specifically, the structure of the Barak Committee and the characteristics
of the dialogue conducted in its meetings resulted in creating a code that
is rich in standards, leaving ample discretion to the court. Notably,
although most interest groups active in the economy at that time had an
opportunity to comment on Professor Procaccia's work or to send their
reservations to the Barak Committee, there was no vigilant involvement
by any group that was not an active participant in the Barak Committee
meetings, certainly not prior to the amendment of the Companies
Ordinance with regard to fiduciary duties. This fact enabled the invitees
to the Barak Committee, most notably the ISA, to gain broad influence
and promote mandatory legislation, at a period of time when market
crashes and financial scandals were widespread. In sharp contrast to
their earlier participative behavior, interest groups other than regulators
took the time and effort to actively participate in the later stages of the
legislation, both in the Parliamentary Subcommittee and in the post-
enactment proceedings. 692 The result was that major innovations of the
Companies Bill, 1995, were modified and mitigated due to strong
50%; eliminating the ultra vires doctrine; adopting the organ theory with regard to the
actions and intentions of those acting on its behalf, enabling a company to repurchase
its own stock; shifting the focus of the board role from managing the company to
monitoring its management; and regulating mergers and acquisitions.
691. Companies Bill, 1995, at 6.
692. See, respectively, supra text accompanying notes 257 and 615-16.
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pressure from different groups.693
Hence, in fighting over the new Israeli corporate law, the more
organized parties and those with access to the legislature won small
battles but did not prevail in the war. The modifications made in the
course of the legislative process with regard to issues such as piercing
the corporate veil, voting by proxy, the separation between the
chairperson and CEO of the company, and shareholder and manager
duties, all seem to reinforce the stance of control holders in the Israeli
market place. On the other hand, different initiatives of the ISA, most
conspicuously the elaborate mechanism for approving conflict of interest
transactions, appear to enforce corporate law through regulatory
schemes. In between, the Justice Ministry, as the public administrator of
corporate law legislation and regulation, endeavored to create the
appropriate balance among the different interests involved, while
incorporating its own ideological agenda on issues such as related
companies and mergers and acquisitions.694
This is not to take any decisive normative position regarding the
outcome of the legislation or the participation of interest groups in the
legislative process. 695  On the contrary, the main inference from the
Israeli case study is a positive one. Interest groups are part of the
political arena and are here to stay. Any legislative initiative that
ignores this fact and aspires to create an ideal solution may prove futile.
Instead, corporate law legislation should take into account the interests
of the different groups affected by the law and attempt to balance them.
This may be the tradeoff necessary to get a second best legislation - not
ideal but optimal.696 The ways to achieve just that, as well as the main
conclusions from the case study of the Israeli corporate law, are
discussed in the next and final part of this paper.
IV. CONCLUSION
Interest-group theory seeks to explain how different groups and
political dynamics affect the outcome of the legislative process. It does
not, however, at least not as I interpret it, purport to furnish a full
693. See supra Part III.B.3.
694. Id.
695. For some normative implications for corporate law, see infra Part IV.D.
696. Cf Macey & Miller, supra note 39 (discussing the agency costs that arise out of
the inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and managers).
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explanation of each and every provision of a law. Neither does it intend
to depict a cynical world in which each participant is driven solely by a
lust for narrow pecuniary benefits. Nonetheless, political theorists are in
essence asking us to abandon the naYve view according to which
legislators act solely and exclusively to benefit society at large.697 The
implication here is that if we had a better understanding of the political
process and its impact on the real world, we could then begin to devise
practical methods aimed at improving it.
As opposed to the United States, in which political analysis has
carved out for itself a legitimate niche within the sphere of legal
academic discourse, in Israel there are too few of these discussions
underway to legitimize their influence on legislative processes. 698 To
become a party to such a discussion, one is forced to either enter the
realm of journalism, which for the most part is regarded as a
sensationalist rather than an informative arena, or try to glean those
undertone remarks that are not meant to be quoted, at least not with
reference to their source. Thus, it comes as no surprise that when
descriptions of actual legislative processes do find their way into a
classroom, they usually come in the form of casual anecdotes. Only
rarely are law students asked, at least implicitly, to think of such
accounts as offering valuable insights into the various considerations
that underlie enacted provisions. The danger here is clear, for to ignore
the real world of lawmaking is to reduce significantly one's ability to
make effective policy recommendations bearing some chance of
adoption by the legislature.
This paper has tried to travel a different path, one that focuses on
interest-group theory and its application to corporate legislation. By
looking at corporate law through the lens of political theory, we have
been able both to elucidate the role played by interest groups in the
legislative process and draw some interesting comparative and
697. See supra Part III.B.
698. Two important exceptions in this regard are Procaccia, supra note 187
(describing, in general lines, the legislative process of the new Israeli Corporations
Law) and Licht, supra note 164 (describing the Israeli dual listing project - a regulatory
program aimed to lure Israeli issuers listed only on U.S. markets to list their stock also
on the TASE). However, these articles treat the political process as a given fact that
bears negative consequences on desirable legal arrangements and do not purport to
discuss the implications of the political process for legislative reform.
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theoretical inferences. In the ensuing sections of this part, I will
recapitulate this study's chief findings with respect to the identity and
impact of the interest groups involved in the process, the role played by
the media, legislators' ideology, and normative implications for
corporate law, and will then put forward a few policy recommendations.
A. The Identity and Impact of the Interest Groups Involved in the
Legislative Process
American scholars have long recognized the uniqueness of
Delaware's political environment as well as the essential role played by
the interstate competition for corporate charters in limiting interest
groups' power. 699  They further acknowledge the importance of the
corporate bar in shaping corporate legislation in Delaware and in other
U.S. states.700 The Israeli experience this paper has been devoted to
exploring can, however, help us to further refine these observations.
First, Israel's corporate law is a national unitary code; as such, it is
expected to be influenced by multiple interest groups who are residents
of its jurisdiction.01 Nonetheless, and much akin to the U.S. experience,
numerous interest groups such as dispersed shareholders, employees,
customers, and suppliers were not involved in the legislative process that
gave rise to the new law.70 2 This fact can be attributed to collective
action problems in the case of shareholders, customers, and suppliers,
and to the existence of alternative and more direct channels of influence
in the case of employees.70 3 Regulatory limitations and structural flaws
may further account for the absence of institutional investors from the
political arena. 04
As for creditors, the acknowledgement made by Professor
699. See supra Part I.B.
700. See Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, supra note 59, at 722-24.
701. In contrast, Delaware's corporate law is susceptible to the influence of fewer
interest groups, since the assets of most corporations incorporated under it are located in
other jurisdictions. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
702. However, as noted in Part II.C, the ISA and the Justice Ministry took it upon
themselves to represent the interests of some of these groups, specifically dispersed
shareholders. See supra text accompanying notes 548-53.
703. Cf Roe, supra note 54, at 2541 (asserting that interest groups, other than
shareholders and managers, may confine corporations by means external to corporate
law).
704. See supra Part II.C.
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Procaccia and the members of the Barak Committee as to the importance
of creditor protection resulted in highly elaborate legal provisions
regarding piercing of the corporate veil and capital preservation,
whereas the active participation of the Banks' Association in the
legislative process ensured the maintenance of creditor interests, most
notably in the case of mergers. 705 And yet, when the Israeli Companies
Law is looked at from a comparative perspective, it seems to entitle
creditors to much less protection than the European Community's
Company Law Directives.70 6 This fact is best explained by reminding
oneself of the extensive disclosure requirements mandated by the Israeli
Securities Law and utilized to safeguard creditors, 707 and also by
considering how the multiple roles played by banks in the Israeli
economy can all too easily bring about conflicts of interest. Nor can one
neglect the fact that, as mentioned above, other creditors were not
represented in the legislative process. 70 8 A complementary explanation
here is that the application in Israel of the "state of incorporation"
doctrine, as opposed to the "real seat" doctrine so often used in Europe,
together with the gradual facilitation of Israel's product and capital
markets, may have been placing more competitive constraints on the
ability of Israeli banks to protect their interests through participation in
corporate legislation.709 Such an explanation is reinforced when one
705. See supra Part II.B.
706. See Carney, Political Economy, supra note 59, at 323-25.
707. See supra notes 668-69 and accompanying text
708. One example in which the absence of small creditors might have harmed the
protection given to them by the law is the issue of the submission of financial reports of
private companies to the Companies Registrar. The Justice Ministry suggested
imposing the submission of a summary of the financial reports in order to enable
suppliers to receive basic information about the private companies with which they
deal. The claim was that, as opposed to banks that are able to demand such information
due to their strong status in the Israeli economy, small creditors are at a disadvantage
when furnishing credit to limited liability private companies. The initiative of the
Justice Ministry was halted by the Manufacturers' Association that emphasized the
negative implications of the matter for the competitiveness of companies. See THE
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER
OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 1995, 14TH KNESSET, 2ND SESS., PROTOCOL No. 9, 18-27
(Mar. 25, 1997); 14TH KNESSET, 2ND SESS., PROTOCOL No. 10, 2-5 (Apr. 8, 1997).
709. Cf Carney, Political Economy, supra note 59, at 311-18 (discussing the role of
tariffs and common markets in limiting interest groups' power).
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observes the move currently underway in the European Community to
eliminate some of the creditor protections, most notably the minimum
capital requirements, on the grounds that these are unnecessary,
ineffective, and an impediment to organization.7"0
Second, the role played by managers and control holders (those two
being indistinguishable here due to the concentrated nature of the Israeli
capital market) in the legislative process of the new law seems to
reinforce interest-group theory's notions, according to which
"[m]anagement's legislative interests will become more intense in the
face of personal losses as a result of corporate law, either from liability
rules or from loss of their positions in contests for corporate control."7 1'
The involvement of organized groups, such as the Association of
Publicly Traded Companies and the Manufacturer's Association, as well
as of influential businesspersons in the post-enactment proceedings of
the new Israeli corporate law, particularly underscores this point.712
These groups demanded that there be a lessening of officer and director
duties and liabilities, and an improvement in the ability of managers and
control holders to initiate substantive changes in the company's structure
without bringing into play the various approval mechanisms set by the
law.713 In their threat to exercise their exit option - that is, to opt-out of
the Companies Law, 1999, and incorporate elsewhere - Israeli managers
stressed the importance of having in place a competitive corporate law
that attracts businesses to incorporate under it.714  They did not,
however, give any explanation as to how the specific revisions
suggested would, if implemented, improve or at least preserve
shareholder protection.
Third, one conspicuous difference between the American and the
Israeli experience has to do with the degree of the local bar's
involvement in formulating corporate law. In the United States, each
710. See, e.g., Werner F. Ebke, Centros - Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48
AM. J. COMP. L. 623 (2000); see also Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors
versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 1165 (2001).
711. See Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, supra note 59, at 728.
712. See supra Part III.B.3(b).
713. See supra notes 612-13, 629-38 and accompanying text.
714. See the official explanation accompanying the Companies Bill (Amendment -
encouragement of incorporation in Israel), 2003, p/267, available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/privatelaw/data/16/267.rtf
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state bar is an organized group that, through its committees, lobbies for
revisions in state corporate law.71 5 In addition, the Model Business
Corporation Act, which serves as a source of law reform for many state
laws, was drafted by the American Bar Association.' 16 By contrast,
although representatives of the Israeli Bar actively participated in the
Parliamentary Subcommittee meetings that led to the creation of the new
Israeli corporate law, they were not the driving force behind the
legislation. This international difference may bespeak a deeper
collective action problem that is faced by Israeli lawyers when it comes
to corporate legislation.
As noted before, the threat that existing Israeli companies will opt
out and reincorporate in another jurisdiction is relatively weak. Even in
such a case, companies still will require local lawyers to handle all
matters relating to labor, bankruptcy, and tax laws.7 17 Thus, the
incentive is drastically reduced for Israeli lawyers to retain clients by
improving and modernizing corporate law. Moreover, since most of the
large Israeli law firms do not focus solely on corporate practice, but
rather provide their clients with a full range of legal services, they could
expect to derive only limited benefits from a wider participation in the
legislative process of corporate laws.718  Two other factors
differentiating the United States from Israel with respect to the degree of
bar involvement in corporate legislation are: within the rather narrow
bounds of the Israeli legal community, no special esteem accrues to a
lawyer from membership in a bar committee examining corporate
legislation; and, due both to Israel's small size and certain common
practices, some leading lawyers, and especially those who represent
managers and/or control holders, rightly feel that they have more direct
and efficient ways of approaching members of the Knesset or
ministers.71 9
It also should be stated in this regard that the Israeli Bar, like those
715. See Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, supra note 59, at 718-22.
716. Id. at 723-25. See also ROMANO, supra note 48, at 28-31.
717. See supra notes 646-47 and accompanying text.
718. In contrast, in matters that might affect lawyers' direct pecuniary interest, such
as the establishment of a second shift in the courts, the Bar demonstrated a deep and
lasting involvement. See, e.g., Shmuel Daklo, The Bar Agrees to the Second Shift - If
the Parties will Consent In Advance, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE (Oct. 2, 2003).
719. See supra Part III.B.3.
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U.S. lawyers who practice in states other than Delaware that do not
enjoy a specialized judicial system, has stressed the need for greater
clarity and certainty in corporate legislation.720  Again, as opposed to
Delaware's lawyers, Israel's lawyers do not seem to encourage higher
litigation costs. To date, they have not made much use of those class
action and derivative suit mechanisms that have been put in place by the
new law. One reason for this is perhaps the dismissal of most of these
cases by the court on preliminary grounds.7 1 Another may be that in the
absence of any contingency fees, Israeli lawyers have no real incentive
to file these suits.72 2 In order not to shut the door completely on class
actions, the Bar has recently voiced its disapproval of a draft of the
Companies Regulations that advises the imposition of court fees on both
plaintiffs and defendants who have settled or lost such suits.
723
A comparison of the provisions identified by legal scholars as being
of interest to the Delaware corporate bar (presumably due to the higher
litigation related fees they generate) with their counterparts in the Israeli
law produces rather perplexing results. Certain provisions said to
benefit the Delaware Bar, e.g. the barring of directors from being
indemnified for payments made in settlement of shareholder actions
724
and the futility doctrine that waives the need for a demand requirement
in derivative suits, 725 are missing from the Israeli law. 726 And yet one
720. See, e.g., statement of the Bar representative in the opening meeting of the
Parliamentary Subcommittee, THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND
JUSTICE COMMITrEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 1995, 13TH KNESSET,
5TH SESS., PROTOCOL NO. 1, 43-44 (DEC. 24, 1995).
721. See Interview with Arie Mientkavich, supra note 125 (criticizing the Supreme
Court for practically repealing the mechanism of class action).
722. Cf Miller, supra note 58, at 75-77 (offering the difference in fee rules as an
explanation for the dissimilar treatment of derivative litigation by American and
English corporate law).
723. See Hadas Magen, The Justice Ministry Plans to Impose a Court Fee in the
Amount of 2,000 Shekels on Class Action Plaintiffs, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE
(Mar. 26, 2003); see also Zvi Noah, The Court Fees Make Plaintiffs Run Away, GLOBES
ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE (Jan. 6, 2005).
724. See Macey & Miller, supra note 39, at 513-14.
725. See Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, supra note 59, at 727.
726. Section 260(a)(2) of the Companies Law, 1999, enables a company to
indemnify an officer or director against expenses (including attorneys' fees) incurred by
that person in connection with an action brought against him or her by, among others,
the company or in its name. Section 194 of the Companies Law, 1999, requires demand
in all derivative suits.
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finds in that law other features said to facilitate the litigation process;
e.g. no requirement for plaintiffs to post security for expenses in
shareholder derivative suits,727 and a broad right to inspect corporate
books and records, including lists of shareholders.728 This apparent
inconsistency suggests that, whereas the Delaware Bar may have
actively lobbied for the enactment of the provisions just alluded to, their
absence from (or presence in) the Israeli law may well have nothing to
do with the Bar but rather be contingent on other factors, such as the
lack of specialized courts 721 or the need to encourage shareholder suits
as a way of monitoring managers and control holders. Then again, it is
also possible that the commentators have simply overstated the benefits
that have been derived by Delaware lawyers, and the conflicts that
would arise between lawyers and shareholders as a result of the
enactment of such provisions.
Lastly, another interest group that was active in the various stages
of the legislative process that produced the Israeli corporate law is the
ISA. As opposed to the situation in the United States, where corporate
laws are enacted at the state level even though securities regulation is
carried out at the federal level 30 (thereby keeping the SEC fairly
uninvolved in formulating state corporate law), Israel's unitary system
has led to a considerable blurring of the borderline between corporate
and securities law.7 1' Although the ISA is not formally authorized to
enforce the Companies Law's provisions, it regularly interprets those
provisions in order to impose the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Law. It also exercises the option given to it under the
727. See Macey & Miller, supra note 39, at 510-11.
728. See id. at 513. Under section 199(3) of the Companies Law, 1999, the court
may order the company or the plaintiff to post security for the defendant's expenses in a
derivative suit. The Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, suggests erasing the words
"or the plaintiff' from the language of the section. Section 184 of the Companies Law,
1999, gives shareholders an extensive right to review the company's documents.
729. Cf supra Part III.B. I (discussing the shift from bright-line rules to standards).
730. On the relationship between federal and state securities regulations, see
ROMANO, supra note 48, at 3-4.
731. For example, the issues of class actions, takeovers, private placements, and
conflict of interest transactions between a public company and its control holder all
were regulated by the Securities Law, 1968, prior to their inclusion in the Companies
Law, 1999.
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Companies Law to subsidize class actions.732 Since its boost in status in
1987, the ISA has been taking an active part in the legislative process
and considerably impacting such aspects of the new law as the
mechanism for approving conflict of interest transactions and the
arrangements for mergers and acquisitions.733
The ISA, as opposed to the Justice Ministry which is, formally at
least, indifferent to the franchise fees accrued by the State from the
incorporation of companies in Israel,734 has an obvious and direct
interest in the development of the Israeli capital market and its stock
exchange. When one adds to this the ISA's commitment to enforcement
as a means of ensuring a fair and functioning market, one gains a better
appreciation of the ISA's deep involvement in corporate legislation, as
well as its current initiatives designed to empower it to directly enforce
certain provisions of the Companies Law.73 5 In notable contrast to some
U.S. state bureaucracies, which may support interest-group legislation
that benefits local constituencies and yet still be constrained by
competitive capital and chartering markets,736 the ISA seems to try to
stimulate investment activity in the local capital market through
mandatory regulation. Given the absence of jurisdictional competition,
the ISA's involvement in the legislative process of the Israeli corporate
law can be perceived as a counterbalance to the pressures being exerted
by other interest groups, particularly managers and control holders.7 37
B. The Role Played by the Media
Political theorists have long pointed to the importance of the media
and so-called salience, i.e. public visibility, in constraining special
interest legislation.738 As the Israeli experience shows, however, the
actual role played by the media is somewhat more complex than that.
732. See supra notes 429-31 and accompanying text.
733. See supra Part III.B for the involvement of the ISA in particular arrangements.
734. See Interviews with Davida Lahman-Messer, supra note 223; Prof. Uriel
Procaccia, supra note 192.
735. See supra text accompanying note 661.
736. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
737. Cf Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 53, at 610 (discussing the advantages of
mandatory federal law and noting that a federal regulator could allocate "more
resources for developing and implementing legal rules that would enhance shareholder
wealth in publicly traded companies").
738. See supra Part I.A.
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To begin with, while well-reported market scandals may lead to
legislative action that ostensibly benefits the public by regulating
various market activities, the efficiency of such initiatives is not always
obvious.73 9 Moreover, once the media turmoil dissipates, the affected
groups invariably act to reshape and mitigate the legal arrangements so
as to restore some of their temporarily slighted interests.740
It also needs to be noted in this regard that, in Israel at least,
corporate law issues tend to receive only superficial coverage; for
journalists often simply take the interest groups' press releases at face
value. This enables those groups to use the media not so much to
convince the public, but rather to influence decision-makers, public
officials, and legislators.74' Put in the words of a representative of the
Manufacturers' Association: "When we deal with such issues we use the
media, because although the MKs know it was written by us - we do not
conceal this fact - still, when you read it in the newspaper it has a more
significant effect. 742
When one adds to the above the loose working methods of
parliamentary committees in Israel743 and the easy access certain interest
groups have to politicians,744 one begins to doubt whether that chief
mechanism offered to us by political theory as a means to overcome, or
at least to reduce, the influence of interest groups on legislators -
namely, regular media coverage - is really is all that it has been cracked
up to be, at least when it comes to corporate legislation.745 If anything,
interest groups make use of the media to communicate their interests to
legislatures. It takes coverage of market crises and major scandals to
initiate legislation, which sometimes yields questionable results.7 46
739. See supra Part III.B.2.
740. See supra Part III.B.3. This phenomenon is consistent with one of the
conclusions reached by Schlozman and Tierney, according to which, interest groups
would have greater influence on narrow, specific, and technical amendments than on
the entire legislation. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
741. See Interview with Shuki Abramovich, supra note 297.
742. Id. (translated freely by author).
743. See supra notes 241-54 and accompanying text.
744. See supra text accompanying notes 567-73, 586-89.
745. Cf Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 44, at 490-503;
Romano, supra note 42, at 297-300 (recording the absence of public opinion on the
issues of takeovers and futures trading in the United States).
746. See Hadas Magen, Lahman-Messer: Only in the Days of the Messiah
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C. Legislators' Ideology
Critics of interest-group theory seeking to debunk the notion of
self-interested lawmakers have suggested that legislators in fact have
their own particular viewpoint of the public interest, i.e. their personal
ideology.74 7  Later models of political theory, however, have treated
legislators' personal ideology as a form of consumption by legislators,
as distinct from "real" general interest policies that are hardly
prevalent.748
The case of the Israeli corporate law strongly reaffirms the
significance of personal ideology in corporate legislation. There is
general agreement among the participants in the legislative process that
produced the new law that both the Barak Committee members and the
Justice Ministry representatives acted out of a deep commitment to
promote the public interest as they envisioned it.749 It is indeed arguable
that this fact can furnish an additional explanation for various key
aspects of the legislative process, such as the shift from bright-line rules
to standards during the deliberations of the Barak Committee, 750 and the
refusal of the Justice Ministry to extend the regulation to related
companies. 5 Since neither the Barak Committee members nor the
Justice Ministry representatives were elected officials, they were less
accountable to voters than legislators and, hence, enjoyed greater policy
discretion, also known as slack.752 Theoretically, such slack could have
Companies' Owners will Disclose how They Appoint Directors, GLOBES ELECTRONIC
ARCHIVE (Dec. 31, 2003) (quoting Davida Lahman-Messer, Deputy Attorney General,
who noted cynically that with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the legislators
of the Israeli Companies Law were relieved since, finally, there was a law that was
worse than the Companies Law).
747. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 893-901 (underscoring the importance
of a legislator's personal ideology is shaping that legislator's conduct). But see Jerry L.
Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-
KENT. L. REv. 123, 143-49 (1989) (describing the methodological problems in
measuring ideology and questioning its importance).
748. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
749. Davida Lahman-Messer, Deputy Attorney General, who is the person most
identified with the formulation of the law, was recently referred to as "the lobbyist of
the public good." See Zvi Lavi, Professor Procaccia and His Fight Against the
Lobbyists, GLOBES ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE (Sep. 11, 2003).
750. See supra Part III.B. 1.
751. See supra text accompanying note 547.
752. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 29, at 176-77.
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been equally useful in implementing either special-interest policies that
would have allowed the lawmakers to retain power or to enhance their
wealth, or other policies that would have furthered the public good as
they conceived it.753  Although motivations are always difficult to
ascertain, the fact that there are other plausible justifications to be made
of the above-mentioned modifications,"' and that there were no obvious
self-interested advantages to be derived from them, seems to infer that
we have personal ideology, rather than special interests, to thank for the
drafting alterations.755
When one contemplates the notion of personal ideology and draws
the distinction between the regulator's own view of the public interest
and a general-interest policy, i.e. one that would be ratified by the public
absent monitoring costs, the issue of the normative value of personal
ideology is inevitably raised. The issue begins to seem all the more
pressing when one acknowledges that not even general interest policies
are necessarily efficient or normatively warranted.756 This all brings us
to the next section, which is devoted to a broader discussion of the
normative implications of interest-group theory for corporate legislation.
D. Normative Implications for Corporate Law
It has been asserted by some critics of interest-group theory (who
have noted how often such theory, when used in isolation from a
normative baseline, produces misleading conclusions) that sound
753. See id. at 176-82.
754. The shift from bright-line rules to standards was justified by the conception that
the development of substantive law by the courts will enable flexible and pragmatic
solutions for companies. See supra notes 543-44 and accompanying text. The refusal to
regulate the issue of related companies was justified by the fear that regulation would
enable control holders to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders.
See THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE COMMITTEE, ON THE
MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 1995, 14TH KNESSET, 3RD SESS., PROTOCOL No. 20
(Feb. 19, 1998).
755. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 29, at 181-82; cf Roe, supra note 54, at
2538-39 (contending that the internal affair norm, which defers the regulation of the
relationships among shareholders, and between shareholders to managers, to the state of
incorporation, is driven by deference to manager-shareholder interests, as much as it is
driven by personal ideology).
756. See supra note 35.
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conclusions as to the "disproportionality" of a group's influence must be
built upon a normative baseline showing the appropriate amount of
influence by minority and majority groups.757  In the context of
corporate law, however, this difficulty is mitigated by the widely
accepted view that the normative baseline against which a legislative act
is to be measured is that of efficiency - which is to say the maximization
of shareholder wealth.758 And yet, this still leaves open the question of
how the efficiency of legal provisions can best be measured.
For some time now, this question has been debated in the United
States, as part of the ongoing and heated discussion of the efficiency (or
lack thereof) of interstate competition for corporate charters. The
corporate law of Delaware, the indisputable winner of that competition,
has been found to be efficient based on empirical assessments of the
value-enhancing effect of state law on the firms incorporated within it.
75 9
From a theoretical perspective, Delaware's gaining of the laurel wreath
in that race-to-the-top has been explained as resulting from the
combination of robust capital markets and flexible and enabling legal
arrangements. 760 Despite the fact that recent papers entering into the
debate on state competition for corporate charters have raised doubts
about both the viability of competition and the efficiency of Delaware's
rules, given that state's considerable market power, none of those
arguments seems to have undercut the simple assertion that competition
plays a vital role in working to uphold shareholder interests and in
757. See Elhauge, supra note 35, at 48-59 (noting that the normative baseline can
represent a standard of social desirability - such as influence in proportion to numbers,
equality of results, equality of opportunity, or distributive justice - or some efficiency
standard - such as wealth maximization, Pareto efficiency, or utility maximization); cf
Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 63
(1990) (criticizing welfare economics and the public choice effort to explain inefficient
legislation).
758. Cf supra note 21.
759. For an overview of the debate and the different empirical studies, see ROMANO,
supra note 48; Romano, The Needfor Competition, supra note 51, at 494-507. See also
Daines, supra note 1.
760. See ROMANO, supra note 48. See also Strine, supra note 534, at 1263
("[L]arge, publicly traded corporations rationally choose Delaware law because its
preference for flexibility rather than rigidity allows corporate boards to structure
corporate transactions in a manner best tailored to the particular circumstances their
corporations face.").
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limiting the power of interest groups. 6
When one attempts to assess the efficiency of corporate law
provisions within a unitary system such as Israel's that is more devoid,
at least "in house," of jurisdictional competition, the efficacy of the
product is less obvious.7 62 A national noncompetitive regulator will, by
the inherent logic of the situation, have less incentive to furnish its
corporations with the most efficient regime than will a competitive
regulator. Indeed the U.S. legal regime, characterized as it is by the
unique feature of charter competition, has been proved to provide
corporations with better shareholder protection and better developed
capital markets than the corporate law of any other country.763
The preceding does not in any way imply, however, that
transplanting American corporate law to other countries would yield
efficient results.7 6  Indeed, given institutional differences, such as
concentrated ownership, an unspecialized judicial system, and
inefficient markets, any attempt to replicate such efficient U.S. legal
arrangements as enabling provisions in countries such as Israel might
prove to be rash.765 It also should be noted that, in contrast to those
mandatory provisions found in European corporate laws that have been
attributed to the participation in the legislative process of creditors,
managers, and employees,766 in Israel the vast majority of mandatory
761. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 53, at 610 ("State rules do provide a
potentially valuable safety valve that protects against huge deviations of corporate law
from optimality.") (referring to Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulations, 107 YALE L. J. 2359, 2387 (1998)); Kahan &
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition, supra note 53, at 735 ("[W]e conclude that
Delaware tends to offer more protection to shareholders than non-competing
states .... )_
762. Cf Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 53, at 599-604 (asserting that in order to
maintain its monopoly position, Delaware biases its laws in favor of judge-made, open-
ended standards that produce efficiency costs); Kahan & Kamar, the Myth of State
Competition, supra note 53, at 739-42 (claiming that the lack of competition causes
Delaware law to be less predictable but more innovative than it would be in the
presence of competition).
763. See Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 5 1, at 542-43.
764. See Procaccia, supra note 187, at 303-04.
765. Note that, at least in the case of Israel, the hypothesis offered by Professor
Procaccia about the development of a competition among the charters of the different
corporations did not materialize.
766. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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provisions were initiated by regulators.16' There have been only a few
instances in which interest groups other than the regulators, most
notably banks, have made use of mandatory provisions to protect their
interests - such as in the case of mergers, and with regard to a creditor's
right to file a derivative suit in the case of prohibited distributions.768
More commonly, such groups have striven to mitigate the mandatory
provisions in ways that suit their needs.769 It is noteworthy in that
context that both regulators and other interest groups have used market
failure (or lack of market failure) rhetoric to back up their views 770 - a
tactic that comes as no surprise to those political theorists who have long
pointed to the use of public-interest rhetoric by legislators in an attempt
to economize monitoring costs by generating public support for their
agendas.771
No empirical research exists attesting to the impact of The
Companies Law, 1999, on the value of a firm. There are, however, some
studies by the ISA's Economic Department which show that regulatory
intervention in voting-rights issues, and in requiring mutual fund
managers to participate in general meetings of shareholders,7 has
curtailed the ability of control holders to personally benefit at the
expense of outside shareholders. 73 Other empirical work indicates that
767. The reference is to the rules of veil piercing, voting by proxy, the separation
between the chairperson and the CEO, conflict of interest transactions, independent
directors, warranted distribution, and mergers and acquisitions. For a description of
these rules, see supra Part III.A.3. The initiating regulators were the Barak Committee
members and the Justice Ministry representatives, both acting out of personal ideology,
and the ISA, whose involvement in corporate legislation may demonstrate what
Bebchuk and Hamdani would refer to as an action of "loyal officials" who spend
"resources for developing and implementing legal rules that would enhance shareholder
wealth in publicly traded companies." See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 53, at 610.
768. See, respectively, supra text accompanying notes 507 and 431.
769. See supra Part III.B.3.
770. See, e.g., THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, ON THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES BILL, 1995, 13TH KNESSET, 5TH SESS.,
PROTOCOL No. 1, 32 (Dec. 24, 1995) (in his opening statement to the Subcommittee, the
representative of the Association of Publicly Traded Companies stated that according to
his perception, most market failures are temporary and therefore should not necessarily
be regulated by the Companies Law).
771. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
772. See supra note 588.
773. See RUTI DAHAN & SHMUEL HAUZER, ISRAEL SECURITIES AUTHORITY, THE
CONNECTION BETWEEN QUALITY OF MONITORING, VOTING RIGHTS IN SHARES, AND
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the very nature of the corporate governance and ownership structure in
Israel negatively impacts the quality of firms and shareholder
protection.774 While these studies were conducted prior to February of
2000 when the new Companies Law came into force, their observations
with respect to Israel's ownership structure and the general
characteristics of its capital market surely remain relevant to the current
state of affairs. 75
This brings us back to political theory. Although the efficiency of
the new law has yet to be measured, evidence of the involvement of
interest groups throughout the stages of the legislative process as well as
its effect on the end product may have probative value.776 It may
provide us with some information indicating which legal arrangements
came into being as a consequence of an arms-length struggle between
the various interest groups and which were born out of a single, narrow,
one-sided interest. Political theory predicts that the arrangements that
were intensely fought over by a number of parties will be less
susceptible to the disproportionate influence of one interest group,777
and, as such, are more normatively desirable.
This paper has shown that the mandatory provisions of the new
Israeli corporate law were a result of market scandals, the empowerment
and improvement in the status of the ISA, and the responsiveness of the
Barak Committee to the legislative initiatives advanced by certain MKs.
The law's mitigating provisions, on the other hand, generally were the
result of concessions made by the various interests involved in the
process as a response to managers and control holders' call for restoring
some of their interests. Similarly, delegating authority to the Minister of
Justice has been used both to create gradual change and to overcome
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN A COMPANY (1997); SHMUEL HAUZER, YEHUDIT ROZENBERG
& SHARON OFIR, ISRAEL SECURITIES AUTHORITY, TESTING THE EFFICIENCY CAUSED
FROM THE DUTY OF PARTICIPATION OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE GENERAL MEETINGS OF
PUBLIC COMPANIES (1999).
774. See Blass et al., supra note 104, at 84-86. See also La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, supra note 2; La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 72, at 492,
501; La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, supra note 72.
775. See supra Part II.A.
776. Cf Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of
Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 123, 145-46 (1989) (making this argument when
explaining the importance of public choice theory to the analysis of public law).
777. See supra Part I.A.
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potential impasses in the Parliamentary Subcommittee. As for the shift
from bright-line rules to standards, it at least in part seems to stem from
the internal dynamics of the Barak Committee rather than from
efficiency considerations.
Given these findings, one begins to see the importance of striking
an appropriate balance among the various interests involved in shaping
corporate legislation. To ignore certain groups at certain stages of the
legislative process is only to risk having to later witness a resurgence of
their narrow interests. Indeed, had more interest groups voiced their
opinions during the Barak Committee meetings, the parliamentary stage
of the legislative process might have been less polemic. Nonetheless,
the overall outcome - which is to say, the arrangements put in place by
the Companies Law, 1999 - can be deemed normatively warranted
(even if still far from optimal)77 when viewed from a political theory
perspective, since they do reflect the interests of a wide range of
groups.779 In this respect, the legislative process that gave birth to the
new law tends to considerably outshine the post-enactment
developments.78 ° It can also be asserted on the basis of our findings that
when a legislature is ill informed, and when the media is not doing their
hoped-for job of constraining interest groups, the significance of a
public regulator who acts as a professional and impartial mediator
cannot be overstated. Such is the case even when the price to be paid is
some deference to the regulator's personal ideology.1
8 1
In summary, the implication of political theory for corporate law is
that distinct market and political realities affect the likelihood both that a
successful piece of legislation will be fashioned such that it is approved
by the legislature and successfully enforced by the courts and the
administrative agencies, and that its various different legal arrangements
will prove to be efficacious. This paper has no reason to quarrel with
those American legal scholars who assure us that vigorous competition,
which constrains the power of interest groups, is the ultimate generator
of shareholder wealth. It does however insist that in the absence of such
vigor, a more highly regulated market is quite certainly the second-best
778. See infra Part V.E.
779. See supra Part III.C.
780. See supra Part III.B.3(b).
781. In comparison to the United States, in the absence of interstate competition, the
public regulator may be seen as the closest substitute for the corporate bar as the driving
force behind statutory reform.
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way we have of reaching this goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.
Indeed, it goes one step further, suggesting that such tighter regulation
may well be the only modality by which we can ensure the formation of
competitive markets in the long run.782
E. Policy Recommendations
As noted earlier in this paper,783 legal scholars, facing interest-
group theory and the fact that "interest groups can be expected to exert
disproportionate influence over outcomes, 784 have begun to focus upon
the role played by the judiciary in ensuring or attempting to ensure a
public-regarding application of the law.785 Be that as it may, in the case
of corporate law it nonetheless remains true that the main factors
affecting the desirability of resorting to a judicial decision are the
expertise of judges and the judicial system's ability to furnish timely
decisions. Thus, improving the quality of the enforcement of corporate
law by the courts may necessitate an overall institutional reform. Too
often, however, such reform simply is not feasible, given the political
and economic restraints found in many countries. In such cases the onus
inevitably falls back onto the shoulders of the legislature.
When one looks at legislative reform from the perspective of
institutional design, two issues loom largest. First, the market structure
of a country is likely to reflect the groups most prone to intervene in the
legislative process and those parts of the legislation that they seek to
influence. Preliminary planning of the legislative process' procedure -
whether such process is undertaken by a governmental ministry or a
parliamentary committee - can serve to attenuate the ability of interest
groups to obtain significant benefits at the expense of other groups
and/or the public at large. Such planning is especially vital when it
782. Cf La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, supra note
2, at 29 (noting that the regulation of financial markets is required in order to encourage
their development and to improve investor protection).
783. See supra note 18.
784. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 901.
785. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29 (1985); Macey, supra note 23; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without
Romance: Implication of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275 (1988).
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comes to such a complex matter as corporate law, for it can reduce the
ability and/or the incentive of interest groups to gain control of the flow
of information to the legislature.
In this regard, we can draw some instruction from everyday
experience, for it suggests that when people are making a mutual effort,
they tend to look hopefully toward the project's outcome rather than
frontally attack it, even when the output of the mutual effort differs
substantially from each individual's input. When, by contrast, a party is
excluded, no binding loyalties or understandings can later induce it to
accept the outcome of a process of which it was not a part. Indeed, the
vigorous participation of the various interest groups who sat in on the
meetings of the Parliamentary Subcommittee quite certainly occurred as
an upshot of their absence from the meetings of the Barak Committee.
Such participation perhaps also contributed to the reopening of previous
understandings between the bodies that did take part in the earlier stage
of the legislative process: the Justice Ministry and the ISA. In other
words, the legislative process that produced the new Israeli Companies
Law might have been less costly, and would maybe have produced
different legal arrangements, at least on the margin, had more careful
consideration been given at the outset to which groups would take an
interest in the legislation's outcomes, and hence should have been
included in early stages of its formulation. It seems likely that if more
participants in the process had been given the chance to consistently
deliberate, rather than just haphazardly comment, on Professor
Procaccia's proposal, they would then have been able to choose from
among a wider array of legal arrangements and to articulate certain
practical reservations to theoretical suggestions. Correspondingly, the
concessions made by the various interest groups could have resulted in
stricter enabling provisions, instead of mitigating mandatory legal
arrangements with the former structure then proving in the long run to
be the best way of fostering competition for corporate charters.
Second, with regard to the substance of legislative reform, much
thought must be given, as it seemingly too rarely is, to the basic question
of whether a particular reform is politically feasible, i.e. likely to survive
the different stages of the legislative process. History suggests that
feasible reforms are either those built around tradeoffs that serve to
separate existing coalitions and interests, or those that make the market
more -competitive and thereby undercut the ability of existing groups to
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oppose the change.786
Within the context of corporate law, it seems that the group most
likely to resist pro-investor reforms is corporate managers (and in
concentrated markets control holders as well) because this is the group
that stands to suffer the greatest direct losses as a result of such reforms.
The Israeli experience affirms this observation. It also indicates that
tradeoffs constitute one inevitable aspect of any effective legislative
reform. One finds it hard to imagine, for instance, that the interim
recommendations of the Barak Committee with regard to manager and
director duties - recommendations that included, among others, the
creation of a special mechanism designated to oversee conflict of
interest transactions - would have been enacted had it not been for the
provisions pertaining to insurance and indemnification that accompanied
them.787 As for the provisions pertaining to veil piercing and the
separation between the chairperson and the CEO, these have been
attenuated, owing to those managers' objections that have led to the
recent amendment to the Companies Law. As more than one of the
participants in the legislative process that produced that law has
conceded: The best is the enemy of the good.
Finally, the new Israeli corporate law may illustrate a noteworthy
path toward the implementation of effective reforms in countries whose
capital markets are not well developed and where ownership is fairly
concentrated. It seems that, at least under these circumstances, one way
to constrain managers and control holders is to empower another interest
group - be it an administrative agency, a political entrepreneur, or a
"loyal" public official - to pursue public-regarding goals. With time this
group could be expected to accumulate sufficient political power to
counterbalance the pressures exerted by other interest groups.
786. Cf La Porta et. al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, supra note
2, at 25 ("Consistent with the dominance of interest group politics, successful reforms
have occurred only when the special interests could be destroyed or appeased.").
787. For a description of the events that led to the enactment of these arrangements,
see supra text accompanying notes 575-83.
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APPENDIX A: MAIN AMENDMENTS IN THE ISRAELI
CORPORATE LAW AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS OF
THE COMPANIES LAW OF 1999788
1929 - Companies Ordinance
Enacted under the British Mandate, the Ordinance was an
almost verbatim copy of the English Companies Act of 1929.
It was amended various times before and after the
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.
1982 - The Minister of Justice asked Professor Procaccia of the Law
Faculty of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to draft a new
and cohesive corporate code.
1983 - Companies Ordinance [New Version]
An official translation into Hebrew of the original Ordinance,
this version replaced the former ordinance, but did not divert
from its common law origins. It was amended several times,
most notably with regard to the issues of independent
directors (1987) and the fiduciary duties of Managers and
Directors (1991).
1985 - The Minister of Justice appointed a public committee chaired
by then Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak that based its
work on Professor Procaccia's proposal. A portion of the
committee's recommendations was implemented as
amendments to the corporate ordinance, e.g., the above-
mentioned 1991 amendment.
1994 - The Barak Committee submitted its report to the Minister of
Justice. The report was adopted by the Ministers' Committee
for Legislation and submitted to the Knesset as the Companies
Bill, 1995. Thereafter, the Knesset approved the blueprint at
"first reading" - the first stage of a tripartite legislative
788. This overview is largely based on the official explanation accompanying the
Companies Bill, 1995. See also Procaccia, Crafting a Corporate Code from Scratch, 17
CARDozo L. REV. 629 (1996).
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procedure. Following its passing, the bill was referred to a
parliamentary committee that drafted it into legislation.
1999 - The Companies Law passed the second and third readings at
the Knesset on April 19, 2000.
2000 - The Companies Law came into force as of February 1, 2000.
2002 - The Companies Bill (Amendment), 2002, was approved by
the Knesset at first reading on July 1, 2002.
2003 - The Companies Bill (Amendment - encouragement of
incorporation in Israel), 2003, passed the primary reading at
the Knesset on May 21, 2003.
2004 - The Companies Bill (Amendment No. 3) (Qualification of
Outside Directors), 2004, was approved by the Knesset at first
reading on November 15, 2004.
2005 - The Companies Law (Amendment No. 3) passed the second
and third readings at the Knesset on March 7, 2005.
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS
1. Prof. Uriel Procaccia, of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of
Law, drafted the original proposal, which was the basis for the work of the
Barak Committee, in Jerusalem, Israel (July 29, 2002).
Members of the Barak Committee:
2. President Aharon Barak, the Supreme Court of Israel, in New Haven, CT
(Sep. 28, 2002).
3. Amihud Ben-Porat, Ben-Porath, Hamou & Co. Law Offices, in Tel Aviv,
Israel (July 12, 2002).
4. Prof. Joseph H. Gross, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law and Gross,
Klienhendler, Hodak, Halevy, Greenberg & Co. Law Offices, in Tel Aviv,
Israel (July 24, 28, 2002).
5. Prof. Meir Het, Chairperson of the TASE Board of Directors at the time of
the appointment, and later Chairperson of Bank Leumi, in Tel Aviv, Israel
(July 1, 2002).
6. Zeev Sher, then Legal Adviser of Bank Leumi, in Jerusalem, Israel (July
29, 2002).
Organizers of the Barak Committee:
7. Davida Lahman-Messer, Deputy Attorney General, the Justice Ministry, in
Jerusalem, Israel (Aug. 11, 2002).
8. Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, then the Justice Ministry, in Jerusalem,
Israel (July 29, 2002).
Participants in the Barak Committee:
9. Sam Bronfeld, Managing Director, the TASE, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 17,
2002).
10. Arie Mientkavich, then Chairperson of the ISA, in Tel Aviv, Israel (Aug.
9, 2002).
11. Dr. Shimon Wise, then Legal Adviser of the ISA, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July
31, 2002).
The Knesset Subcommittee of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee on
the matter of the Corporations Bill, 1995:
12. Dan Meridor, Chairperson of the Parliamentary Subcommittee during the
13th Knesset, telephone interview (July 7, 2002).
13. Eliezer Sandberg, Chairperson of the Parliamentary Subcommittee during
the 14th Knesset, in Jerusalem, Israel (July 9, 2002).
14. Eran Rosman, then the Justice Ministry, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 22,
2002).
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15. Shuki Abramovich, Director of the Economy Division, the Manufacturers'
Association of Israel, in Tel Aviv, Israel (Aug. 12, 2002).
16. Michel Ohayon, the Israeli Bar, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 23, Aug. 12,
2002).
17. Amir Sharf, Deputy Director of the Legal Department, the ISA, in Tel
Aviv, Israel (July 12, 2002).
18. Ruth Shikler, Deputy Chief Legal Adviser, Bank Leumi, Representative of
the Banks' Association, in Tel Aviv, Israel (August 13, 2002).
19. Nathan Shilo, Legal Adviser, the Association of Publicly Traded
Companies, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 14, 2002).
20. Gad Soen, Managing Director, the Association of Publicly Traded
Companies, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 8, 2002).
21. Dr. Omri Yadlin, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law, Representative of
the Manufacturers' Association of Israel, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 7,
2002).
Others:
22. Dr. Eyal Sulgenik, Chief Accountant, the ISA, in Tel Aviv, Israel (July 7,
2002).
23. Dr. Reuven Y. Hazan, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of
Political Science, in Jerusalem, Israel (July 9, 2002).
24. Dr. Menachem Hofnung, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department
of Political Science, in Jerusalem, Israel (July 10, 2002).
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF MAJOR MODIFICATIONS MADE DURING THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Issue The Companies Professor Procaccia's The Companies Bill, The Companies Law, The Companies
Ordinance [New Proposal 1995 1999 (modifications Law (Amendment
Version], 1983 + from the 1995 Bill) No. 3), 2005
Israeli Common
Law
Piercing 1. No general I. Discarding the I. Defining the I. Adopting I, Setting forth
the reference in the existing statutory concept of veil undercapitalization as a reduced and
Corpor- Ordinance, only causes for piercing the piercing, an explicit cause for exhaustive list of
ate Veil particular cases in corporate veil. 2. Listing, as non- piercing the corporate cases for piercing
which 2. Codifying the exhaustive examples, veil. the corporate veil.
shareholders or judicial causes of the cases in which the 2. Enabling the 2. Abolishing
managers should circumventing the law court may pierce the court to restrict the the option of
be held personally and creditors' deceit, corporate veil: where future occupation of piercing the
liable for their and adding an there exists a statutory shareholders or corporate veil for
companies' debt, independent cause of stipulation, or intent to managers and managers and
such as in the case undercapitalization, abuse the law, or to directors, to whom it directors.
of misusing the 3. Introducing the deceive or deprive a attributes the 3. Adding a
company's seal or doctrine of equitable person. company's duties, knowledge qualifier
managing the subordination. 3. Recognizing the in connection with
business of a 4. Imposing subordination of a the attribution of
dissolving personal liability on shareholder's debt. the company's
company managers and 4. Acknowledging duties to a
fraudulently. directors in the the court's power to shareholder.
2. Common specific case of pierce the corporate
law doctrine, breaching the veil for managers and
including reporting duties of the directors under the
enterprise theory. company. same causes
mentioned above.
5. Rich with
standards.
Share- 1. No 1. Creating an I. Establishing the I. Embracing a 1. Imposing the
holder reference in the enabling proxy ownership right of an limited version of the costs of the
Activism Ordinance; general process that regulates investor in the share, mechanism set forth authorization of
principles of voting by proxy, 2. Adopting the by the 1995 bill. share ownership on
agency apply to shareholder proposals proxy process 2. Confining the exchange subject to
the situation of and inspection rights proposed by Prof. subjects on which a determination by
voting by proxy. in a manner similar to Procaccia, but making shareholders of a the Minister of
2. In practice, the American legal it mandatory for public company may Justice of
no voting of arrangements on the public companies, vote in writing. circumstances in
dispersed issue. 3. Leaving a wide which ownership
shareholders since, discretion to the authorization will
legally, ownership Minister of Justice to require a fee.
of shares belonged regulate substantive
to a registration questions.
company rather 4. The mechanism
than to investors. will come into force
only after the
publication of the
regulations regarding
its implementation;
these haven't been
published yet.
Chair- I. No 1. Suggesting an I. Setting that in a I. Stating that I. Permitting an
person/ reference in the enabling arrangement public company the notwithstanding the override also in
CEO Ordinance. according to which: board chairperson will said provision, the cases where the
2. A common first, in any company not act as the CEO and general meeting of the number of
practice for public (public or private) that will not have the shareholders may dissenting non-
companies to have has more than three CEO's powers. authorize the control
their chairperson directors, the CEO chairperson to act as shareholders does
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Law
act as their CEO. will not act as the the CEO for a period not exceed 1% of
chairperson; and of up to 3 years, if the the overall voting
second, that in every majority vote included rights in the
public company, the 2/3 of the non- company
chairperson would be controlling 2. Clarifying
elected from among shareholders, that the general
the independent meeting may use its
directors. authority
repeatedl
Delegat- 1. No 1. No elaboration I. Delegation is I. Reducing the
ion to reference in the of the issues that can acceptable unless the list of the issues
Commit- Ordinance. or cannot be bylaws state that the board
tee of the delegated, otherwise, cannot delegate to
Board 2. Suggesting that 2. Listing the its committees.
the law should not issues that the board
include a provision cannot delegate to the
that enables delegation active management.
but rather, that a 3. Listing the
company that wishes issues that the board
to delegate powers to cannot delegate to a
board committees will committee, but for its
declare so explicitly in recommendation.
its bylaws.
Share- 1. No I. Requiring that I. Extending the 1. While 1. Reducing the
holder reference in the control holders duty to act in good maintaining the duty list of transactions
Duties Ordinance except exercise their control faith and with fairness of any shareholder to that require special
the prohibition to in good faith and in an to any shareholder in act in good faith and approvals,
act in a way that accepted way. the company. in an accepted way, 2. Applying the
oppresses other 2. Applying the 2. Establishing the fairness duty is special approval
shareholders, same duty to any that a shareholder imposed only on mechanism
2. Common shareholder or other should avoid using a control holders and required with
law doctrine constituency member company's business shareholders whose respect to the
regarding whose actions are opportunity if it might vote is decisive, employment of a
fiduciary duties pivotal to the harm the company's 2. Omitting the control holder by
that apply to company's operation. interest duty imposed on the company also to
control holders 3. Adopting a shareholders to avoid the employment of
who sell their procedural mechanism misusing the a relative of such
shares (Cosoi). for approving irregular company's business control holder by
3. Securities conflict of interest opportunities. the company.
Regulations transactions, not only 3. Applying the
(conflict of with regard to control procedural mechanism
interest between holders but also with for approving irregular
a listed company regard to any conflict of interest
and its control shareholder, transactions only to
holders), 1994 - control holders rather
setting a special than any shareholder.
procedural 4. Instead of
mechanism for exempting from the
approving special approval
irregular conflict procedure a certain,
of interest concrete, closed list of
transactions. transactions,
delegating the
authority to exempt
certain types of
transactions to the
Minister of Justice.
Derivat- I. No I. Codifying and Adopting Prof. 1. Facilitating the I. Setting that
ive Suit reference in the elaborating the Procaccia's proposal submission of class the fees of the
and Class Ordinance. mechanisms for and the Securities actions, compared to plaintiff's attorney
Action 2. Common derivative suit and Law's provisions in the former in a derivative suit
law doctrine class action, establishing extensive arrangement, will be set by the
THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF
CORPORATE LEGISLATION
Issue The Companies Professor Procaccia's The Companies Bill, The Companies Law, The Companies
Ordinance [New Proposal 1995 1999 (modifications Law (Amendment
Version], 1983 + from the 1995 Bill) No. 3), 2005
Israeli Common
Law
regarding 2. Regarding arrangements for court and paid by
derivative suits, derivative suits: the derivative suits and the company,
3. General right to file a suit is class actions in both unless the court
civil procedure and given to any public and private decides for special
the Securities Law shareholder or companies. reasons that the
- regulating class director; there is a 2. Extending the plaintiff should pay
actions, demand requirement; right to file a its attorney's fees.
and, contrary to derivative suit in the
former law, there is no specific case of a
contemporaneous prohibited distribution
ownership also to creditors.
prerequisite. 3. As opposed to
3. Providing a Prof Procaccia's
pecuniary incentive to proposal, the decision
file both derivative whether to grant
and class action suits reimbursement to the
to the plaintiff itself plaintiff and the
rather than to its amount of
attorney and setting reimbursement is left
the reimbursement at a to the discretion of the
fixed rate. court.
I. Requiring
every public
company to
appoint at least
two independent
directors to its
board, to have at
least one
independent
director on each of
the board's
committees, and to
have an audit
committee
consisting of all
the independent
directors.
2. An
independent
director was
defined as a
resident of Israel,
who did not have
an economic
relation to the
company or its
related company
and did not have a
material
connection to the
company's
business
management.
3. Establishing
an extemal
statutory
committee
composed of a
judge, the head of
the ISA. and the
1. Suggesting a
model for public
companies that
enables the company
to choose among two
altematives: a board in
which the majority of
the members is
independent or a board
with a monitoring
committee that is
composed of at least
three members, all of
them independent, and
that has the powers
conferred under
American law to the
audit, compensation,
and nomination
committees.
1. Taking after the
arrangement
established by the
Companies Ordinance,
but imposing the duty
to appoint independent
directors on the
company rather than
on an external
statutory committee.
I. Establishing
that the independent
directors are to be
appointed by the
general meeting of the
shareholders under a
procedure similar to
the one required for
approving conflict of
interest transactions.
2. Mitigating the
qualifying conditions
for independent
directors.
1. Further
narrowing the list
of people who
cannot be appointed
as independent
directors because of
their relation to the
company.
2. Providing
that at least one of
the outside
directors appointed
by a public
company should
have accounting
and financial
expertise and that
the rest of the
outside directors
should have a
professional
qualification.
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Law
chairperson of the
TASE, whose role
is to authorize the
appointment of
independent
directors suggested
I by the company.
Manager 1. Fiduciary 1. Influenced by 1. Following the 1. Eliminating the I. Further
& duties were the American concepts Ordinance's provision regarding excluding from the
Director acknowledged by of these issues, provisions with regard the duty of loyalty in definition of
Duties the Supreme Court to fiduciary duties of the special case of "personal interest"
and (Cosoi) and later managers and related companies, situations where a
Rights incorporated into directors, and which was suggested manager or director
the ordinance improving the by the Justice Ministry in a fully owned
together with procedural mechanism in consultation with subsidiary holds
indemnification for approving conflict Prof. Procaccia and shares or options in
and insurance of interest was added to the the parent
rights, transactions. Companies Bill, 1995, company, or where
2. The 2. Enhancing prior to its approval by a manager or
Ordinance further manager and director the Ministers' director serves on a
set a special rights. Committee for number of filly
procedural Legislation. owned subsidiaries
mechanism for 2. The only of the same
approving conflict remnant of this company.
of interest provision is the
transactions, exclusion from the
3. The ight of definition of a
independent "personal interest" of
directors for a manager or director
information and in a transaction - an
experts' aid was interest that
added to the necessitates a special
Ordinance as part approval mechanism
of the general of the transaction - a
arrangement situation where he or
regarding she serves on both a
independent company and its fully
directors. owned subsidiary.
Permiss- I. No explicit I. Defining the I. Adopting the I. Eliminates the
ible and provision actions that are general framework liquidity test.
Prohib- regarding the considered a dilution proposed by Prof. 2. Delegating to
ited preservation of the of the company's Procaccia but setting a the Minister of Justice
Distribut- company's capital. capital, be it through more restrictive the authority to set
ions 2. Establishing dividend, allocation of threshold: the return presumptions and
that a dividend can shares without an received from the exemptions with
be paid only out of appropriate return, or allocation of the regard to permissible
profits and that a the purchase of shares company's shares distributions.
company cannot by the company itself (including the
repurchase its own ("distribution"). premium) and any
shares. 2. Distinguishing profits that were
between permissible capitalized.
distributions and 2. Referring to
distributions that are "accepted accounting
prohibited, that is, rules" in defining
result in the reduction distributable profits
of the company's contrary to Prof.
capital below a certain Procaccia's proposal
threshold set by the to clearly define the
law. funds that can be
3. Setting the distributed.
threshold on the sum
of the company's
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Law
liabilities and "stated
capital", which
includes the stocks'
par value in addition
to any portion of the
premium that the
company did not
exclude and any
capitalized profits.
4. Setting two
additional
requirements for
permissible
distribution: solvency
and liquidity.
Director 1. No 1. Holding that the 1. Adopting the I, Extending
Liability reference in the relevant basis of arrangement suggested the legal
for Ordinance. accountability in the by Prof. Procaccia. presumption
Prohib- case of a prohibited regarding the type
ited distribution is guilt, of duty breached in
Distribut- but that in cases where the case of a
ion the director opposed prohibited
the distribution and distribution to
did all that could be include also duty of
done to prevent it, care, which, as
where the director opposed to duty of
relied in good faith on loyalty, is
misleading insurable.
information that 2. Providing,
would otherwise however, that
warrant the companies will not
distribution, or where be able to exempt a
he or she did not know director, in
and did not have advance, from
reason to know about liability in this case.
the distribution, the
presumption of breach
of duty of loyalty
would not apply.
M&A 1. Limited I. Prohibiting the 1. Diverging from I. Substantially 1. Clarifying
arrangements in acquisition of de facto Procaccia's proposal revising some of the that private
the Ordinance and control in a company only by enabling a 1995 bill provisions, purchase of control
in the Securities in ways other than creditor of the 2. With regard to need not be
Regulations through merger or company to apply to mergers, requiring, in cqnducted by way
(Tender Offer), tender offer and the court to delay or addition to the of a tender offer.
1994. forbidding the prevent a merger, and approval by the 2. Requiring the
obtaining of control by extending the shareholders' meeting acquirer of more
through piecemeal appraisal right of in each of the merging than 45% of the
purchase of shares. minority shareholders companies, an company's voting
2. Facilitating to any case of a approval of the merger rights to do so by a
mergers, including merger or tender offer by the boards of those tender offer, only if
statutory mergers, and by an existing control companies, and this there is not another
offering a new model holder, would not be given if person who holds
for takeovers that is there exists a the same amount of
based on the unforced reasonable doubt voting rights.
acceptance of the offer regarding the solvency 3. Revising the
by the majority of the of the acquiring shareholders'
shareholders. company, following voting rule on
3. Adopting a the merger. merger, so that
decision rule, 3. Requiring that a shareholders'
according to which, merging company approval of certain
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me snarenolders vote
on a merger or tender
offer will not include
the votes held by the
offeror.
4. Limiting
managers' and
directors' actions, in
the face of a tender
offer, to negotiating
the improvement of a
tender offer or
searching for a "white
knight."
5. Regulating
freeze out mergers by
granting an appraisal
right to minority
shareholders, who
hold less than 10% of
the company's shares,
in the case of a forced
sale of shares to the
control holder.
6. The proposal
does not regulate the
private sale of control.
send the merger
proposal to its secured
creditors and notify its
unsecured creditors
about it.
4. With regard to
takeovers, narrowing
down the requirement
that acquisitions of a
control block be
conducted exclusively
by way of a tender
offer, by applying it to
only two cases: where
no other person
already holds a control
block, or where as a
result of the purchase
the holdings of the
acquirer will exceed
45% and no other
shareholder holds
more than 50% of the
company's voting
rights.
5. Explicitly
exempting from the
application of the
above provision the
purchase of shares in a
private placement.
6. Conditioning a
special tender offer on
the acquiring of at
least 5% of the
company's voting
rights.
7. As for poison
pills, eliminating Prof.
Procaccia's proposal
to specifically ban
specific "suspected"
actions.
8. Providing for
appraisal rights for
minority shareholders
only in the case of a
freeze out merger.
types of merger is
no longer required.
4. Providing
that-the mere
holding of shares in
a merging company
that holds shares of
the other merging
company would not
count as a holding
in the other
company (a holding
that bans the
shareholder from
voting on the
merger).
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APPENDIX D: THE PARLIAMENTARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MATTER OF
THE COMPANIES BILL, 1995 - LIST OF INVITEES
Date of Just- ISA The Minis- The The The The The The Others
Meeting ice Comp- try of TASE Ass'n of Manuf- Banks Isra- Inst. of
789 Mini- anies Fina- Publicly acturers Ass'n eli CPAs
stry Regist- nce Traded Ass'n Bar
rar Comp-
anies
12/24/95 6 2 1 2 5 5 1 2 2 Procaccia
12/31/95 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 Procaccia
1/14/96 4 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 Procaccia
Ed Rock
1/21/96 4 2 2 2 2 I 3 1 Procaccia
1/28/96 4 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 1
2/4/96 5 3 1 I 4 2 1 1 1 Gross
Bank of
Israel
2/18/96 3 2 3 1 1 Gross
Bank of
Israel
11/18/96 3 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 2
Bank of
Israel
12/17/96 4 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 Bank of
Israel
1/7/97 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 Gross
1/14/97 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 The
Insurance
Compa-
nies'
Assoc-
iation (2)
MK
Shahal
2/11/97 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 The
(Gross) Institute
790 of Internal
Auditors(5)
2/18/97 4 2 2 1 3 I 1 1 3 The
(Gross) Institute
of Internal
Auditors
(4)
Bank of
Israel
789. The Parliamentary Subcommittee met in the course of two Knesset sittings.
During the 13th Knesset, the Subcommittee conducted seven sessions. In its next
cadence the Subcommittee conducted another thirty sessions.
790. Professor Joseph H. Gross, a member of the Barak Committee, participated in
some of the Parliamentary Subcommittee meetings. According to the Subcommittee
protocols, on the occasions noted, he represented the Institute of CPAs.
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Date of Just- ISA The Minis- The The The The The The Others
Meeting ice Comp- try of TASE Ass'n of Manuf- Banks Isra- Inst. of
789 Mini- anies Fina- Publicly acturers Ass'n eli CPAs
stry Regist- nce Traded Ass'n Bar
rar Comp-
anies
2/25/97 4 3 3 1 2 1 The
Institute
of Internal
Auditors
(3)
3/11/97 5 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
3/25/97 4 2 2 1 5 2 The
(Gross) Insurance
Compa-
nies'
Associat-
ion
The
Institute
of Internal
Auditors
4/8/97 4 4 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 The
Institute
oflnternal
Auditors
6/18/97 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2
7/1/97 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 Bank of
(Gross) Israel
7/8/97 3 2 1 1 3 1 1 I
8/6/97 4 3 1 3 2
8/7/97 2 3 3 1 2 1
12/2/97 3 3 1 1 2 1 2 IDI
12/22/97 3 5 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 Bank of
Israel
1/6/98 3 4 1 2 2 2 1
(Mient
kavich
2/8/98 3 6 1 1 3 1 1 2 3 (?)
2
professors
1 judge
2/19/98 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 IDI
3/10/98 3 5 1 1 3 1 2 3
3/15/98 3 4 1 2 1 2 2
7/7/98 3 5 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 1
7/14/98 3 7 1 1 3 2 1 I 1 1
Gross
7/21/98 4 4 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 Antitrust
Authority
Procaccia
Tax
advisors'
Bar
8/13/98 2 1 
1 2
8/23/98 3 3 3 2 1
791. The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) is an independent research center for
policy studies.
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Date of Just- ISA The Minis- The The The The The The Others
Meeting ice Comp- try of TASE Ass'n of Manuf- Banks Isra- Inst. of
789 Mini- anies Fina- Publicly acturers Ass'n eli CPAs
stry Regist- nce Traded Ass'n Bar
rar Comp-
anies
9/17/98 2 2 2 1 2 3 The
Institute
of Internal
Auditors
(3)
10/1/98 3 3 1 2 2 1 1 The
Institute
ofInternal
Auditors
(2)
l
10/27/98 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 The
(Gross) Institute
of Internal
Auditors
(6)
Tax
advisors'
Bar (2)
State
Comptrol-
ler (2)
Notes & Observations
